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Abstract 
Reduced wastewater disposal through reuse can provide improved environmental, economic and 
social outcomes. Under the Australian Constitution, states and territories have the power to make laws 
over water and therefore there is considerable variation in the approaches taken by various Australian 
jurisdictions to urban wastewater management, urban water industry governance, and the management 
of discharge environments including recreational water. This thesis considers whether urban water 
governance, environmental regulation and recreational water quality management impact decisions to 
either reuse urban wastewater or dispose of it to the environment, and identifies opportunities for 
reform. 
Chapter 2 reviews Australian urban wastewater management and environmental regulation and 
barriers to wastewater reuse. Australian water quality standards are contained in non-binding national 
guidelines which are applied by states in policies and licences granted under pollution control 
legislation. A range of barriers to wastewater recycling have been identified including an inability to 
account for the external impacts of water management.  
Chapter 3 follows with a case study of the decision process for a wastewater reuse scheme in 
Beaconsfield, Tasmania. Circumstances leading to recent reform of urban water management and 
historically poor environmental performance are described. These demonstrate how investment 
decisions are biased by urban wastewater governance, economic policies for pricing and profits, 
application of principles of competition in absence of competition, and the level of past investment. 
Chapter 4 considers how environmental management and other factors may impact assessment of 
costs and benefits of reuse. This is done by comparing the Chapter 3 case study (Beaconsfield) to 
wastewater reuse planning by Hunter Water (NSW) revealing that the feasibility of wastewater reuse 
technologies changes with the conditions in which the feasibility of reuse is framed; in Tasmania, 
different outcomes were observed under the same non-binding environmental guidelines and 
influences including 1) the comparative level of formality or transparency in the assessment 
processes, 2) the different drivers for wastewater reuse (environmental protection or water scarcity), 
and 3) the ability for environmental regulations to account for external impacts of wastewater 
disposal; providing new knowledge to this research area. 
In order to test an assumption within reuse feasibility assessments that effective Australian 
environmental regulations negate the economic impacts of discharge as a benefit from wastewater 
reuse, Chapter 5 examines Australian recreational water quality management, drawing on examples 
from the USA and more progressive Australian jurisdictions. This represents the first study of the 
legal efficacy of Australian recreational water management, also providing new knowledge. The 
chapter concludes that despite national guidelines, there remains high inter-jurisdictional variation in 
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recreational water quality management. Recommendations for reform include: 1) management actions 
based on single high samples, 2) consistent communication, 3) consistent microbiological limits, 4) 
consistent levels of acceptable health risk for primary and secondary recreational activities, and 5) 
model policy mechanisms to facilitate these. 
Two further case studies support the findings of Chapter 4. Firstly, Chapter 6 considers wastewater 
discharges by Melbourne Water Corporation at Gunnamatta beach in Victoria, Australia, identifying 
that even though the discharge was apparently compliant with legislation and policy, there was 
environmental degradation, a divergence from the national approach for recreational water quality 
management to a less accurate methodology, and a water authority that stated or implied that their 
discharge represented no risk to human health; all of which has the potential to affect bathers’ abilities 
to make informed and safe recreational choices. Secondly, in Chapter 7, management of Combined 
Sewage Overflows (CSO) in Tasmania and the USA are compared demonstrating that the application 
of non-binding national and state water quality guidelines has facilitated a parlous level of 
infrastructure investment. A case study of proposed US laws, which would require public notice when 
untreated effluent is disposed from CSOs, is put forward as a model for reform.  
Weaknesses in recreational water quality management and variation in the extent to which 
environmental regulations and monitoring programs account for impacts of wastewater disposal 
contradict the key assumption used when comparing economic costs and benefits of wastewater 
disposal and wastewater reuse. The assumption is that Australian environmental regulation is effective 
and therefore compliance reflects socially optimal conditions. Inadequate recreational water 
management is therefore a new barrier to wastewater reuse which acts alongside the barriers to 
wastewater reuse identified earlier in the thesis. Proposed reforms include; 1) the ability of decision 
makers to account for the external impacts of wastewater disposal, 2) improved communication of the 
externalities of disposal which impact community willingness to pay for recycled water, and 3) 
mechanisms for more consistent application of non-binding environmental guidelines. Addressing 
these will assist the incorporation of the true costs of wastewater disposal into decisions to either 
reuse or dispose of wastewater. 
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2 Introduction, background, methods 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses on two seemingly disparate themes; environmental regulations which 
manage waters where wastewater is disposed, and the assessment of the feasibility of urban 
wastewater reuse. In particular it investigates Australian legislation, policy and management of 
recreational water quality, providing case studies from Australia and the US, with a goal of 
identifying specific aspects of environmental regulation of receiving waters impacted by wastewater 
which act as barriers to wastewater recycling. It concludes that in many jurisdictions recreational 
water quality management is not optimal and may impact assumptions used when assessing the 
feasibility of wastewater reuse. 
Wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), collect and treat urban wastewater, removing faecal solids 
and the associated pathogens (bacteria, viruses and protozoa), improving water quality. Wastewater 
which is not recycled is disposed to surface waters. In the case studies in this thesis urban wastewater 
is collected at urban WWTPs, treated and then either reused or disposed to the ocean or other waters. 
Wastewater reuse is the alternative to environmental disposal, and therefore recreational water quality 
was selected for study as an integral aspect of the lifecycle of wastewater, which to the author’s 
knowledge, has not yet been considered within the study of barriers to wastewater reuse. Although the 
primary focus of this thesis is to examine environmental regulation and its interaction with decisions 
to reuse wastewater, the thesis also considers interconnected themes such as economics, governance 
structures for urban water management, known barriers to wastewater reuse, and marine and health 
sciences.  
All of the case studies in this thesis consider water quality management and microbiological water 
quality in areas where wastewater is disposed and wastewater reuse has been investigated. In addition 
to a review of communication of microbiological recreational water quality in Australia, in-depth case 
studies provide a comparison of assessment of wastewater reuse feasibility in NSW and Tasmania, 
communication of information on waters impacted by wastewater in Melbourne, Victoria, and the 
management of untreated wastewater discharges in Launceston, Tasmania (Figure 1.1). To support 
each case study, examples are drawn upon including recreational water criteria of the United States 
Environment Protection Agency (US EPA), frameworks for research and regulatory collaboration in 
California (USA), and proposed laws for management of combined sewer overflows in New Jersey 
(USA) (Figure 1.1). The case studies identify deficiencies in the regulation of wastewater disposal. 
This thesis concludes with a discussion chapter which links the varying themes set out in different 
chapters, and sets out questions for ongoing research and recommended policy reforms. 
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The remainder of this chapter is set out in the following manner; Section 2 provides a brief summary 
of the policy framework in this area including an introduction to current research which is continued 
in later chapters. Section 3 provides definitions and assumptions used in the thesis. Section 4 presents 
the aims, hypothesis and describes the objectives and questions used in the thesis. Section 5 provides 
a brief overview of the research methodology. Section 6 provides a justification for the research. 
Section 7 provides an outline of the dissertation. Section 8 provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of case study areas (Launceston (Tasmania), Gunnamatta (Victoria), Hunter 
region (NSW), New Jersey and Southern California (USA)). Showing principal legislation or 
guideline for management of wastewater disposal and number of water authorities in each area 
 
2.2 Policy framework 
2.2.1 Wastewater disposal in Australia 
In 2005, when Australia was in the grip of its millennium drought a Parliament of Australia 
research brief identified the need to realise the potential of recycled water to ensure economically 
viable wastewater reuse options are carried out ex ante disposal as one of Australia’s most pressing 
issues (Dimitriadis 2005).  Despite increased demand for alternative sources of water and national 
reforms of urban water management, the utilization of wastewater as a resource continues to present a 
multidisciplinary policy challenge. Even when combined with waste minimization and water 
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conservation policies, the majority of wastewater in Australia is still discharged to marine or 
freshwater environments (Whiteoak et al. 2012).  
The primary alternative to wastewater disposal is to recycle or reuse it. At its simplest level this may 
simply involve some level of treatment followed by land application of wastewater to support 
growing of crops for agriculture or other purposes (Agriculture and Resource Management Council of 
Australia and New Zealand & Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council 
1997). Uses of recycled water increase with treatment, the highest of which is treatment to a standard 
for safe human consumption, capable of entering the domestic supply system in place of drinking 
water. Substitution of wastewater in place of traditional sources of water may have broad benefits for 
society including decreased impacts on environmental values and recreational uses of water through 
decreased pollution (Anderson 2003). However, the costs and benefits of wastewater reuse vary, 
leading to calls for case by case assessment of costs and benefits (Marsden and Pickering 2006), as 
described in Section 1.3 below. 
Although Australian water cycle governance has recently begun to shift away from end of pipe 
solutions to waste management, wastewater reuse on a scale that approaches levels of consumption is 
still far from being realised. Australia set a national target for wastewater recycling at 30 per cent by 
2015. However, volumes of reuse of wastewater in 2009-2010 were 16.8 per cent, this is summarised 
as follows;  
Volumetrically, the largest volumes recycled are in the states with the largest populations − Victoria, 
New South Wales and Queensland. However, South Australia reuses the highest proportion of 
wastewater at 28 per cent, followed by Victoria (24 per cent) and Queensland (24 per cent). Tasmania 
and the Northern Territory recycled the least by both volume and proportion, facing the lowest demand 
and abundant potable supplies in most of their major centers (Whiteoak et al. 2012). 
Table 1.1 presents the percentages of recycling in 2009 and 2010 presented in the ‘Progress against 
the national target of 30% of Australia’s wastewater being recycled by 2015’ report (Whiteoak et al. 
2012). Overall the nation was achieving a 16.8 percent rate of recycling.  
 
Table 1.1: Wastewater recycling for each jurisdiction in 2009/2010 (Whiteoak et al. 2012) 
Jurisdiction Percent recycled 
ACT 13.3 
Australia (All) 16.8 
NSW 9.8 
Northern Territory 6.0 
Queensland 23.7  
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A fundamental principle of managing wastewater discharges within national water quality policies is 
to maintain environmental values of the water; that is, to manage discharge in a manner which takes 
into account the beneficial values that water provides to society (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 1997). 
Even though jurisdictions have managed to lower the environmental impact of urban wastewater 
management, in the past 20 years, anthropogenic inputs into the ocean and surface waters have still 
increased, with more coastal facilities reporting emissions, increasing population and urban reliance 
on coastal areas which could have serious consequences for marine and ecological environments 
(Beeton et al. 2006). Disposal of wastewater relies on the ability of the marine or freshwater 
environment to effectively dilute pollutants and therefore avoid negatively impacting environmental 
values. The Australian Guidelines for Sewerage Systems - Effluent Management describe the function 
of wastewater discharges as follows; 
Many discharges are designed to take account of naturally occurring dilution and disinfection processes 
at the discharge site, thus providing further protection of the environmental values of the adjoining 
waters without costly treatment (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 1997, p. 15). 
Analysis of the rationale for historical decision making provides important insights into why 
wastewater treatment infrastructure relies so heavily on wastewater disposal. Beder 1989 examined 
the political and engineering decisions that resulted in marine outfalls becoming the chosen 
engineering solution in Sydney (and indeed Australia) for the 25 years that followed. Selection of 
wastewater outfalls provided what appeared at the time to be a cost effective solution to avoid the 
costs of treating wastewater and to remove a variety of toxic wastes away from human populations 
(Beder 1989). This solution relies on the assimilative capacity of the environment to absorb and dilute 
anthropogenic pollution. Despite the seemingly insidious nature of diverting wastewater to the ocean 
in order to provide a conduit to disperse toxic and other wastes, wastewater disposal is part of a 
process of collection and treatment which provides sanitation, and this has provided a better quality of 
life for many people. Although decisions which may have produced a net benefit to society 30 years 
ago may no longer be accepted under modern water quality guidelines, the legacy of existing 
infrastructure may have ongoing implications simply by being in place where alternatives require 
additional investment.  
 
South Australia 28.1 
Tasmania 6.2 
Victoria 24.1 
Western Australia 12.0 
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2.2.2 Australian water quality management and pollution control legislation 
Australia’s water shortages and inefficiencies have led to national reform of the water industry 
and integrated management of terrestrial water is an express purpose of Australian terrestrial water 
policy (Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 2010). The number of water authorities in each 
Australian state is shown in shaded areas in Figure 1.1. In the USA there is one national agency 
responsible for water, each state has multiple agencies dealing with water supply, wastewater 
collection and treatment, and water quality regulation and monitoring. Management of urban water, 
recycled water and other surface waters in Australia each have legislative regimes set by each State 
government. Once wastewater is disposed to the marine environment it is no longer terrestrial water 
and is then governed by pollution control legislation or other environmental control. There are also 
known inconsistencies between standards that govern on land reuse and those that control marine 
disposal (Higgins et al. 2004).  
The National Water Commission (NWC) has critically commented on regulation of water quality in 
Australia stating ‘current regulation of water quality, public health and environmental outcomes is not 
cost-effective and creates barriers to integrated water management’ (NWC 2011, p. viii). In Australia 
regulation of pollution of water is still primarily driven by State government legislation under which 
an offence is created for causing environmental harm through polluting (Bates 2010). In order for 
WWTPs to legally discharge to surface waters, they ordinarily require a licence or permit under that 
State’s environmental legislation. However the command-control model of pollution reduction has 
been criticised as being over relied upon and ignores other policy solutions providing pollution 
reduction, such as the role of financial institutions (Richardson 2002). There are no laws which 
establish statutory causes of action to recover money from polluters who have harmed publically 
owned natural resources, however there are orders, offences and monetary penalties that courts may 
impose in order to uphold the polluter pays principle (Preston 2009).  
Australia’s voluntary national guideline approach to national water quality management is contained 
in the documents which make up the National Water Quality Management Strategy (NWQMS). The 
primary document within these considered by this thesis is the National Health Medical Research 
Council Guidelines for Managing Risk in Recreational Water 2008 (NHMRC 2008). Water quality 
management in Australia is very much a product of Australia’s constitution which does not give the 
Commonwealth Government power to make laws for recreational or ambient water quality. As a 
result NWQMS guidelines are non-binding and merely set a benchmark or guidance for states and 
local officers to adopt and apply according to local circumstances. 
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2.2.3 Existing research on barriers to integration and efficiency in natural resource management 
This section provides a brief overview of work undertaken in various disciplines towards 
identifying barriers to integrated water management. A review specific to barriers to wastewater reuse 
is provided in Chapter 2 which provides a summary of barriers to wastewater reuse, and Chapter 4 
provides an analysis of the interaction of these barriers to conceal the benefits of wastewater. In its 
‘Future Directions’ report, NWC (2011, p. 25) include impediments to alternative sources of water 
supply as having ‘cumbersome regulatory and approvals processes’ as well as ‘inadequate evaluation 
and consideration of the full benefits and costs of IWM options’. 
Regulation and institutional factors have been identified as a barrier to integrated water management 
including (but not limited to) inhibitive costs of producing recycled water, pricing structures which do 
not allow full costs to be captured, and challenges in streamlining and coordinating regulation and 
assessment of recycled water (MacDonald & Dyack 2004). Both institutional models and legislation 
have tended to deal with different aspects of the water cycle in a compartmentalized manner, which 
may be a barrier to integrated water cycle management (NWC 2007). These inconsistent regulatory 
standards for water have been observed during the phases of wastewater disposal and wastewater 
reuse across all jurisdictions in Australia (Higgins et al. 2004).  
Significant research has been undertaken under the Australian Water Recycling Centre for Excellence 
in improving water recycling technologies, improving the evidence base for water recycling 
guidelines, and to understand and overcome institutional and legal barriers to recycling. For example, 
significant inroads have been made recently to provide empirical evidence to questions underpinning 
the assessments of costs and benefits of wastewater reuse, including economic assessment and 
community willingness to pay for recycled water (Marsden Jacob Associates 2013). In another 
example, the identification of the impacts of environmental protections for receiving waters as an 
institutional barrier or driver for investment in treatment has also been considered, for which 
wastewater reuse may be an option (Institute for Sustainable Futures 2013).  
The Productivity Commission (2008) has also made significant contributions to the study of optimal 
models for the water sector including, the broad impacts of pricing and structure, as well as the 
efficiency of the urban water sector, and the achievability of integrated water management 
(Productivity Commission 2011). With adoption of large scale desalination and several large 
recycling projects, water management in Australian cities has seen a period of state government-
driven project selection of large scale water supply projects. Project selection, such as the choice 
between wastewater recycling or other water supply options involves assessment of multiple factors 
including an initial assessment that an investment in infrastructure is required (Productivity 
Commission 2014).  Inappropriate or unnecessary investment in desalination plants in many 
Australian cities may have been caused by avoidable policy and governance aspects, clarity of 
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institutional roles and responsibilities, inadequate options analysis, and notably, the provision of 
financial subsidies and direct policy prohibitions towards other options (Productivity Commission 
2011).  
These large augmentation projects appear to have come about through a project selection process 
driven by the state governments themselves, in many cases with an intense push from government for 
a particular option to proceed. On the other hand, the majority of individual WWTPs will be either 
smaller in scale than such projects necessitate, or may fall outside the interest of this larger scale 
decision making. In 2006 and 2010 Radcliff reviewed the status of water recycling in major 
Australian cities, the later review finding evidence that some ‘policy bans’ still exist which prohibit 
planned potable recycling (Radcliffe 2006, Radcliffe 2010). This and other issues have led to the need 
to reform processes for assessing public infrastructure projects to be described as urgent (Productivity 
Commission 2014). 
Wastewater disposal is generally considered part of the traditional supply network of urban water and 
sanitation, whereas recycled water projects are often considered as a supply of water from a source 
which is more expensive to produce than ordinary surface or groundwater. This has led to 
comparisons of the cost (such as treatment and transport) of recycled water benefits such as attempts 
to estimate market factors such as demand and consumer willingness to pay. However, due to a lack 
of consideration of non-market factors, inaccurate water prices were developed, potentially skewing 
such assessments against reuse or towards lower cost options (Dimitriadis 2005). It is believed that 
the external costs of wastewater discharge (pollution to the ocean, loss of recreational water 
resources) are internalized either through environmental licensing and permitting; meaning that 
environmental externalities would be considered as direct costs of a project to improve a WWTP, or 
through costs which are avoided, such as no longer meeting discharge requirements (Economic 
Regulation Authority 2009, Frontier Economics 2011). This however relies on the assumption of the 
reliability and social desirability of environmental regulation, the subject of further discussion in this 
thesis. 
Perception of risk of recycled water has been highlighted as a barrier to wastewater reuse (MacDonald 
and Dyack 2004, Nancarrow et al. 2008, Dolnicar & Hurlimann 2010, Dolnicar et al. 2010, 
Hurlimann and Dolnicar 2010).  Higgins et al. (2002) carried out extensive surveys of both users and 
providers of recycled water. In order to identify the key drivers of self-sufficiency in water supply, 
Rygaard et al. (2011) examined 113 case studies where water ‘self-sufficiency’ measures have been 
undertaken. Self-sufficiency was used as a quantifiable means of tracking drivers and barriers that led 
to water reform in each case study. Several key drivers of water self-sufficiency were identified 
including direct lack of water, constrained infrastructure, a bias towards particular infrastructure based 
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on spending known as sectoral bias, and lack of water based on policy changes such as maintaining 
environmental flows to rivers, or desire for water independence. 
Another barrier, the thesis addresses, is a lack of integration between land based water and waste 
management and reform, and marine or freshwater wastewater disposal. Recreational water quality 
management is a prevalent area of management of waters where wastewater is disposed. An absence 
of effective regulation and management in recreational waters impacted by wastewater may therefore 
lead to negative impacts on marine resources by increasing reliance on ocean outfalls where more 
efficient alternatives exist. This has negative environmental, social and economic consequences for 
the marine environment (Blackwell 2008), as quantified by Blackwell and Wilcox (2009). Selection 
of public infrastructure must be done with the principle objective of maintaining the interests and 
wellbeing of the public (Productivity Commission 2014). This ultimately means greater inclusion of 
the broader benefits of reduced disposal (Blackwell & Iacovino 2008).  
 
2.3 Definitions of terms  
The term wastewater is used to refer to water collected within urban areas for the purpose of 
transporting to wastewater treatment plants for the purpose of treatment and then disposal or reuse. 
Sources of urban wastewater generally include liquid waste from households as well as industrial and 
other liquid wastes in some cases. In the Chapter 7 case study which deals with sewer overflows the 
term sewage is used to describe water which has been collected but has not been treated at a 
wastewater treatment plant. A broad definition of wastewater is accepted, although it is important to 
note that this thesis will consider wastewater that is discharged from regulated wastewater treatment 
facilities.  
Recycled water is defined as wastewater and stormwater which has been treated and diverted away 
from disposal and, as a result of appropriate treatment, is suitable for beneficial uses (Dimitriadis 
2005).  In this thesis it refers to treated wastewater produced by an urban water utility and utilized by 
the utility or a third party for; ‘onsite reuse, agriculture, irrigation, industry, potable or other use 
external to the treatment process’ (Water Services Association Australia & NWC 2007). In order to 
ensure consistency with other literature in this area the terms recycled water and reuse water are used 
interchangeably (Dimitriadis 2005).  
This thesis considers two types of wastewater reuse feasibility assessments, one driven by a state 
government water planning process calling for costs and benefits to be determined for a range of 
wastewater reuse options for multiple WWTPs. The other process is driven by an environmental 
regulator under WWTP environmental permitting that requires study of the feasibility of reuse options 
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for each WWTP. It is expected that there will be a range of drivers for assessments as well as 
approaches depending on local circumstances and needs.  
Feasibility assessment of wastewater reuse is used broadly in this thesis to describe the processes 
involved in decision making on wastewater reuse and recycling schemes. This could involve project 
selection or may involve the assessment of the costs and benefits of various options for wastewater 
reuse, such as different applications of wastewater which require different costs of treatment or 
transport, or may result in differing rates of return. The options themselves may be simple (decision to 
proceed, site location, technology choice, pricing structures etc.). However there may be complex 
interactions of social, environmental, economic and even political factors which if not considered, 
could lead to unnecessary costs to society (Urkiaga et al. 2008). With respect to comparative costs, 
factors such as geographic location, need for transport, pipes and other factors mean wastewater 
recycling options are required to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis (Marsden & Pickering 2006).  
The National Water Commission (‘NWC’) states that its ‘unambiguous’ position on urban water 
recycling is ‘….subject to four conditions’ which are that: 
1. [p]rior cost/benefit and risk analyses are conducted which take full account of social and 
environmental externalities and avoided costs; 
2. the best available science is utilised; 
3. the project is subject to best practice regulatory arrangements (based on the Australian 
Guidelines for Water Recycling); and  
4. the community participates in decisions to introduce recycling and that subsequent management 
arrangements are transparent and accountable (National Water Commission 2010, p. 2). 
Although there are as yet no national guidelines to assist in the assessment of wastewater reuse costs 
and benefits; the NWC’s position statement on urban water recycling states that the Australian 
Guidelines for Water Recycling  (‘AGWR’) ‘provide an excellent framework for managing safety and 
guiding responsible decisions’ (NWC, 2010, p. 1). The AGWR have been developed under the 
National Water Quality Management Strategy (‘NWQMS’). The guidelines are divided between 
several aspects of water reuse including, managed aquifer recharge, augmentation of drinking water 
supplies, managing health and environmental risks, and safe concentrations of chemicals in recycled 
water. The approach taken to protect human and environmental health is described as a risk 
management approach (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council et al. 2006).  
The unintended positive or negative consequences of increased pollution on marine resources are 
known to economists as one of the externalities of wastewater management (Daly & Farley 2011). 
Externalities themselves are a focus of this thesis. For this thesis the interest is on examining 
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environmental and social benefits or disadvantages of the practice of wastewater management which 
may or may not be factored into cost benefit analysis for wastewater options assessment.  
There are a range of structures for managing urban water in Australia. For the three Australian case 
studies in this thesis, urban water is managed through a government owned statutory corporation 
(TasWater Corporation, Hunter Water Corporation, Melbourne Water Corporation). The term ‘water 
authority’ is therefore used throughout this thesis to recognize that although this structure is common, 
it is not the only model of urban water services in Australia. That said, the phrase water corporation 
may be used interchangeably in place of this term. 
 
2.4 Aims, hypothesis and research questions 
The primary aims of this thesis are; 
To examine the integration between land based water and wastewater management, the establishment 
of wastewater reuse schemes, and wastewater disposal in Australia in order to determine whether it is 
possible to identify and remove any policy or regulatory barriers to wastewater recycling in Australia.  
In doing so, this thesis aims to provide insight into aspects of Australian water and environmental 
legislation and practice which may be acting as a barrier to policies that promote efficient lifecycle 
management of wastewater. A central theme of the thesis is whether recreational water quality 
management is optimal and if not, what steps should be taken to rectify this situation.  
This thesis therefore poses the following hypothesis: 
Management of the external impacts of wastewater disposal in Australia is currently not optimal and 
this creates a barrier to wastewater reuse and extends to broader consequences for the marine and 
coastal environment. 
This thesis accumulates evidence for and against this hypothesis by considering the following 
additional research questions: 
1. How do wastewater and water quality management approaches between jurisdictions 
compare, including local, state or territory, national and international standards? (Chapter 
2) 
2. What methods are currently used to address the feasibility of wastewater reuse and what 
factors are known to impact these, including environmental regulation? (Chapters 3, 4) 
3. Do urban water quality governance structures and economic regulation of water industry 
influence the ability to consider environmental externalities of wastewater treatment? 
(Chapters 2, 3, 4) 
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4. Using recreational water quality management as an area of regulation of external impacts of 
wastewater disposal, does governance of wastewater disposal in Australia impact decision 
making on the establishment wastewater reuse schemes? (Chapters 5, 6, 7). 
5. For the purposes of willingness to pay, do swimmers and other recreational users gain a fair 
appraisal of the impacts of wastewater disposal by relying on communication of recreational 
water quality? (Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7) 
6. Does Australian environmental regulation (through recreational water quality testing and 
monitoring) provide an accurate representation of the external impacts of wastewater 
disposal? (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8) 
7. Are recreational water quality guidelines applied consistently across Australia? (Chapters 5, 
6, 7) 
8. How well do Australian water quality guidelines meet their own objectives and serve the 
public in ‘worst case scenario’ situations of untreated effluent discharges to recreational 
waters? (Chapters 6, 7) 
9. Are there better approaches to water quality communication which can be learnt from other 
jurisdictions? (Chapters 5, 6, 7) 
10. Does the lack of communication of externalities produce problems with the use of willingness 
to pay for recycled water as a factor in the assessment of wastewater reuse and disposal 
options? (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8) 
11. Does recreational water quality management present new barriers to efficient wastewater 
reuse in Australia, not previously considered, and are there opportunities to improve? 
(Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) 
 
2.5 Methods 
In order to answer the above research questions a number of methods were employed. 
Following a legislative and policy review included in Chapter 2, a series of case studies were chosen 
based on the factors listed in Table 1.2. The Tasmanian case study is returned to in Chapters 2 and 3 
which examine institutional barriers to wastewater reuse, as well as in Chapter 8 which examines 
environmental regulation of externalities of wastewater disposal. Tasmania was selected as an 
appropriate case study due to recent water and sewage industry reforms, which included changes to 
environmental management and also because the state does not have water scarcity, leaving 
environmental regulation as the primary driver for wastewater reuse, and relative lack of progress for 
wastewater recycling. This same lack of water scarcity was also present in the NSW Hunter region 
case study. Due to the high variability of wastewater governance and specific circumstances 
impacting these assessments the recurrent focus on Tasmania allows more specificity when reforms 
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are proposed in later chapters, in contrast to the broad brush painted in early literature into barriers to 
wastewater reuse. 
Table 1.2: Factors leading to selection of major and minor case studies presented in this thesis 
Authority Location Justification 
TasWater 
Corporation 
Launceston, Tasmania 
 
Regional water authority, may have different challenges to 
well-studied large authorities in capital cities 
Recent water governance restructure in Tasmania 
Facing significant challenges in meeting water quality 
guidelines and objectives 
Presence of untreated effluent discharges from CSO into 
secondary contact recreation area  
Hunter Water 
Corporation 
Hunter Valley, New 
South Wales  
Historical ecosystem health issues in receiving waters 
Regional water authority with comparable water quality 
issues but has been in existence longer than TasWater 
Different environmental regulation creates contrast for 
comparison to Tasmanian reuse feasibility assessment 
Melbourne Water Melbourne, Victoria Historical management of wastewater outfall in presence 
of primary contact recreation 
Upgrade of WWTP driven by recreation and 
environmental impacts of outfall 
Highly studied outfall with respect to marine and 
recreational impacts 
Incongruence between claims of public, media, water 
authority, regulators and government 
USA Orange County, 
California, USA  
 
Presence of Southern California Coastal Water Research 
Project as established cooperative approach to water 
quality research 
US Environment Protection Authority Recreational Water 
Criteria 2012 present novel techniques of relevance to 
Australian beach water quality management programs 
USA New Jersey, USA Use of CSOs has been a historical issue for water quality 
management 
Presence of relevant bill (proposed law before state 
legislature) which would provide additional reporting 
requirements for combined sewer overflows  
 
The case study analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis focuses on governance and legislation. 
Chapter 3 analyses the background to wastewater reuse upgrades in Tasmania. The recentness of these 
reforms provided information on the motivations and drivers for reform, and how these impact 
wastewater management. Chapter 4 on the other hand focuses on the interaction of environmental 
legislation and management with wastewater reuse feasibility assessment. 
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The analysis of recreational water in Chapter 5 involves collecting guidelines from each jurisdiction 
and comparing elements including communication and microbiological limits with those contained in 
NHMRC 2008 guidelines. US recreational water criteria are discussed in this chapter in order to 
provide a context for the assessment of the modernity of Australian practice. US experience and 
practice is referred back to within the reform section of this chapter which proposes novel policy 
reforms for overcoming constitutional issues with Australian water quality management. 
In addition to the analysis of the case studies in earlier chapters, Chapters 6 and 7 provide examples of 
the management of recreational water environments where there is an identified need for wastewater 
treatment upgrade. These chapters provide information on the weaknesses and strengths of water 
quality guidelines and regulation. These case studies were also selected based on the presence of 
recreational waters in conjunction with wastewater discharge, and the availability of evidence and 
debate, which was deemed necessary in order to carry out this review.  
Chapter 6 provides a review of scientific understanding of the marine environmental and human 
health impacts of wastewater discharge from one outfall, as well as the resulting public debate and 
coverage of statements from citizens and water authority representatives in the media. The chapter 
notes that this approach is limited as a scientific method because it does not confirm or deny the 
public claims of recreational water illness made in the newspaper articles. However, more 
importantly, it does allow a picture to be presented of communication of recreational water quality in 
response to claims by members of the public.  
Chapter 7 examines the management of water quality where untreated sewage and stormwater are 
discharged. Within this chapter, the analysis of Roberts and Craig (2014) is used to assess regulatory 
effectiveness of water quality management in Tasmania. This involves examining legislation under 
categories of clarity of objectives, clarity of legal interpretation, clarity of institutional responsibilities, 
and strength of enforcement powers. This approach was chosen because Roberts and Craig (2014) 
used it to analyse similar environment protection policies in Victoria, offering a useful point of 
comparison. 
In order to support the case studies informal interviews were conducted with Tasmania's state health 
regulator, local government environmental health departments, the state economic regulator, the 
Tasmanian water corporation, TasWater, and an NGO in the US. A Human Research and Animal 
Ethics approval was obtained from the University of Tasmania. Under this an email was sent to 
participants explaining the information that would be recorded, this included names of organisations 
but not personal details or names. These interviews often involved discussing the application of 
publicly available documents and where possible this thesis refers to the primary source referred to by 
the interviewee. These interviews were supported with informal conversations, meetings and industry 
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involvement throughout the thesis supported by involvement in Water Research Australia. This 
included visits to Beaconsfield WWTP, Hunter Water WWTPs in NSW, and Gunnamatta outfall in 
Victoria (Figure 1.1). 
 
2.6  Justification 
Regulatory reforms must be made with knowledge of the effectiveness of current governance 
structures and the policy requirement to factor in the externalities of water management into decision 
making (COAG 2010, Clause 73). Decision making on wastewater reuse is undertaken around 
Australia for WWTPs ranging from very small to very large. For this reason the identification and 
analysis of factors which may decrease the ability of such processes to account for the range of social, 
environmental and economic impacts is necessary and valuable.  
This PhD differentiates itself from existing studies on barriers to wastewater reuse because, whereas 
other studies examine processes encountered delivering in specific schemes, this thesis examines the 
extent to which current environmental regulations manage the negative or positive externalities of 
wastewater disposal. This is done to question the extent to which performance indicators (like 
regulatory compliance or recreational water monitoring results) can be relied upon that represent the 
economic and other costs of continuing to discharge wastewater, compared to reducing discharge 
through wastewater reuse. In summary, it provides a review of environmental legislation, policy and 
practices and describes their interaction with assessment of wastewater reuse schemes. This PhD 
builds upon existing research into institutional barriers by exploring one possible barrier in detail in 
order that specific and implementable reforms can be sought. 
Information availability impacts public perception of alternative water sources (Dolnicar et al. 2010). 
It also impacts decision making for whether people choose to use a swimming or recreation site 
(Vesterinen et al. 2010). The choice of recreational water quality management as an area of study for 
environmental impact of wastewater disposal was based on several factors; 1) it is the primary level of 
human interaction with wastewater disposal impacts, the opening or closing of a recreation area is a 
key example of social and environmental impact of disposal; 2) when people are being surveyed or 
expected to pay for wastewater reuse in order to inform project selection, it is important to understand 
what information they have access to, for example, whether beaches are opened or closed, and if this 
is based on consistent factors; 3) although ambient monitoring of receiving waters is potentially a 
larger area of regulation, the impacts on marine species may be hard to define or out of sight for 
people making choices in willingness to pay; and 4) whereas environmental standards for wastewater 
disposal are contained in diverse and hard to access documents (licences set for individual wastewater 
discharges), recreational water practices and policies are more readily determined and available. 
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Recreational water regulation therefore provides an ideal but often overlooked platform for studying 
the environmental management of wastewater for the study of the efficiency of regulation.  
Assessment of the economic costs and benefits for wastewater recycling assumes that environmental 
legislation of wastewater disposal is socially optimal and therefore the external impacts of reduced 
wastewater disposal are internalized as avoided costs of regulatory compliance (Economic Regulation 
Authority 2009, Frontier Economics 2011, Marsden Jacob Associates 2013). It is crucial that this 
assumption is accurate, particularly since it can result in rejection of reuse projects and therefore 
greater or continued reliance on disposal. Further, Higgins et al. (2004) showed a disparity between 
disposal regulation and recycled water guidelines; indicating that the assumption that environmental 
guidelines reflect optional social conditions requires investigation. 
In addition to new information for wastewater management, a review of recreational water guidelines 
in Australia provides new knowledge to allow suggested reforms for human health and safety (Figure 
1.2). Human contact with wastewater in water at recreational sites can lead to important public health 
implications, with recreational water illnesses such as gastroenteritis, upper respiratory infections and 
skin infections, amongst other less common illnesses, shown in Figure 1.2 (NHMRC 2008).  
 
Figure 1.2:  Recreational water illnesses which can result from exposure to polluted water and 
described in National Health and Medical Research Council 2008, Guidelines for Managing 
Risks in Recreational Water (NHMRC 2008), and sources of microbial water pollution 
described in Gunnamatta (Victoria) and the Tamar Estuary (Tasmania). 
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Further, at a local and regional scale, Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 7 describe deficiencies, reforms and 
improvements to a Tasmania’s previously inadequate management of human impacts on water and the 
associated costs to society. Together these chapters provide timely new-knowledge and in-depth 
independent analysis which is valuable current and the ongoing reform process in Tasmania. 
 
2.7 Outline of the dissertation 
This thesis will examine known barriers to increasing water reuse and the level of integration 
between governance ‘on land’ and environmental regulation in once wastewater is disposed to the 
environment, two distinct phases of the Australian water cycle.  
There are three parts and eight chapters in this thesis, the case studies used in each part is presented in 
Table 1.3; Part 1 provides a background to wastewater pollution in Australia (Chapter 2) by reviewing 
Australian legislation, policies and guidelines and describes the governance structure of water quality 
and wastewater management. Part 2 (Chapters 3 and 4) examines the feasibility assessment of 
wastewater reuse by providing two case studies which highlight novel features of governance and 
legislation with relevance to the environmental externalities of wastewater management. Part 3 
(Chapters 5, 6 and 7) outlines the legislation, guidelines and practice for the management of 
recreational water in Australia. The latter two chapters provide in-depth case studies highlighting 
inadequacies within the system of recreational water management by discussing jurisdictional 
experience outside Australia. In addition, not included in Table 1.3 are two smaller US case studies 
referred to in Chapters 5 and 7, which are described in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.3: Overview of the contribution of individual case studies to the broad themes of 
disposal regulation, reuse feasibility assessment and recreational water quality 
Themes 
1. Wastewater disposal 
legislation and water 
quality guidelines 
(Chapters 2 & 3) 
2. Assessment of 
wastewater reuse 
feasibility 
(Chapters 3 & 4) 
3. Recreational water quality (Chapters 
5, 6 and 7) 
Approach 
Legislative review: 
Australia (national 
guidelines) 
 
 
Review of legislation, guidelines, practice: 
(National, ACT, NSW, Northern Territory, 
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, 
Victoria, Western Australia) 
In depth case studies: 
Tasmania 
TasWater (formerly 
Ben Lomond Water) 
(Tasmania) 
TasWater ‘Combined Sewer Overflow’ 
(Launceston Tasmania) 
Victoria  Melbourne Water ‘South East Outfall’ (Victoria) 
 NSW Hunter Water (NSW)  
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Although this thesis covers a broad range of topics, convergent themes that are returned to across the 
thesis are barriers to wastewater reuse, and inadequate environmental management of wastewater 
disposal (including recreation). A review of literature on the barriers to wastewater reuse is provided 
in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 governance structures within Tasmania which have driven underinvestment 
and therefore may act as barriers to integration are described. In Chapter 3 barriers to wastewater 
reuse are described with respect to their impact on assessment of wastewater reuse feasibility. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis is a review and discussion of legislation and guidelines in Australian 
jurisdictions. This review focuses on water quality guidelines and water industry structure. In order to 
do this it will identify relevant pollution and water quality guidelines and legislation. Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 focus on wastewater reuse feasibility assessment. Chapter 3 has a focus on water and 
sewage management and governance structures. TasWater Corporation in Tasmania (formerly Ben 
Lomond Water Corporation) is a recently-formed water and sewage corporation. The historical issues 
for water and sewage management are contrasted against the need to assess every WWTP for the 
feasibility of wastewater reuse in an area where water scarcity is not an issue.  
In Chapter 4, the assessment discussed in Chapter 3 is compared to a much larger state government-
driven assessment conducted for Hunter Water Corporation in NSW. Within this Chapter, the 
discussion of barriers to wastewater reuse focuses on their impact on wastewater reuse feasibility 
assessments. It identifies an assumption used within the economic literature and assessment of 
willingness to pay for recycled water, that environmental regulation in Australia is effective. This has 
implications for how the external impacts of wastewater disposal are considered when various options 
are compared. This leads the thesis to consider the environmental regulation of wastewater disposal 
through Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Following the review of recreational water management practice in 
Australia (Chapter 5), the subsequent chapters provide more detail showing the real world application 
of environmental guidelines in areas where wastewater disposal causes problems for humans through 
water-based recreation.  
Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the impact of regulation of environmental impacts of wastewater on 
efficient wastewater management and the policy mechanisms that have been proposed to deal with 
these deficiencies. It also raises the question as to whether environmental management is sub-optimal, 
in particular, the communication of environmental externalities, could this also produce problems for 
assessment of willingness to pay for recycled water? 
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2.8 Summary and conclusion 
By combining the study of institutional barriers to wastewater reuse (through examining the 
assessment of wastewater reuse feasibility) with an appraisal of the regulatory effectiveness of 
environmental regulation of wastewater disposal, this thesis identifies and analyses factors which may 
impact technology choices, as well as environmental regulations, which may impact how the 
externalities of wastewater disposal are accounted for in decision making. Deficiencies in 
environmental management have implications for public health and environmental impacts which 
produces negative outcomes for humans and the environment. This necessitates an analysis of 
recreational water quality management. By discovering weaknesses in recreational water quality 
management, the thesis is able to outline reforms which may overcome weaknesses within Australian 
water quality guidelines. Perhaps more central to the theme of the thesis, the thesis concludes that 
where recreational water quality communication or environmental management is not optimal, this 
may alter the outcomes of wastewater reuse feasibility assessments. This is presented as an 
overlooked barrier to wastewater reuse, the study of which allows for removal of incorrect 
assumptions which ultimately will lead to better decision making.   
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Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia, pp. 1 – 20, viewed 11 November 2014 
<http://ecite.utas.edu.au/85324>. 
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3 Policy framework for disposal of wastewater to surface waters 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background into environmental laws and policies regulating wastewater 
disposal in Australia. Wastewater disposal to the marine and freshwaters is regulated separately in 
each Australian jurisdiction. In general WWTPs are operated under a licence or permit issued in 
accordance with state environmental legislation. The Commonwealth Government has played its 
central role as the formulator of water quality guidelines.   
Australia’s Constitution lists powers of the Commonwealth Government, meaning it can make laws 
for only certain affairs. Since water management is not listed as a federal power the Commonwealth 
can either seek an intergovernmental agreement from the states whereby the commonwealth, state and 
local governments meet through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and agree to pass 
legislation to take a consistent approach or establish guidelines. The Commonwealth Government 
produces water quality guidelines, while local application of these guidelines and management of 
point source marine pollution from WWTPs continues to be carried out by the states and local 
governments (Bates 2010). 
The first section of this chapter introduces the Australian policy and regulatory regime for the disposal 
of wastewater and the protection of water quality. It briefly outlines national policies which establish 
the benchmark for how urban water and water quality are managed. Different approaches have been 
taken for water management (described in Section 2.1) compared to water quality management which 
is set through guidelines applied by states (described in Section 2.2). National guidelines have been 
also been established covering water quality for recreational waters. 
The second section of this chapter provides an overview of environmental protection legislation under 
which wastewater is disposed to marine and freshwater in Tasmania, New South Wales (NSW) and 
Victoria in order to set the stage for more focused analysis in later chapters of this thesis. Although 
differences between how these jurisdictions apply national water quality guidelines are noted 
throughout this thesis, similarities described in this chapter include the use of environmental 
protection legislation to prohibit causing environmental harm by discharging pollution to water. 
Recreational water management by these jurisdictions is examined briefly here and returned to in 
greater detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Next, a discussion of mixing zones is included. Mixing zones are areas surrounding a wastewater 
discharge where water quality protections are not applied. This is relevant to this thesis because the 
differential application of these areas allows different levels of external impact from wastewater to be 
considered as compliant with environmental regulation. Finally, a review of literature on barriers to 
wastewater reuse is presented.  
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3.2 Overview of the legal regime for wastewater disposal in Australia 
3.2.1 National Water Initiative (NWI) 
In 2004 the COAG agreed on the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative 
(‘NWI’). This agreement focused on ensuring water management would undergo a uniform national 
reform process. The objectives and elements of the 2004 NWI included (but were not limited to) 
access to water, planning and management, urban water governance, water markets, accounting, 
trading and pricing, recognising that surface and groundwater resources are connected, and planning 
for environmental and public benefits through integrated management of environmental water 
(Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 2010). Section 7 of the National Water Commission Act 
2004 (Cth) initially gave the National Water Commission (NWC) general functions in implementing 
the NWI, making recommendations on water management issues to the Commonwealth Government, 
assessing Australia’s water resources and producing biennial assessments of the implementation of 
the NWI.  
Variation still remains between the structures of various jurisdictions’ water authorities, as reflected 
by the number of authorities providing water and sewage services in each jurisdiction. NSW, Victoria 
and Queensland have a multiple water authorities, while Tasmania and South Australia, ACT, 
Northern Territory and Western Australia have just one each. Although within NSW two large water 
corporations Sydney Water and Hunter Water provide water and wastewater services within the 
Sydney and Newcastle cities and surrounding suburbs. In addition, some areas are serviced by local 
governments, such as outside of the management areas of Sydney Water and Hunter Water in NSW, 
and outside of South East Queensland. Generally, where water authorities provide these services the 
model is to provide both water and sanitation, charge for these services, then to provide a dividend 
payment to government owners based on economic and pricing principles set by the state. 
 
3.2.2 National Environment Protection Measures (NEPMs) 
The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (1992) (IGAE) was an agreement 
between the Commonwealth Government and the states and territories of Australia which defined the 
roles and responsibilities of the parties to the agreement with respect to environment protection 
(COAG 1992). As a result of the IGAE the Commonwealth Government passed the National 
Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (Cth) which established a National Environment Protection 
Council (NEPC). Legislation was later introduced by the states and territories in order to implement 
the National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) and National Environment Protection Measures (NEPMs), 
which are standards, guidelines and goals and protocols which attempt to harmonise pollution 
standards across Australia (Bates, 2010). Each state has passed legislation to implement these 
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measures, in the case study jurisdictions through the National Environment Protection Council Act 
1994 (Cth), National Environment Protection Council (New South Wales) Act 1995 (NSW), National 
Environment Protection Council (Victoria) Act 1995 (Vic), and National Environment Protection 
Council (Tasmania) Act 1995 (Tas). Section 14(1) of the National Environment Protection Council 
Act 1994 (Cth) presents a list of matters which the NEPC may make NEPMs for. NEPMs can be 
distinguished from the water quality guidelines (discussed in Section 2.3 of this chapter) because they 
can be legislative measures (National Environment Protection Council Act s. 21). NEPMs have not 
been set for water quality and national guidelines for water quality are discussed in Section 2.3 of this 
chapter.  
The National Environment Protection (National Pollutant Inventory) Measure (1998) (NPI) is a 
centrally driven pollution monitoring and information collection measure. Where a WWTP emits a 
substance listed under the NPI in excess of the threshold amounts for prescribed pollutants it is 
required to report to the NPI. States and local governments report the annual emitted volumes of listed 
substances under the NPI and this data is then available online through the Australian Government 
NPI website (Australian Government Department of the Environment 2014a).  
 
3.2.3 The National Water Quality Management Strategy (‘NWQMS’) 
The Commonwealth has carried outs its role of coordinating water quality standards through 
development of the NWQMS. The aim of the NWQMS is to achieve sustainable use of Australia’s 
water resources through: 
A nationally consistent approach to water quality management will be achieved through the 
development of high-status national guidelines which can provide the point of reference when issues 
are being determined on a case-by-case basis. The adoption of national guidelines provides a shared 
national objective while allowing flexibility to respond to differing circumstances at regional and local 
levels. The management process provides for a consistent approach to the implementation of the 
strategy while recognising differing political, social and natural conditions (Australian and New 
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council & Agriculture and Resource Management Council of 
Australia and New Zealand 1994, p.vi). 
Unlike NEPMs the NWQMS guidelines are not legislative instruments. They create no mandatory 
requirements. They are not intended to be used as a set of criteria providing limits for water quality. 
The guidelines component of the NWQMS consists of a series of documents under the headings; 1) 
water quality benchmarks which include drinking water, recreational water, water quality monitoring 
and reporting; 2) groundwater protection guidelines; 3) diffuse and point sources pollution guidelines 
which cover rural land uses and stormwater management; 4) guidelines for sewerage systems 
including effluent management, trade waste, biosolids, reclaimed water use and overflows; 5) effluent 
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management guidelines which have been made for various agricultural practices; and finally 6) 
Australian guidelines for water recycling. In addition there are several additional water quality 
publications, reviews, discussion papers and a set of guidelines for the management of acid sulphate 
soils in inland aquatic ecosystems (Australian Government Department of the Environment 2014b). 
NWQMS Paper 4 is referred to as the Australian and New Zealand Guidelines for Fresh and Marine 
Water Quality (ANZECC Guidelines) (ANZECC & ARMCANZ, 2000b, vol. 1). The ANZECC 
Guidelines contains seven chapters, elements of which have been replaced by later guidelines to 
reflect more recent scientific evidence, this includes the recreational guidelines which were replaced 
in 2008 and are discussed in Section 2.4 of this chapter.  
The ANZECC guidelines provide a methodology for State and local water quality managers to 
establish the level of protection required for a body of water based on environmental values, as well 
as allowing them to establish monitoring programs which gather scientific knowledge to allow 
development of guidelines, decision making criteria, objectives and water quality indicators based on 
local circumstances, and use this framework and information to apply appropriate management 
responses (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 1994). Stakeholders and the community should be involved and 
consulted in the process of determining water quality objectives (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 1994). 
Key terms within NWQMS are environmental values, objectives and guidelines. Environmental 
values (also called beneficial uses or protected environmental values) are defined within the NWQMS 
as:  
[P]articular values or uses of the environment that are important for a healthy ecosystem or for public 
benefit, welfare, safety or health and which require protection from the effects of pollution, waste 
discharges and deposits (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 2000b, vol. 1, p. 2-6). 
Environmental values are applied to individual waterbodies by states. For the environmental value of 
recreation many states include primary or secondary contact recreation. These are defined differently 
in various states however as an example; primary contact recreation may involve full body immersion 
for example, swimming. Whereas secondary contact recreation involves partial contact such as 
splashing of the arms and body, for example, jet skiing, kayaking and sailing (Healthy Waterplay 
2014). The process of setting environmental values is followed by the establishment of management 
goals which contain details of what protection is required to maintain environmental values 
(ANZECC & ARMCANZ 2000b, vol. 1).  
The ANZECC guidelines define water quality guidelines as ‘…a numerical concentration limit or 
narrative statement recommended to support and maintain a designated water use.’ (ANZECC & 
ARMCANZ 2000b, , vol. 1, p. 2-9). Water quality guidelines contain the actual physical parameters 
that would need to be maintained to uphold environmental values or meet management goals. 
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Australian guidelines moved away from ‘trigger’ values under which a single Australia-wide limit is 
set for a parameter above which action is triggered, and towards a risk management approach and the 
concept of applying different values in different circumstances (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 2000b, vol. 
1). This is reflected in the national recreational water guidelines which do not set universal daily 
values for microbial pollution, discussed in Section 2.3 of this Chapter. Although note there has been 
a move towards trigger values in recreational water management, discussed in Chapter 5. 
A further key concept of Australian water guidelines are objectives, which are defined as; ‘...the 
specific water quality targets agreed between stakeholders, or set by local jurisdictions, that become 
the indicators of management performance’ (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 2000b, vol. 1, p. 2-11). 
Whereas water quality guidelines such as ANZECC 2000 recommend limits for various 
measurements of water quality, for a body of water a State would include specific numerical 
concentrations or limits within water quality objectives (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 2000b, vol. 1).  
 
3.2.4 National Health Medical Research Council Recreational Water Quality Guidelines  
Within the NWQMS recreational water quality is covered within the National Health and 
Medical Research Council Guidelines for Recreational Water Quality and Aesthetics ('NHMRC 2008 
Guidelines'). These are used in place of former ANZECC Guidelines Chapter 5 which relied on 
numerical limits based on a percentage of samples exceeding a limit.  
The method of measuring risk of microbiological contamination used within the NHMRC 2008 
Guidelines is the use of sanitary inspection categories in conjunction with microbial water quality 
assessment. Microbial water quality assessment is necessary because of the connection between the 
presence of human faecal material in recreational water to human illness. They therefore recommend 
states take water samples and test these for the presence of faecal indicator bacteria (FIB). The FIB 
chosen within NHMRC 2008 for both fresh and marine water is the organism enterococci. FIB are 
organisms found in the digestive tracts of mammals, they may not necessarily be harmful themselves 
but are used to indicate the presence of faecal matter and therefore other harmful pathogens.  
The NHMRC 2008 guidelines introduce a three level alert system for monitoring hazards to 
recreation, these are surveillance mode (green), alert mode (amber), and finally action mode (red). 
Green is simply normal conditions requiring normal sampling following the guidelines, amber is used 
where there are elevated levels of some contaminant and therefore this requires investigation, and red 
where the water is unsuitable for recreation and therefore public warnings should be issued.  
The application of NHMRC Guidelines and ANZECC Guidelines at the State, Territory and local 
government level appears to vary considerably. This is the subject of Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this 
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thesis. Table 2.1 provides an overview of environmental protection legislation in Australia and 
recreational water quality guidelines.  
Table 2.1: Overview of legislation or policies for Australian jurisdictions2 
Jurisdiction Environment protection Recreational water quality 
ACT Environment Protection Act 1997 
(ACT) 
ACT Guidelines for Recreational 
Water Quality (2010) (ACT 
Government Health 2010) 
Commonwealth National Water Quality 
Management Strategya 
National Health Medical Research 
Council Guidelines for Managing 
Risks in Recreational Water 2008 
(NHMRC 2008) 
NSW Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 (NSW)  
Marine Water Quality Objectives for 
NSW ocean waters (NSW) 
(Department of Environment and 
Conservation (NSW) 2005) 
Northern 
Territory 
Waste Management and Pollution 
Control Act 1998 (NT) 
Guidance Notes for Recreational 
Water Quality in the Northern 
Territory (Northern Territory 
Department of Health 2011) 
Queensland Environmental Protection Act 
1994 (QLD)  
Queensland Water Quality Guidelines 
2006 (Queensland Government 
Department of Environment and 
Heritage Protection 2009) 
South Australia Environment Protection Act 1993 
(SA) 
South Australia Environment 
Protection (Water Quality) Policy 
2003(South Australian Government 
2003) 
Tasmania Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas) 
Tasmania Recreational Water 
Guidelines 2007 (Tasmanian 
Government Department of Health 
and Human Services 2007) 
Victoria Environment Protection Act 1970 
(Vic) 
State Environment Protection Policy 
(Waters of Victoria) 2003  (EPA 
Victoria 2003) 
Western 
Australia 
Environmental Protection Act 
1986 (WA) 
Microbial Quality of Recreational 
Water Guidance Notes (Department 
of Health and The University of 
Western Australia 2007) 
a. NWQMS provide non-binding guidelines for water quality management as described above 
 
Table 2.1 shows that ACT, Northern Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia have guidelines or 
guidance notes specific to recreational water. By contrast other states may provide limits or guidance 
for recreational waters within general water quality policies or objectives. Furthermore, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory are the only states whose recreational water guidance notes apply 
2 Where no guidelines exist jurisdiction relies on Commonwealth guideline unless otherwise indicated. Where 
possible the most relevant jurisdiction-wide guideline has been listed. 
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NHMRC 2008 to their local context. For this reason these jurisdictions do not have their own 
recreational water guidelines. Note that the NSW Beachwatch program does not recommend the 
Marine Water Quality Objectives for NSW ocean waters (NSW). The recommended program is 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
3.3 Wastewater disposal legislation in Tasmania, New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria 
3.3.1 Tasmania 
3.3.1.1 Discharge licensing and environmental monitoring 
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas) (Tasmanian EMPC Act) 
Sections 12 and 13 establishes the Environment Protection Authority (Tasmanian EPA) and 
Environment Protection Board. The EMPC Act s. 50, 51 and 51A creates the penalties for the 
offences of causing serious environmental harm, material environmental harm, or to deposit pollutants 
where environmental harm might reasonably be expected to be caused. 
The Tasmanian EMPC Act defines three levels of activity; the Tasmanian EPA is only responsible for 
reviewing Level 2 activities. Level 2 activities include facilities that discharge sewage, septic tank 
effluent or industrial or commercial wastewater to both land and water with a design capacity of more 
than 100 kl a day (EMPC Act Schedule 2). The EPA may then require environmental performance 
conditions to be contained in the WWTP’s permit (EMPC Act s. 24). There are 84 of these facilities 
in Tasmania and an unknown number of smaller Level 1 facilities controlled by councils 
(Environment Protection Authority (Tasmania) 2014). 
There is some level of integration between the various legislative regimes. If a proposal is made under 
the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas) for a Level 1 activity, it may be required to be 
referred to the EPA board (EMPC Act s. 24).  If a planning permit proposal is made under the Land 
Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas) for a Level 2 activity, it must be referred to the EPA 
board for an assessment (EMPC Act s. 25). If a person proposes a Level 2 activity and is not required 
to obtain a permit under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas) then they must also 
refer the proposal to the Tasmanian EPA Board for an assessment under the (EMPC Act s. 27). Level 
3 activities are also declared under the State Policies and Projects Act 1993 (Tas) and may be required 
to undergo an integrated assessment.  
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3.3.1.2  Guidelines and objectives for discharges in Tasmania 
Tasmanian water quality objectives are contained in the State Policy on Water Quality 
Management 1997 (‘SPWQM’). The Tasmanian SPWQM sets the objectives upon which resource 
and planning decisions that impact surface waters in Tasmania are made. The values decision makers 
must choose from distinguish surface waters ecosystems and coastal waters ecosystems. Recreational 
water quality and aesthetics includes primary contact, secondary contact and aesthetics. Once 
environmental values are set they are displayed publically, and are incorporated into planning 
schemes, as well as catchment management mechanisms. The Tasmanian SPWQM states that 
measures to achieve policy objectives could include regulatory measures, economic instruments and 
communications strategies. 
As is the case with other state policies, guidelines and objectives are distinguished, and the policy 
states that objectives are not regulatory limits. As in other jurisdictions water quality guidelines are 
estimates of the level of certain indicators which must be met in order to maintain an environmental 
value (SPWQM s. 8). Once guidelines have been set by the Board in order to determine the key 
indicators to achieve environmental performance, the board will use the guidelines to determine water 
quality objectives (SPWQM s. 9). Objectives are defined as the ‘...most stringent set of water quality 
guidelines which should be met to achieve all the protection environmental values nominated for the 
body of water’ (SPWQM s. 9). A key feature of the policy is Division 2A under which discharges to 
waters are to be avoided unless it can be shown that reuse is not practical. This is discussed further in 
Chapter 3.  
In Tasmania the ‘Emission Limit Guidelines for Sewage Treatment Plants That Discharge Pollutants 
to Marine Waters’  apply to all new and existing sewage treatment plants that report wastewater flows 
of between 2 and 500 kl per day and that discharge to marine or fresh water (Tasmanian Government 
Department of Primary Industries Water and Environment 2001). ‘Accepted Modern Technology’ is 
defined within the Tasmanian SPWQM which matches the definition contained in the ‘National 
Water Quality Management Strategy - Policies and Principles - A reference document' (ANZECC & 
ARMCANZ 1994).  SPWQM guidelines include a version of the waste management hierarchy.  
Problems have been identified with the implementation of the NWQMS; delays in implementing 
Protected Environmental Values (PEVs) for coastal areas, a lack of development of policy in line with 
updates and advances in National policies, and Local Governments previously using ANZECC 
guidelines as trigger values for water quality (Tasmanian Government Department of Environment 
Parks Heritage and the Arts 2008).  
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3.3.1.3 Microbiological recreational water quality monitoring in Tasmania 
The Tasmanian Recreational Water Quality Guidelines (2007) specify procedures for managing 
recreational waters in the State including timing of sampling, regime for closure of waters that pose a 
risk to public health and sanitary inspections. The methodology followed in the guidelines involves 
weekly sampling at popular swimming locations. The guidelines provide two trigger values, if a 
sample contains a number of enterococci organisms higher than 140 organisms per 100ml another 
sample is taken within 48 hours, if the second sample is still over this limit a public warning will be 
required. If a single water sample contains more than 280 enterococci organisms per 100ml a public 
warning may be necessary. 
Local Governments are required to monitor the quality of water within its relevant area in accordance 
with the aforementioned guidelines (Public Health Act 1997 (Tas) s. 130). Further, they are required 
to manage waters in a manner does not pose a threat to public health, and notify the Director under 
Section 128 of the Public Health Act 1997 (Tas) if this does or is likely to happen. The Tasmanian 
Director of Public Health produces an annual Recreational Water Annual Report based on this data 
(Tasmanian Government Department of Health & Human Services 2012).  
 
3.3.2 New South Wales 
3.3.2.1 Discharge licensing and environmental monitoring 
The NSW Environment Protection Authority (NSW EPA) issues and regulates licences to 
discharge or pollute under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) (NSW 
POEO Act). Sewage treatment facilities are defined by the POEO Act as scheduled premises where 
they treat wastewater of approximately 2500 persons or equivalent or 750 kilolitres per day, 
whichever is greater (POEO Act Schedule 1 s. 36). If a premises falls into this category it must be 
licenced under the NSW POEO Act. If a person wished to carry on work at a premises that is not a 
scheduled premises and that work would make the premises a scheduled premises, there is a 
requirement to obtain a licence (POEO Act s. 47). 
The Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW) Section 5 constitutes the 
Environment Protection Authority of NSW (‘NSW EPA’). Under Section 13A of this Act, the 
Minister has the power to direct the NSW EPA to refer a particular licensing matter to the Minister at 
which time the EPA ceases to have the power to carry out that role. 
One aspect of NSW pollution licensing that differs from other jurisdictions is the introduction of load 
based licence fees through the Protection of the Environment Operations (General) Regulations 2009 
(NSW). The objective of this is to utilize the polluter pays principle in order that there is an incentive 
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for industries to reduce the amount of pollutants they produce (Protection of the Environment 
Operations (General) Regulations r. 13). An environment protection licence holder is required to 
calculate, record and report the actual load of a pollutant (Protection of the Environment Operations 
(General) Regulations r. 15).  A condition may be included in the licence which allows an agreed 
amount decided under a load reduction agreement to be treated as the assessable load for the purpose 
of deciding the fee (Protection of the Environment Operations (General) Regulations r. 26). The 
impact of load based fees in comparison to traditional licences are discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis.  
Load reduction agreements may be accompanied by a financial assurance (Protection of the 
Environment Operations (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW) Div 4). Load reduction agreements may 
run for up to four years (Protection of the Environment Operations (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW) 
r. 26). When a polluter has entered into a load reduction agreement this will reduce the licence fees 
they pay. However, there may be penalties for non-compliance with the agreement such as the 
forfeiture of any financial assurance that was required to be paid under Protection of the Environment 
Operations (General) Regulation 2009 (NSW) r. 28. The agreement is given effect through a term in 
the operating licence for the WWTP (Protection of the Environment Operations (General) Regulation 
2009 (NSW) Section 30).  
 
3.3.2.2 Guidelines and objectives for discharges in New South Wales 
The NSW EPA is required to create environmental quality objectives, guidelines and policies 
and monitor the state of the environment for the purposes of achieving those objectives (Protection of 
the Environment Administration Act s. 9). Marine water quality objectives have been developed for 
NSW ocean waters as well as other water categories. Objectives provide the framework for applying 
national guidelines to local waters in NSW. As such, the objectives provide a description of the water 
quality which should be met in order to protect the listed environmental values. As such they are not 
mandatory and do not provide prescriptive indicator values (Department of Environment and 
Conservation (NSW) 2005). However, Chapter 5 describes how Beachwatch NSW no longer 
recommends the objectives for recreational water quality, instead following a modified approach 
based on NHMRC 2008 guidelines. 
Under Chapter 2 of the POEO Act Protection of the Environment Policies (‘PEPs’) can be made. 
They include environment protection goals, environment protection guidelines, environment 
protection protocols, and environment protection standards. PEPs must be taken into consideration by 
local councils when undertaking certain planning actions under the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s. 29. Amongst other factors the NSW EPA must consider NEPMs in 
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preparation of Draft PEPs (POEO Act s. 13). It is important to note that in NSW a PEP is not a 
statutory rule (POEO Act s. 41). 
 
3.3.2.3 Microbiological recreational water quality monitoring in New South Wales 
NSW has a several microbial beach safety monitoring programs coordinated by the NSW 
Government Office of Environment and Heritage Beachwatch program The program expands the area 
it can conduct testing in by supporting local governments. These programs monitor 265 individual 
locations (NSW Government Department of Environment Climate Change and Water 2010). Other 
beach monitoring programs described in this thesis focus on capital cities in summer months, the 
NSW Beachwatch program includes a water quality monitoring partnership which involves some 14 
NSW coastal councils.  
Beach watch publishes information on monitoring and results online. This is described in Chapter 5. 
Further, information including the Sanitary Inspection Grade, Microbial Assessment Category, and 
Beach Suitability Grade for each testing location are made publically available (NSW Government 
Department of Environment and Heritage 2014). These monitoring programs are based upon the 
NHMRC 2008 guidelines (NSW Government Department of Environment Climate Change and Water 
2010). As discussed above the NSW Maine Water Quality Objectives provide indicative guideline 
limits for recreation for example, however NSW Beachwatch relies on NHMRC 2008 guidelines. 
Conditions for a polluter to monitor the receiving environment may also be included within 
environmental protection licences and POEO Act s. 64 makes it an offence to fail to comply with 
these conditions. Further, licence conditions may require monitoring and reporting to NSW EPA 
including discharges, relevant ambient conditions inside and outside the licensed premises, analysis of 
monitoring data and other factors as required by the Act and the licence (POEO Act s. 66). It is an 
offence to provide false and misleading information under these requirements. NSW EPA may also 
impose licence conditions which support pollution management including requiring the licence holder 
to undertake mandatory audits and environmental studies (POEO Act s. 67-68). An example licence 
condition requires the licensee to take monthly grab samples from two defined ‘ambient’ water points 
adjacent to the outfall to measure colony forming units of faecal coliforms per 100 millimetres 
(Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) licence No 13972011, cl. 15). 
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3.3.3 Victoria 
3.3.3.1 Discharge licensing and environmental monitoring 
Management of pollution to waters in Victoria is principally regulated under the Environment 
Protection Act 1970 (Vic) (Victorian EP Act). It is an indictable offence in Victoria to pollute waters 
so that the waters become noxious, poisonous, harmful or potentially harmful to health, welfare, 
safety or property, poisonous to life including animals, fish and vegetation, or detrimental to any 
environmental value (called a beneficial use in Victoria) (Victorian EP Act 1970 s. 39(1)). 
For WWTPs to discharge to waters they must hold works approvals and licences issued by EPA 
Victoria (Victorian EP Act s. 19A, 20). Wastewater treatment plants that discharge to marine or 
estuarine environment and exceed a design or actual flow rate of five kilolitres a day are ‘Scheduled 
Premises’ in Victoria (Environment Protection (Scheduled Premises and Exemptions) Regulation 
2007 (Vic) Schedule 1 Table 1). As a result increases or alteration wastewater discharged from 
WWTPs require authorization under the either a Works Approval, Licence or other approval 
(Victorian EP Act s. 19A, 20). 
Notable aspects of the Victorian EP Act licensing regime include amalgamated licence which allows 
for the Victorian EPA to revoke licences where two or more licences apply to one premises and 
replace these with a single licence (Victorian EP Act s. 20(11A)). Licensees are also required to 
submit ‘annual performance statements which contain information on the performance in complying 
with the conditions within the licence (Victorian EP Act s. 31D). Finally, another pollution reduction 
mechanism in the Victorian EP Act are accredited licences. These allow licence holders who can 
demonstrate high levels of environmental performance to apply for an accredited licence at a lower 
financial cost and with fewer regulatory requirements, therefore providing an economic incentive for 
environmental performance (Victorian EP Act s. 26A). 
 
3.3.3.2 Guidelines and objectives for discharges in Victoria 
State Environment Protection Policies (‘SEPPs’) are created under the Victorian EP Act s. 16 
and are one of five different types of policies under the Act. They differ from legislation or guidelines 
because they are created through an order published in the Government Gazette (Victorian EP Act s. 
16). The objectives in the SEPPs include indicators of the environmental quality that should be 
reached in order to protect listed beneficial uses (environmental values). SEPPs are especially 
important as the guidelines. Objectives and physical parameters that they contain must be met in order 
to comply with the Victorian EP Act. Although SEPP have the effect of law, in practice some of the 
objectives can be aspirational in nature as opposed to being strict objectives, for example, 
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requirements to reduce mixing zones over time (SEPP (Waters) cl. 30(2)), this is described further 
below. 
Discharge of wastes into Victorian waters must be in accordance with the SEPP (Victorian EP Act s. 
44). The SEPP (Waters) contains guidelines and objectives used by decision makers when creating 
licences, works approvals and disposal limits for the discharge of wastewater into surface waters. The 
SEPP (Waters) provides a list of beneficial uses for particular categories of water found in Victoria, 
for example, oceans and coasts. In order to protect beneficial uses in each water category the SEPP 
(Waters) sets objectives of environmental quality, which are found in Schedule A to the SEPP. The 
beneficial uses for oceans and coasts include primary and secondary contact recreation, aesthetic 
enjoyment, indigenous and non-indigenous cultural and spiritual values, and uses such as aquaculture, 
industrial, commercial use, and harvesting seafood for human consumption (SEPP (Waters) 2003 cl. 
10). 
The SEPP (Waters) directs that before discharges to water are allowed first the waste hierarchy should 
be followed. If discharges are necessary then they should not exceed the environmental quality 
objectives included in the SEPP and therefore should not impact beneficial uses. Where beneficial 
uses cannot be protected the Victorian Environment Protection Authority (‘EPA’) may grant a mixing 
zone, discussed further below (SEPP (Waters) cl 28(1)). Where discharges are allowed they should be 
accompanied by an Environmental Improvement Plan, and a monitoring program that ensures 
protection of beneficial uses (SEPP (Waters) cl 28(2)).  
 
3.3.3.3 Microbiological recreational water quality monitoring in Victoria 
Guidelines for recreational water quality management in Victoria are contained in the SEPP 
(Waters). These contain limits for recreational water based on a percentage of water samples taken at 
regular intervals over a defined period of time containing less than a prescribed value of the bacteria 
E.Coli and enterococci. This is not the approach taken in NHMRC 2008 guidelines. The practice of 
recreational water monitoring in Victoria is described fully in Chapter 5. For the purposes of this 
chapter it is important to highlight that the Victorian EP Act creates the obligation for environmental 
regulators to meet SEPP (Waters) in WWTP licences, not national guidelines. 
The requirements for monitoring the health of Victorian waters to which wastewater has been 
discharged are found in individual WWTP licences. Section 38 Victorian EP Act requires all 
discharges to water to follow the SEPP (Waters). By means of example, Victorian EPA licences may 
require the licensee to have a monitoring program approved by the EPA (EPA Victoria Corporate 
Licence; East Gippsland Region Water Corporation,’ (18 March 2008) Victorian Government 
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Environment Protection Authority 2008, cl 2B). Performance may also be reported publically through 
annual performance statements.  
In addition to the self-monitoring process described above. EPA Victoria publishes an annual beach 
report for the recreational beaches of Port Phillip Bay. This report details the weekly monitoring of 36 
beaches and is discussed further in Chapter 5 (EPA Victoria 2012). 
 
3.3.4 Mixing zones 
Mixing zones are pollution control regulatory mechanisms that list a distance from an effluent 
outfall and a range of water quality objectives that do not need to be met within that zone (ANZECC 
and ARMCANZ 2000a, vol. 2). This is important for this thesis because it provides an area where 
environmental damage may be above levels generally accepted in guidelines and policies. Mixing 
zones may be included in wastewater discharge licences which list a specific area in which certain 
criteria may not apply. 
The ANZECC Guidelines define a mixing zone as ‘[a]n explicitly defined area around an effluent 
discharge where certain environmental values are not protected’ (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 2000b, 
vol. 1, p. 2-17).  The ANZECC guidelines state that mixing zones are not appropriate for substances 
that bio-accumulate, or for nutrients or particulate substances (ANZECC & ARMCANZ 2000b, vol. 
1). The correct application of mixing zones as a pollution control mechanism is where the impact of a 
discharge relates primarily to concentration. An example may be the impact of freshwater on or 
hypersaline water on marine species.  
A summary of the general guidelines for implementing a mixing zone follows (ANZECC & 
ARMCANZ 2000a, vol. 2):  
• first follow the waste hierarchy; 
• once this is done, disposal should be best practice; 
• mixing zone should have a maximum size; 
• the size of the mixing zone should be as small as practicable;3 
• the size of the mixing zone should be reduced over time; 
• impacts to environmental values should be limited to the mixing zone; 
• impacts to environmental values should not amount to permanent degradation; 
• the mixing zone should be designed to minimize ecological detriment; and 
3 Note, different jurisdictions define the mixing zone in varying manners including two and three dimensions. 
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• mixing zones should not be used to allow for environmental values of human health or 
recreation. 
For example, under the Tasmanian State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997 mixing zones 
may be used ‘if it is not reasonable or practical to reduce levels of pollution’.  A mixing zone is 
defined as a; ‘three dimensional area of the receiving waters around a point of discharge of pollutants 
within which it is recognised that the water quality objectives for the receiving waters may not be 
achieved’ (Tasmanian Government 1997, pt 3.7). 
In Victoria the SEPP (Waters) defines a mixing zone as; 
…an area contiguous to a licences waste discharge point and specified in that licence, where the 
receiving environmental quality objectives otherwise applicable under the Policy do not apply to 
certain indicators as specified in the licence. This means that some or all beneficial uses may not be 
protected in the mixing zone (SEPP (Waters) cl 3). 
As an example of the application of mixing zones the SEPP (Waters) directs that mixing zones should 
not be approved by the Victorian EPA where they would result in risks to beneficial uses beyond the 
mixing zone. Mixing zones should also not be issued where the discharge results in harm to humans, 
unacceptable impacts on plants and animals, or causes a loss of aesthetic enjoyment or an 
objectionable odour (SEPP (Waters) cl. 30(1)). Where a mixing zone is applied the environment 
improvement plan should aim to reduce the size of the mixing zone over time, with the aim of 
eventually eliminating the mixing zone (SEPP (Waters) cl. 30(2)). 
The Victorian EPA licence that authorised discharge from Melbourne’s South East Wastewater 
Outfall (the case study discussed in Chapter 6), allows a mixing zone that stretches 1.7 km west, 2.3 
kilometers east, and 900 meters offshore from the discharge point where there are no compliance 
limits for total dissolved solids. The exception for toxicant objectives is set at a 200 meters radius, and 
600 meters for nutrients (Licence EM35642, Melbourne Water Corporation, Eastern Treatment Plant 
Bangholme 3175, Granted 15 August 1975, last updated 16 August 2005 (Victoria) 2005).  
 
3.4 Literature Review of Barriers to Wastewater Reuse 
3.4.1 Institutional and governance arrangements 
Australian jurisdictions each manage urban water differently. Institutional structure and the 
entrenched paradigms within the water industry mean some institutions may be swayed towards large 
centralised schemes over decentralised infrastructure and may not be well placed to consider the 
benefits that wastewater reuse can provide to society, such as the amenity gained from greening urban 
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landscapes or enhanced recreational use of surface waters formerly degraded by pollution (Stenekes et 
al. 2006). Byrnes et al. (2009) found greater technical efficiency in the larger utilities compared to 
smaller utilities they studied, hypothesising several possible causes including the attraction of key 
staff and the composition of boards; such that where strategic decisions are less likely to be made 
based on an engineering paradigm there may be a lesser tendency towards ‘gold-plate infrastructure’. 
Byrnes et al. (2010) found efficiency was greater for similar sized regional Victorian compared to 
NSW utilities; of relevance to the removal of barriers to wastewater reuse was their finding that 
efficiency decreased when utilities had a higher proportion of industrial customers. 
The Productivity Commission (2008, p. xiv) found ‘monopoly provision of urban water impedes 
opportunities to develop alternative supply sources’ and that reform had focused on governance 
arrangements rather than structural changes which could achieve better outcomes such as an effective 
market for urban water. Abbott and Cohen (2010) describe a lack of consistency within the literature 
with respect to optimal industry structure. As highlighted by Dollery and Crase (2010) the 
Productivity Commission has enhanced this area through analysis of the costs and benefits of 
institutional arrangements as well as establishing a suite of options for implementing reforms in both 
urban and regional urban water supply. The implementation of wastewater reuse and other alternative 
supply options has potentially been impacted by issues of the urban water sector, for example, the lost 
value from reduced consumption from water restrictions, inefficient and costly large scale 
augmentation projects, and perverse outcomes of large government grants for infrastructure 
(Productivity Commission 2011). 
Regulatory and other impediments to reuse include cumbersome approvals processes such as absence 
of streamlined or integrated responsibilities for obtaining planning approval for new subdivisions with 
recycled water schemes (Radcliffe 2004), fixed headwork charges for developments as opposed to 
providing economic incentives for incorporating reuse in developments (MacDonald & Dyack 2004), 
lack access for investors outside of government to access wastewater and wastewater infrastructure, 
community and political perspectives on increasing water charges which is influenced by inadequacy 
of differentiation in water pricing between uses of water and the increased complexity of producing 
recycled water (MacDonald & Dyack 2004, Radcliffe 2004). 
 
3.4.2 Difficulties in determining the true cost of disposal options 
Inadequate recognition of the cost of externalities including environmental costs of disposal in 
water pricing is a barrier to wastewater reuse (Radcliffe 2004). Is has been argued that decisions on 
whether to invest in reuse are often based on economic market appraisals, with assessments of social 
and environmental factors being carried out as administrative functions in order to satisfy 
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development or other approval processes (Listowski et al. 2009). Financial evaluations of recycled 
water schemes may be too simplistic and may ignore benefits of reuse, such as avoided expenditures, 
and ignoring non-market costs and benefits, instead focusing on capital and operational expenditure 
and funding (Dimitriadis 2005). Examples of non-pecuniary external costs can be seen where 
wastewater is disposed to surface waters. In these cases the impact of both reuse and the resultant 
avoided discharge are dispersed in society and are difficult, but by no means impossible, to calculate; 
and without their inclusions decisions on wastewater management are likely to be suboptimal 
(Blackwell 2008). Both pricing of externalities and quantity-based permitting are possible ways to 
overcome these problems however both options have their own advantages and disadvantages 
(Frontier Economics 2011). 
 
3.4.3 Issues of competition and demand 
In discussing demand for wastewater it seems necessary to restate the absence of an effective 
market for urban water, monopoly provision of urban water, and reforms focused on governance 
arrangements in favour of structural reforms to address this and other issues stated by the Productivity 
Commission (2008). What is more, structural reform will need to be implemented amongst the legacy 
of expense and contractual commitments to large scale desalination which in many cases were 
unnecessary (Productivity Commission 2011).  
Factors which may increase demand for recycled water include consumer acceptance, availability of 
other sources of water, and increases in the price of potable water to reflect externality charges for the 
costs of wastewater disposal; whereas supply may be altered through advances in technology and 
increasing efficiency (MacDonald & Dyack 2004). Disincentives include failure to provide 
appropriate reduction in charges for developers using recycled water, failure to consider externalities 
and failure to establish an appropriate charging structure for all sources of water (Radcliffe 2004). The 
relative costs and complexity of recycled water when compared to other sources of water (Radcliffe 
2004) are relevant to this discussion, for example, the costs of removing salinity from secondary 
effluent (which arises from either infiltration or industrial discharges to wastewater) (Dimitriadis 
2005), and management of human behavior at the source of waste water creation (e.g. lack of price 
signals, volumetric charges, and external costs as indicated by Blackwell (2008)).  
National recycling targets have been offered as an inadequate policy mechanism as they do not 
acknowledge the full costs of water nor the reality of reuse water’s price signals of competition and 
demand (Chanan et al. 2011). The Productivity Commission (2011) noted that removal of 
impediments to integration would be a better approach than assuming wastewater reuse is in the 
community’s interest without examining costs and benefits. Crase and O'Keefe (2012) suggest 
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imposition of policies of water demand management in absence of price ignore the link between 
demand, price and supply; and selection of high-cost recycling projects in order to meet recycling 
targets may ignore who is impacted by the costs and may lack consideration of benefits costs analysis.  
3.4.4 Inadequate water quality management 
The NWC’s position in its 2011 urban water paper was unequivocal in stating that regulation of 
water quality, and environmental and public health created barriers to integration of water 
management (National Water Commission 2011). Problems with water quality management are 
identified as a barrier to wastewater reuse (MacDonald & Dyack 2004). This includes limitations of 
water quality guidelines for some water uses (Radcliffe 2004). Differences have been recorded 
between reclaimed water guidelines and effluent discharge licences (Higgins et al. 2004). In a NWC 
review, Power (2010, p. xi) found inconsistent application of AGWR between Australian 
jurisdictions. In addition, implementation issues were identified in all Australian jurisdictions which 
included:  ‘…long-term management of on-site systems, alternative disposal mechanisms, ownership 
of recycled water, cross-connections, decreased flow to sewers, long-term security of supplies through 
private service suppliers, laboratory capacities within states, and validation’.  
Guidelines and discharge licences may reflect artificial separation of various stages of the water cycle; 
where discharge licences focus on environmental protection, recycling guidelines focus on public 
health and sustainability of agriculture (Higgins et al. 2004). This distinction may hinder reuse 
feasibility assessment by concealing the non-market benefits of wastewater reuse. 
Inadequate understanding of acceptable risks amongst local regulators may lead to high monitoring 
costs, cumbersome approvals or isolated decision making which is focusing on one area (e.g. health or 
environment) and ignores broader benefits (MacDonald & Dyack 2004). The imposition of liability 
upon water utilities in the supply of recycled water has also been identified as a potential barrier to 
water recycling (Radcliffe 2004). One commentator has described precautions which were taken 
towards recycled water as unnecessary, for example, where the suppliers of treated water were 
required to continue to assist the end user in meeting their liabilities with respect to the supplied water 
(Jackson 2005). These issues may combine to cause wastewater reuse to appear unfavorable when 
compared to more traditional options. 
 
3.4.5 Political and policy influence on decision making 
Political influence may impact on the assessment of some technologies; for example, where 
policy bans against potable reuse of wastewater are in existence these policies are barriers to full 
consideration of all options and their costs and benefits (Radcliffe 2010). The Productivity 
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Commission (2011, p. 89) cites commentary from the National Water Commission, Australian Water 
Association and Business Council of Australia which ‘expressed concern that supply augmentation 
decisions have been made without transparent consideration of the costs and benefits of all available 
options’.  
Khan (2011) refers to a Sydney Water comparison of desalination and indirect wastewater reuse in 
which augmentation of drinking water with recycled water was ruled out due to the increased costs of 
transferring water to a reservoir as an ‘environmental buffer’ for indirect potable reuse (IPR), whereas 
direct potable reuse (DPR) was not considered but would have avoided these transport costs. 
Advantages offered by DPR include the provision of a source of highly treated water when surface 
water supplies are contaminated, for example, during extreme weather events. In the State of Victoria 
in 2007 seawater desalination was announced without any recourse to public opinion save for the 
statutory rights to participate in Commonwealth environmental impact assessment after the 
construction of ‘preliminary works’.  
Political influence may also impact the determination of how much profit should be paid by water 
utilities to government owners. O'Keefe et al. (2009) question the current status of many jurisdictions 
where profits of water utilities are diverted to government and described this as a being essentially a 
tax. A conflict of interest may exist where policies restraining consumption through pricing structures 
collide with obligations of State or local government-owned utilities to maximise returns to their 
shareholder; for example, where provision of recycled water would undermine objectives to increase 
profit from the more profitable (for example due to less complicated treatment) sale of potable water 
there could be conflicting objectives of profits, water pricing, provision of water and environmental 
objectives (Radcliffe 2004). Efficiency improvements may therefore result in higher returns to 
shareholders but not necessarily increased benefits to the consumer (Abbott et al. 2011). 
 
3.4.6 Perceptions of integrated water supply options 
Public acceptance and perception of risks from wastewater are well documented barriers to 
wastewater reuse (Jefferson et al. 2000, MacDonald & Dyack 2004, Radcliffe 2004, Dolnicar et al. 
2010). However, public input is somewhat limited by not being able to participate in a functioning 
urban water market (as described in Section 1.4.1) and an inability for the public to openly view 
information on the non-pecuniary impacts of various options, for example, openly accessing 
information on the environmental impacts of wastewater disposal.  
Willingness to pay for recycled water has also emerged as an area of study however there is little 
discourse on drivers for wastewater disposal; which is the primary alternative to wastewater reuse. 
The ability for the public to make informed decisions about the impacts of wastewater discharges is 
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limited by their access to information which, in many cases, is collected and held by government or 
water authorities. Further, the impacts of wastewater discharge are often underwater and out of the 
public eye, and water quality monitoring in many areas assesses long term trends (focusing on median 
and 90th percentiles of samples taken weekly or monthly) while individual high risk days may go 
unreported. These factors may hinder the public’s ability to comprehend the impacts of wastewater 
disposal and therefore hinders their ability to make informed decisions on their willingness to pay for 
recycled water.  
Stenekes et al. (2006, p. 128) describe public acceptance of water recycling as a ‘minefield of 
assumption and rhetoric [and] is widely used as a way to explain the lack of progress on water 
recycling’. They argue that this may conceal other influences on decision making such as institutional 
conservatism and other factors. Research on the public and recycling may also have a narrow focus on 
public preferences and attitudes as of end-users as a prediction of future behavior without developing 
an understanding of the factors which precede the frameworks and approaches under which 
institutions resolve issues (Mooney and Stenekes 2008). 
The perceptions of decision makers and water industry employees may influence the selection of 
integrated water management options and the options that are considered for selection. A qualitative 
study which examined the experience of managers of 12 representative Australian recycled water 
schemes identified environmental abatement as the primary factor influencing the initial decision to 
invest in the scheme (Muston & Wille 2006). A survey of water practitioners in Brisbane, Melbourne 
and Perth showed receptivity for uses of sewage was high for industrial and public open space, but 
low or average for drinking, indoor and outdoor household use and environmental flows, further, 
while the practitioners perceived “environmental outcomes” as a driver to on-site reuse schemes and 
third-pipe schemes, no perceived driver was identified for potable reuse (Brown et al. 2009). Martin 
(2006) found that surveyed ‘stakeholders’ perceived the greatest barrier as financial and economic 
impediments including financial costs of recycled water infrastructure as well as cost relative to other 
sources of water. 
While it is accepted that perceptions may be dynamic and rapidly changing, at the very least it may be 
argued that the evidence presented above indicates that perceptions of water practitioners did not align 
with the stated position of the NWC (2010) towards open minded and transparent consideration of all 
options towards integrated water cycle management. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the legal regime for monitoring and maintaining water 
quality in Australia, as well as describing wastewater disposal regulation in Victoria, New South 
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Wales and Tasmania. The NWQMS provides guidance for state and local regulators and managers 
which allows for development of parameters and standards for waters to which wastewater is disposed 
as well as recreational waters. The NWQMS guidelines which apply to recreational water are the 
NHMRC 2008 recreational guidelines. Legislation managing wastewater discharges to water is set by 
State governments such as environment protection legislation and water quality guidelines. Notable 
features of wastewater regulation include Tasmanian SPWQM which requires discharges to be 
avoided unless it can be shown that reuse is not practical (discussed in Chapter 3) and load based 
licensing in New South Wales (discussed in Chapter 4). Further details on the on the ground practice 
and application are provided in subsequent chapters. Notably, Victoria, NSW and Tasmanian 
recreational water quality ‘guidelines’ all use different methods to determine the microbiological 
water quality of recreational water, the subject of Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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Details of publication of Chapter 3 - Wastewater reuse in the absence of 
water scarcity and a market: A case study from Beaconsfield, Tasmania 
(Australia) 
This chapter was presented as a peer reviewed conference paper at the 2013 Asia Pacific Water 
Recycling Conference & Membranes and Desalination Conference. Sections have been edited in order 
to accommodate inclusion in a thesis as well as providing additional information in Section 3.8. 
Details of authors and their contribution can be found in the opening pages of this thesis.  
Publication details for this chapter are: 
Perraton, SC, Blackwell, BD, Gaston, T, Fischer, A & Meyers G 2013, ‘Wastewater reuse in the 
absence of water scarcity and a market: A case study from Beaconsfield Tasmania (Australia)’, Asia 
Pacific Water Recycling Conference & Membranes and Desalination Conference, Brisbane, viewed 
22 November 2014 <http://ecite.utas.edu.au/85331>. 
  
 
 
73 
 
4 Wastewater reuse in the absence of water scarcity and a market: A case study from 
Beaconsfield, Tasmania (Australia) 
 
4.1 Abstract 
This chapter describes the formation of the urban water industry in Tasmania. The recent 
commencement of a wastewater reuse scheme to irrigate a tree-lot in Beaconsfield (Tasmania) may 
represent a prescient view of the future of wastewater reuse in Tasmania. The case study in this 
chapter is returned to in Chapter 4 where environmental regulation and process is discussed. This 
chapter provides a background to the historical and current issues with urban water management in 
Tasmania which have led to current environmental problems. This chapter canvases specific 
Tasmanian governance and policy drivers and barriers to this and other wastewater reuse schemes, 
whereas Chapter 4 focuses on the reuse assessment itself in order to discuss barriers to reuse which 
may be applied more broadly across Australia. The chapter finds that governance structures and past 
underinvestment present challenges to a hastened search for a balance between providing a return on 
assets and rapidly achieving the goal of sustainable water management. The understanding of these 
challenges is critical for decision makers when assessing the costs and benefits of upgrading assets 
and reforming the industry. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
In 2008 the State Government of Tasmania passed legislation to remove urban water 
management from 29 local governments and form the Tasmanian water and sewerage industry. 
‘Sustained under investment’ resulted in low compliance of wastewater discharges and pollution of 
Tasmanian waters (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2011, p. iv). Local government 
management was even described as a ‘litany of mismanagement’ (Property Council of Australia 2012, 
p. 5); approximately $1 billion of capital investment was required before Tasmania’s water 
infrastructure could reach levels of compliance present in other Australian jurisdictions ("Water and 
Sewerage Industry Bill 2008 Second Reading Speech" 2008).  
Of central concern to this chapter and the reform agenda for Tasmania are the conflicting demands of 
wastewater management in Tasmania. Foisted returns for local government and corporatized 
wastewater assets can adversely impact available funding for capital improvement. This has the 
imminence to denigrate the rate at which compliance is improved and thus the volume of reused 
wastewater (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2012b).  
In order to draw-out the salient features of these conflicting demands we use the example of a scheme 
announced as a ‘pilot or demonstration’ project for reuse in Tasmania (Wightman 2012). The case 
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study involves a tree-lot irrigation scheme at Beaconsfield wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) and is 
supplemented with evidence from submissions, inquiries and information collection was supported 
through interviews. 
Within this ‘reuse’ describes wastewater disposed through reuse schemes described by Tasmanian 
regulators as reuse schemes, under which definition they include land application of wastewater. This 
chapter refers to the regional water corporation ‘Ben Lomond Water Corporation’ which has since 
been replaced with the state wide TasWater. The assessment referred to in this chapter and Chapter 4 
were carried out by Ben Lomond Water prior to the creation of TasWater.  
The remainder of this chapter is set-out in five sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
evolution of Tasmanian urban water management from 2006 to 2013. Section 2 discusses the current 
malaise of wastewater reuse in Tasmania. Section 3 discusses elements of Tasmanian urban water 
governance and microeconomic reform which may be barriers to wastewater reuse. Section 4 presents 
a case study and finally, Section 5 provides a discussion. The chapter concludes with some brief 
closing remarks. 
 
4.3 Tasmanian urban water management from 2006-2014 
In 2006 a Tasmanian Government Ministerial water and sewage taskforce was formed in 
response to underperforming water and sewage infrastructure (Government of Tasmania 2006). The 
Tasmanian State Government passed legislation in 2008 which brought about structural reform of the 
water and sewage industry and in 2009 three local government owned regional urban water and 
sewage corporations were formed under the Water and Sewerage Industry Act 2008 (Tas) and the 
Water and Sewerage Corporations Act 2008 (Tas), as well as an additional corporation to provide 
services to the three regional corporations. On 1 July 2013 Tasmania’s water and sewerage 
corporations were merged into a single utility called TasWater. 
The 2006 Tasmanian Government Ministerial Water and Sewerage Taskforce discussion paper stated; 
‘there is growing evidence that Tasmania’s water and sewerage infrastructure has not kept pace with 
the State’s strong economic progress in recent years’ (Government of Tasmania 2006, p.3). This 
included ‘widespread non-compliance of sewerage treatment plants with their environmental permits’ 
(Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2012b, p. ix). Regulatory non-compliance of 
Tasmanian WWTPs required ‘significant capital expenditure to overcome the environmental damage 
caused by ageing wastewater treatment plants’ (Ben Lomond Water 2012b, p. 44).  
Wastewater which escapes reuse is discharged to estuarine environments, to a lesser extent to marine 
waters, and finally, inland waters. In the 2011-2012 reporting period 49 out of 78 Level 2 WWTPs 
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were less than 90 percent compliant with discharge to waters limits; and 24 of 78 Level 2 WWTPs 
were operating over maximum licence flow limits by more than 100 percent, indicating demand for 
wastewater treatment outmatches supply in these regions (Office of the Tasmanian Economic 
Regulator 2013). 
In response to these shortcomings, three regional urban water and sewerage corporations and a shared 
‘common service provider’ were formed under the Water and Sewerage Corporations Act 2008 (Tas). 
In June 2013 these corporations were merged to form a single statewide corporation under the Water 
and Sewerage Corporations Act 2012 (Tas). 
The move to a single corporation in Tasmania was enacted through State Government legislation and 
followed a vote of a special meeting of the Local Government Association of Tasmania (LGAT) 
(Local Government Association Tasmania 2012). The LGAT had been critical of the initial State 
government taskforce as ‘relying upon a submission process and a series of informal discussions with 
council representatives’ (LGAT 2007 p3). 
Tasmania’s local governments own the urban water infrastructure as well as the water and sewerage 
corporation and receive returns in the form of dividends, tax equivalents and guarantee funds. Local 
governments retain responsibility for the management of stormwater as well as recreational water 
quality monitoring. Local governments oversee the management of the corporation through a 
shareholders letter of expectation (Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporation (Northern Region) 
2009). Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporation (Northern Region), Ben Lomond Water, 
Launceston, as well as an ‘Owner’s Representative Group’ which makes decisions on board 
remuneration and dividends. The Tasmanian Government retains a role through the regulators and has 
provided price caps and customer reimbursements (House of Assembly Select Committee into 
Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporations 2012).  
The Water and Sewerage Industry Act 2008 (Tas) establishes the structure of the industry including 
price regulation as well as the powers and reporting requirements of the economic regulator. The 
economic regulator of the industry is the Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator. The economic 
reforms were altered in 2010 when the Tasmanian Government placed an interim price cap restricting 
charge increases to five percent and providing water users with a share of an $8.9 million dollar rebate 
package (Bartlett 2009). 
The environmental regulator is the Board of the Environment Protection Authority (‘Tasmanian 
EPA’) and the Director of Public Health (Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)), 
exercises responsibilities under the Public Health Act 1997 (Tas) (Office of the Tasmanian Economic 
Regulator 2013).  
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Table 3.1 displays the key benefits of the reform as stated on its introduction; these benefits are 
further separated into three categories. 
Table 3.1: Stated benefits of Tasmanian water and sewerage reform ("Water and Sewerage 
Industry Bill 2008 Second Reading Speech" 2008). 
Benefit  Key element 
Accountability of services Operating licence regime 
Independent regulation of prices  
Enhanced public performance requirements 
Efficiency and 
performance 
Enhanced asset management planning  
Removing duplicated activities of exiting regulators  
Customer service Minimum customer service standards 
Established ombudsman for customer complaints 
 
4.4 Wastewater reuse in Tasmania 
In 2013 the Tasmanian Economic Regulator reported that in the previous reporting period 6.5 
percent of urban wastewater produced in Tasmania was recycled. This included five full reuse 
schemes, 28 partial reuse schemes (however, 15 of the partial reuse schemes reused less than 50 
percent of total wastewater) and 46 WWTPs providing no reuse. Wastewater which is reused is 
primarily treated to Class B standard4 and applied to land for irrigation of golf courses, farms, tree 
lots, bush blocks and similar land based disposal methods (Office of the Tasmanian Economic 
Regulator 2013). 
Known issues with the State’s WWTPs and reuse schemes include; public risk from environmental 
discharges and wastewater reuse, uncertainty and risk including unsatisfactory contractual 
arrangements for wastewater reuse involving third parties,  and inability to utilize wet periods due to 
lack of storage and lack of demand for irrigation during these periods (Ben Lomond Water 2011b). 
Ben Lomond Water described the wastewater reuse schemes under its management;  
These re-use schemes do not generate a profit as there is little or no market for the re-used water and it 
is delivered to the recipient free of charge or for a nominal amount. The primary purpose for these re-
use schemes is land disposal of treated effluent. 
Accordingly, the re-use schemes are fundamentally “disposal” schemes and the revenues, expenses and 
assets are all part of the delivery of regulated sewerage services (Ben Lomond Water 2012b, p. 32). 
4 Class B is a standard established in the ‘Tasmanian Recycled Water Guidelines’ Environment Protection Authority 
(Tasmania). 2001. Environmental Guidelines for the Use of Recycled Water in Tasmania. Department of Primary Industries 
Water and Environment, Hobart, December 2002. 
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This statement refers to thirteen effluent reuse schemes established by councils in the State’s North 
East, instigated by Commonwealth funding, generally on private land, some of which included level 
of contribution from the landholder, for which only four generate a volumetric charge or annual fee 
(Ben Lomond Water 2012b).  
Table 3.2 shows that total compliance with existing permit conditions is lower when compared to 
‘Accepted Modern Technology’5 (AMT) limits. When AMT is considered, the flow weighted 
compliance of effluent discharged to water lowered by 22 percent (Ben Lomond Water) 27 percent 
(Southern Water) and 23.6 percent (Cradle Mountain Water) (Office of the Tasmanian Economic 
Regulator 2013). A range of factors account for differences in reuse percentage between authorities 
including, population and rainfall patterns. 
Table 3.2: Compliance with discharge to waters’ and reuse limits 2011-2012 (Office of the 
Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2013 pp. 110-114). 
 Compliant effluent (%) AMT compliance (%) Effluent reuse (%)6 
Ben Lomond Water 92 70 5 
Southern Water 89 62 11 
Cradle Mountain Water 84.6 61 <2 
 
The Economic Regulator noted that the level of regulatory compliance of Tasmania’s WWTPs may 
be a poor representation of environmental sustainability due to the gap between existing permit 
conditions and AMT, as well as differences between treatment licenses and assessment methodologies 
(Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator, 2013). 
 
4.5 The Tasmanian EPA and wastewater reuse feasibility assessments 
The Tasmanian EPA has commenced updating Tasmania’s Environment Protection Notices 
(‘EPNs’) for WWTPs.7 Rather than reflecting the assimilative capacity of the receiving environment, 
the EPNs, issued in 2011-2012, reflect the capacity of existing facilities under optimized operations. 
These interim limits would be expected to be eventually replaced with conditions that meet AMT 
(Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator, 2013). 
Tasmania’s State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997, Section 15.1 requires the Tasmanian 
EPA to only issue an EPN to authorize a discharge to waters once satisfied that either reuse/recycling 
or discharge to land are not practical. Utilising the necessary process of updating EPNs, the EPA 
5 Accepted Modern Technology is defined in the State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997 (Tasmania) Section 4.1. 
6 These values were approximated from the report. 
7 ‘Level 2’ WWTPs require an EPN to be issued by the environmental regulator under Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas). 
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decided that where there is an environmental discharge and where reuse had not ‘previously been 
satisfactorily explored’ a condition would be introduced into the EPN to require the permit holder to 
conduct a feasibility study for effluent reuse (EPA Tasmania 2011b). An allocation of $2.8 million 
was assigned to the process of updating the water and recycled water quality policies over a three year 
period (EPA Tasmania 2011a). 
In 2011 the Tasmanian EPA released the ‘Effluent Reuse Feasibility Study Guidelines’. The 
guidelines establish a broad process for assessing the feasibility of reuse for a WWTP. The guidelines 
leave the specific methodology within the phases of the assessment open. However other jurisdictions 
may have no such guidelines and wastewater reuse feasibility assessments may be performed on an as 
need basis, as described in Chapter 4. The procedures contained within these guidelines to be 
followed to assess wastewater reuse feasibility are discussed further in Chapter 4. 
The process envisioned by the Effluent Reuse Feasibility Study Guidelines (2011b) is to first, scope 
and identify potential options for effluent reuse at the WWTP. An overview must be presented of the 
site-specific factors such as water quality, land uses and availability and relevant maps, any potential 
issues caused by trade waste or the effluent, and general restrictions of the area which may limit reuse. 
The Guidelines go on to state that initial options identification should be followed by consultation. 
Depending on the options chosen through the scoping process, the consultation could potentially be 
broad and involve advertising, public meetings and interviews. This is followed by the scoping of 
options, a process of information gathering to investigate the options. Finally, a report should be 
prepared which includes scoped costing estimates for the options and a rationale to support decisions 
in the form of a triple bottom line assessment (EPA Tasmania 2011b).  
 
4.6 Factors impacting the volume of wastewater reuse in Tasmania 
Table 3.3 (below) divides some of the barriers to wastewater reuse in Tasmania into categories 
of physical barriers and financial and economic barriers.  
From 2009-2013 the water corporation’s primary focus was provision of potable water ahead of 
upgrading wastewater infrastructure which resulted in limited WWTP upgrades with the focus instead 
on optimization and lower cost improvements (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2013). 
One key barrier is the drain that required dividends have on much needed capital for infrastructure 
upgrades. Another four barriers to the delivery of objectives were proposed in a submission on behalf 
of the Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporations: 1) involvement of the Tasmanian government in 
capping previously agreed to price increases prior to the 2010 election; 2) financial and economic 
constraints including ‘…a fear that political pressure could undermine the independent economic 
 
 
79 
 
regulation of the sector…’ (Onstream 2010, p. 4); 3) structural tensions including managing the 
expectations of returns by council owners created by the corporate model; and 4) pressure placed on 
capital funding by the need to service previously un-serviced populations (Onstream 2010). 
Table 3.3: Factors impacting the volume of wastewater reuse in Tasmania (Onstream 2010) 
(Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2013). 
 Barrier to reuse 
Physical Climate, availability of water and lack of demand  
Absence of land in proximity to WWTPs for land based discharge 
Inadequate storage and/or demand during wet periods 
Financial and 
economic 
Absence of capital for investment and requirement to pay dividends 
Government intervention reducing revenue base (interim price cap) 
Potential for political pressure to undermine independent economic regulation 
Structural tensions including expectations for returns exacerbated by corporate 
governance model 
Need to provide services in previously unserviced areas  
Prioritised investment for critical projects including provision of adequate 
drinking water 
 
4.7 Financial and economic barriers to reuse 
4.7.1 Is the rate of return on water and sewerage assets appropriate?  
There is evidence that the requirement to pay dividends to local government is a barrier to capital 
expenditure: 
The EPA noted that the limit of available funds for capital expenditure is an obstacle to improved 
compliance and this obstacle is exacerbated by dividend payments to local government owners before 
the regulated entities are operating on a sustainable footing (where sustainability also includes meeting 
regulatory obligations) (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2012b, p. 44). 
The dividend policy for Ben Lomond Water required a dividend distribution target of 50 percent of 
after tax profit which is paid  in addition to the payment of income tax equivalents and payments from 
guarantee bonds (Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporation (Northern Region) 2009).  
The financial position of Ben Lomond Water and Cradle Mountain Water were expected to become 
financially unsustainable (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2012b). It has been argued 
that this creates an inconsistency under the Water and Sewerage Corporations Act 2008 (Tas) which 
requires the dividend policy to be both consistent with good commercial practice and to make 
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adequate provision for future capital investment and operational expenses before a dividend is paid 
(Property Council of Australia, 2012).  
The House of Assembly Select Committee into the Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporations 
quote Miles Hampton in their 2012 report when recounting his meetings with various councils;  
They wanted to see us increasing the dividends. Their language would be they wanted there to be no 
price increases; I interpreted that to mean that they wanted price increases to be kept as low as possible, 
because the former is unrealistic whereas the latter is realistic (House of Assembly Select Committee 
into the Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporations 2012, p. 16). 
Payment of income tax equivalents and guarantee funds in addition to dividend payments were 
justified based on the COAG obligations of competitive neutrality (Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) 2006) for businesses in the public sector ("Water and Sewerage Corporation 
Bill 2012 Second Reading Speech" 2012). It is difficult to comprehend the necessity for competitive 
neutrality in circumstances where a single water and sewerage corporation exists without competition 
and where to do so denies revenue to investment which is required to remedy risks to public health 
and safety and the environment. 
There is also evidence in the case of one corporation that the amount of profits that some local 
governments would retain following the reforms were inflated by shifting the balance of fees 
collected away from water and towards the general rate, thereby increasing the amount of revenue the 
councils’ retained through general rates and decreasing the starting revenue of the water corporations 
(Parliament of Tasmania House of Assembly Select Committee on Water and Sewerage 2011).  
 
4.7.2 Are structural tensions and past management practices barriers to improved environmental 
compliance? 
While many existing reuse schemes were initiated through Commonwealth funding, the current 
ability to access to similar funding was commented upon by one State Government representative;  
The State Government is correctly of the view that they don't own the water and sewerage problem 
anymore. If you are leaning on them they will apply on your behalf, but they do not have any single 
drive on their own to represent your best interests at Federal Government level (Parliament of 
Tasmania House of Assembly Select Committee on Water and Sewerage 2011, p. 2). 
A 2010 LGAT press release entitled “Hands Off Water and Sewerage” reveals structural tensions that 
existed throughout the reform stating ‘[I]f the State Government thinks that it can just march in and 
covet billions of dollars worth of ratepayer assets, then it had better think again’ (LGAT 2010). The 
LGAT press release goes on to provide an insight into the tension between State and local government 
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which surrounded the negotiations leading up to the 2008 reforms stating ‘[W]e worked with the State 
Government to try to get an outcome that was workable. There was a lot they didn’t like about the 
process and a whole lot more that we didn’t like, particularly the haste with which it was done’ 
(LGAT 2010). 
In 2007 the LGAT represented that the process of the Tasmanian Government Ministerial Water and 
Sewerage Taskforce (2006) should consider historic investment by local government and that local 
governments were ‘…best placed to deliver water and sewerage services around the state…’ (LGAT 
2007, p. 10). In 2004-2005 for wastewater 11 municipalities returned a rate greater than 4 percent, 13 
returned less than 4 per cent and 3 reported a negative rate of return (Government of Tasmania 2006). 
The statement below suggests that the LGAT believed that there was a disincentive to initiating 
investment in water and wastewater infrastructure because to do so would result in the application of 
national standards to a WWTP’s discharge;  
The application of a national standard to a new facility generally means that the discharge conditions 
are far more onerous than those applied to the facilities of immediate council neighbours. This creates a 
disincentive (sic) toward upgrade as any improvement process is likely to trigger additional conditions 
that are unaffordable and arguably, unnecessary. The issue should relate to the impact on receiving 
waters (LGAT 2007, p. 7). 
However the Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator’s 2012 Water and Sewerage Price 
Determination Investigation Final Report notes the Tasmanian EPA’s assessment that its compliance 
expectations for the corporations were much higher than the expectations it placed on councils (Office 
of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2012b). The application of stricter standards following a period 
of underinvestment may be responsible for a bottleneck of required capital investment. 
 
4.8 Case study 
A number of the salient barriers to wastewater reuse are exemplified in the case study of 
Beaconsfield WWTP. By way of introduction, the plant was constructed in 1980 with a capacity of 
400KL a day to service a population of approximately 400 people (Ben Lomond Water 2011b). The 
facility had been identified by the Tasmanian EPA of one of several WWTPs which was a high 
priority for upgrade as it was not complying with environmental licence conditions for wastewater 
discharge. The solution that was chosen for this site was the construction of a 49 hectare tree-lot 
irrigation reuse scheme.  
The Compliance Implementation Plan for the Tasmanian Water and Sewerage Corporation (Northern 
Region) Pty Ltd directed EPA Tasmania to develop a priority framework for WWTP upgrades. The 
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2009 EPA Tasmania ‘Priority Framework for Level 2 WWTPs’ listed 10 WWTPs as high priority, 9 
WWTPs as medium priority and 9 WWTPs as low priority. Beaconsfield WWTP was the second 
highest priority on the list, which was agreed to by Ben Lomond Water and the Tasmanian EPA (Ben 
Lomond Water 2011b). Problems at Beaconsfield WWTP included lack of flow monitoring, and inlet 
screening. Implementation of these items commenced prior to the larger task of effluent reuse (Ben 
Lomond Water 2011b). 
The Minister for Environment and Heritage announced that the scheme ‘may prove to be a pilot or 
demonstration project for other sewage treatment plants in this and other regions of the State’ 
(Wightman, 2012). Ben Lomond Water announced the Beaconsfield wastewater reuse scheme as an 
economical way to reduce nutrients to surface waters as well as avoiding costly upgrades (Ben 
Lomond Water 2012a).  
Under the Water and Sewerage Industry Act 2008 (Tas) licence issued to Ben Lomond Water it was 
required to submit a WWMP to Tasmanian EPA. The WWMP was created to assist the organisation 
and regulators to assess how to prioritise investments on WWTPs. The WWMP is described as a 
‘flexible and living document’ because it describes Ben Lomond Water’s wastewater infrastructure 
assets, plans, and the requirements of relevant regulators (Ben Lomond Water 2011b). Capital 
expenditure on this process was also influenced by other improvement priorities regulated by State 
Government departments including the DHHS and the Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 
(Ben Lomond Water 2011b). 
Reuse feasibility assessment commenced after the Ben Lomond Water Wastewater Management Plan 
was agreed to between Ben Lomond Water and the Tasmanian EPA; it identified the WWTP as a high 
priority due to its impact on receiving waters (Ben Lomond Water 2011b). This was followed by an 
investigation of the costs of a range of options showing full reuse as the lowest cost option (GHD 
2011). Following this technical investigations were undertaken and a Development Proposal and 
Environment Management Plan (DP & EMP) (Ben Lomond Water 2011a). The DP & EMP is also 
assessed by the local council for its planning aspects. Requirements for the contents of a DP & EMP 
for WWTPs are contained in guidelines prepared by the Tasmanian EPA (Environment Protection 
Authority (Tasmania) 2012).The process of this feasibility assessment and the outcomes are described 
further in Chapter 4. In addition, a stated benefit of this option was that in owning the reuse scheme 
removes risks associated with providing wastewater to third parties (GHD, 2011). Ben Lomond 
Water’s existing schemes were located on private land and the Price and Service Plan documents the 
risk in relation to the schemes; it refers to the contracts for the schemes which were signed before Ben 
Lomond Water existed (Ben Lomond Water 2012b). 
 
 
83 
 
Before reuse wastewater was discharged to a tributary of the Tamar estuary which often had no 
natural flow, thus required ratios of 80 parts river water to 1 part wastewater were not achieved (GHD 
2011). Without full wastewater reuse environmental discharge would continue and this imposed costs 
including upgrading the treatment plant and potentially constructing a new outfall into the larger body 
of water (GHD 2011). Table 3.4 compares the indicators which are listed in the EPN for both 
discharge to water and discharge to reuse scheme.  
Table 3.4: EPN limits for effluent discharged to water and discharge to a reuse scheme 
(Environment Protection Notice No. 7934/3) 
Indicator Reuse Discharge  
pH  6.0 - 9.0 6.5 - 8.5 
Thermotolerant coliforms (cfu/100ml) <10,000 (Median) 500 (Max) 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (mg/L) 80 (Max) 30 (Max) 
 
Table 3.5 shows the three parameters from the licence for Beaconsfield WWTP in place from 1992-
2011 (Licence No.3597, 1992), and compares these to the same parameters in the 2011 EPN 
(Environment Protection Notice 7934/1, 2011, EF6-1). The limit on several parameters was raised in 
the second licence, and there was an increase in compliance for two parameters. 
 
Table 3.5: Discharge compliance limits for Beaconsfield WWTP (Ben Lomond Water, 2011b)a 
Parameter Limit (Maximum) 
1992/2011 
Percentage Compliance 
2010/2011 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (5 day) mg/L) 20 / 30 43% / 100% 
Non-filterable Residue / Suspended Solids (mg/L) 30 / 50 43% / 60% 
Thermotolerant Coliforms (cfu/100 ml)b 200 / 500 43% / 0% 
Notes; a. Other parameters included in the 2011 EPN have been excluded as these did not contain numerical 
limits in the 1992 EPN. b. CFU – Colony forming units 
 
4.9 Discussion 
In the case study of this chapter, sustainable wastewater reuse in the form of tree lot irrigation 
or other similar schemes was argued to be an economical way to reduce discharge of nutrients to 
surface waters. On the other hand, using land based disposal as a means of regulatory avoidance 
creates a new set of risks to manage by shifting the environmental, social or economic impacts in time 
and space; for example, by shifting impacts from surface water to groundwater (Mitchell 2006).  
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Tasmanian water quality policies require reuse to be considered before disposal (State Policy on 
Water Quality Management 1997). The absence of a direct reuse market may not equate with a lack of 
demand, for example, where wastewater is discharged to a river system and accessed for use 
downstream for other purposes. However, the blanket application of reuse targets may result in 
inequities due to local variables (Crase & O'Keefe 2012).  
The case study identified ‘risks’ associated with supply of recycled water to third parties as a factor in 
decision making. Requirements for the supplier of recycled water to manage risks associated with the 
use of recycled water which has been supplied to a third party can be unnecessary or unreasonable 
(Jackson 2005). Conversely, there may be circumstances where wastewater reuse would not be 
possible without the supplier providing ongoing expertise and retaining risk. If the Tasmanian 
governance structure necessitates avoiding such risk this may create barriers to reuse.  
The appropriateness of diversion of a portion of water bills into another arm of government as a ‘de 
facto tax’ has been questioned (O'Keefe et al. 2009). It is also counterintuitive that infrastructure 
could return a positive rate of return while at the same time not meet regulatory requirements. 
Wastewater infrastructure has been linked to gastrointestinal human health sickness in over 100 
people through consumption of contaminated commercially farmed shellfish (ABC News 2013). The 
question of whether a water bill is the appropriate mechanism for local government to collect revenue 
to be used in areas other than urban water and sewerage should therefore be a test of public interest 
which asks: What more urgent spending priorities justify diverting funds, where to do so would slow 
the rate of public health related infrastructure upgrades? 
The Productivity Commission has affirmed the importance of independence of utilities and regulators 
from government decision making on matters of public interest, and that the primary objective of the 
urban water sector is the provision of services in an economically efficient manner on behalf of the 
community (Productivity Commission 2011). The requirement for urban water to provide a 
commercial return on assets, places the water and sewerage corporation in a contradictory position 
between political and community resistance towards increasing charges, and the need to provide 
sanitation. This may be magnified by past ‘under investment’ (Office of the Economic Regulator 
2012). 
It is hoped that the merger of the Tasmanian water corporations will increase the efficiency of 
delivery of water and sewerage services. There is evidence that points towards relative efficiencies 
through similar larger board driven organisations when compared to local government (Byrnes et al. 
2010); conversely, there may be disadvantages of local government amalgamation and policy 
objectives may be better achieved through shared service provision (Dollery, Byrnes & Crase, 2007). 
In either event, it is suggested that strategic priority documents which decide the timing of investment 
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were in place before the 2012 reform and this would be expected to limit the impact of the reform on 
the timing of improvements to wastewater infrastructure. 
If the principle of competitive neutrality is applied without simultaneously ensuring other aspects of 
competition reform are present, such as the possibility for private competitors to enter the market, the 
policy merely serves to direct more revenue away from water and sewerage. When considering 
microeconomic and other water governance reform it is important that the Productivity Commission’s 
primary objectives are not forgotten, that is, that citizens gain improved services in a more efficient 
manner. If this is not achieved the reform has failed. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
The decision to reform Tasmania’s malaised urban water and sewerage sector has allowed 
regulators to provide input into the strategic priorities and investments for the industry. In the 
immediate future, while parts of the drinking water supply as well as many effluent discharges to 
waters remain non-compliant, it is likely that reuse of urban wastewater in Tasmania will not be dealt 
with as a stand-alone priority. While requirements to generate profits may push the outcomes of cost 
benefit analysis away from options for which the main benefits are non-pecuniary, the ruminating 
message from the Beaconsfield case study is that not being able to provide solutions that generate 
income based on the volume of wastewater sold should not justify doing nothing at all. The barriers to 
wastewater reuse, as identified in this chapter, are critical to the analysis of necessary future reform of 
the industry. Avaricious policies, such as requiring a dividend payment, instead of investment in much 
needed infrastructure to meet public health obligations, should be immediately apparent to the 
decision makers and citizens as unethical and indefensible. 
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5 Systemic barriers to wastewater reuse in Australia: Some jurisdictional examples 
 
5.1 Abstract 
This Chapter describes the regulatory framework and assessment process of urban wastewater 
reuse in two distinct regions of Australia, the Tamar Valley in northern Tasmania and the Hunter 
region of New South Wales. Relative similarities are evident between human population, water 
availability and recent necessity for reuse feasibility assessments. In the Hunter region, assessments 
informed a State government led catchment scale water security strategy. In Launceston, the need for 
assessments stems from a condition of the environmental permits for individual facilities. Salient 
institutional, social, economic, and political barriers mire the assessment process for, and success of, 
wastewater reuse. Distinct legal, policy and procedural differences exist between the two cases. Future 
reuse guidelines should identify the different drivers for wastewater reuse and avoid studies that only 
serve to meet administratively predetermined selections. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
The first condition of the National Water Commission’s (NWC’s) position on urban water reuse 
is that cost-benefit and risk analyses should be undertaken to ‘take full account of social and 
environmental externalities and avoided costs’ (NWC 2010, p.1). Assessment of costs and benefits 
prior to commencing wastewater reuse is an important step to ensure water management is sustainable 
and avoid a mere corporate promotional display. This chapter contributes to our understanding of the 
factors that influence the inter-jurisdictional inconsistency of such assessments and reuse 
determination by describing the requirements and processes of two urban water and sewage 
institutions: the former Ben Lomond Water Corporation (Ben Lomond Water), which until recently 
existed in the north-east of Tasmania; and the Hunter Water Corporation (Hunter Water) in eastern 
New South Wales (NSW) (Figure 4.1).  
One barrier to reuse is that much of Australia’s wastewater infrastructure has been built as part of a 
one directional, non-integrated supply network (NWC 2007). In part, the reason for these inadequate 
networks lies in an inattention to the social dimensions of water (Harriden & Graymore 2013) 
resulting in ineffective collaborative management (Lukasiewicz et al. 2013). Under these networks, 
wastewater and stormwater are collected, treated, and then discharged to the environment, ‘with 
insufficient regard to the impacts on the receiving environment’ (NWC 2007, p. 7). Additionally, due 
to the historical and continued disregard for these ‘external’ impacts for groups in society, the rising 
demand for water is met with increased supply and discharged wastewater (NWC 2007), perniciously 
imposing further impacts on receiving environments. While Marsden Jacob Associates (2013) 
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consider these impacts to be relatively small or rarely occurring, Blackwell and Willcox (2009) 
estimate the lost benefits for recreational users of a single beach of tens of millions of dollars 
annually. By reducing these adverse impacts, wastewater reuse offers an alternative to discharge, 
which can assist in meeting the goals of integrated water cycle and collaborative management.  
As the case studies show, recycling schemes vary by application, scale, and the roles of parties, 
required levels of treatment, ability to fund capital and operational investment, and whether they are 
operated on a ‘not for profit’, or on a commercial basis. These variations result in contrasting 
outcomes for the assessment and success of reuse. For example, Melbourne's Eastern Treatment Plant 
discharges large volumes of Class A quality wastewater without reuse because several large scale 
reuse options did not meet cost-benefit balance requirements set by the Victorian State Government’s 
business case (Melbourne Water 2009). Inconsistently, the business as usual option, disposal of 
wastewater, required no such business case. 
 
5.3 Feasibility assessment of wastewater reuse in Australia 
Feasibility studies for the implementation of integrated water cycle management options assess 
potential impacts of a proposal in order to allow a decision to be made on whether to invest in it 
(Urkiaga et al. 2008). Options for supply from traditional water sources are compared with options for 
wastewater recycling by contrasting the cost of producing recycled water with estimated market 
demand or willingness to pay (Hurlimann 2009). However, decisions to increase recycling equate to 
decisions to decrease discharge. Given a business case for discharge is not required, as in the 
Melbourne’s Eastern Treatment Plant example (Melbourne Water 2009), the external benefits of 
decreased discharge, such as improvements to water quality and beach recreational activities 
(Blackwell & Willcox 2009), are not factored into reuse assessments.  
Whether a proposed reuse technology is economically feasible involves consideration of technical, 
geographical, social and economic factors (Urkiaga et al. 2008). These factors will almost certainly 
vary between jurisdictions and sites. The NWC (2010, p. 1) position in favour of urban water 
recycling is ‘subject to four conditions’ including that ‘prior cost/benefit and risk analyses are 
conducted which take full account of social and environmental externalities and avoided costs…’, 
best available science and regulatory arrangements (based on the Australian Guidelines for Water 
Recycling (AGWR) (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council et al. 2006)), and finally 
community participation in decisions to implement recycling schemes which have transparent and 
accountable management arrangements. 
AGWR address risk management (Environment Protection and Heritage Council 2008). That said, 
there are no national guidelines for assessing costs and benefits of wastewater reuse. The process of 
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developing such guidelines would draw on existing guidelines from other jurisdictions (Urkiaga et al. 
2006), and methodologies for assessing the performance of reuse projects (Urkiaga et al. 2008), and 
for determining and calculating internal costs, externalities and opportunity costs (Hernandez et al. 
2006). 
 
5.4 Systemic Barriers to Assessing Wastewater Reuse 
5.4.1 Summary of systemic barriers to reuse and commentary 
The broad literature on barriers to reuse (presented in Chapter 2) is summarised in Table 4.1 and 
grouped into six main types, with details of how each aspect could impact the assessment or success 
of wastewater reuse. Barriers that have economic ramifications include: institutional and governance 
arrangements (Table 4.1, item 1), difficulties in determining the true cost of disposal options (item 2), 
and those that relate to demand and competition (item 3). The remaining three types: inadequate water 
quality management (item 4), political and policy influence on decision making (item 5), and 
perceptions of integrated water supply options (item 6), combine with the first three to sufficiently 
obscure or ‘muddy the waters’ for the transparent and complete assessment or success of reuse. This 
chapter refers to this ‘muddying of the waters’ as ‘coalescing concealment’, which results in a 
heightened likelihood of failure for wastewater reuse projects. Four examples help to clarify the 
workings of the concept with reference to the six main types of barriers (Table 4.1). 
The first example of coalescing concealment is that institutional and governance issues (Table 4.1, 
item 1), such as monopoly service provision and no competitive market for urban water (Productivity 
Commission 2011), manifest as economic problems in determining the true cost of disposal (item 2) 
and demand (item 3) for reuse (Stenekes et al. 2006). With an ineffective wastewater market where 
there are no price and volumetric charges as a mechanism to connect supply with demand decisions 
(Blackwell & Iacovino 2009), or no externality pricing (Radcliffe 2004), or no complete cost-benefit 
analyses that account for the external effects of water use and wastewater disposal (Blackwell & 
Willcox, 2009), wastewater reuse projects are preconditioned to fail (Dimitriadis 2005). Without 
volumetric charges, there is no incentive to reduce at its source (e.g. at point of use of the toilet) the 
creation of wastewater, in turn resulting in lower reuse demand (Blackwell & Iacovino 2009). 
Without the inclusion of the external benefits of increased water recycling, such as through improved 
recreational benefits from better ocean and beach water quality, cost-benefit analyses of water 
recycling and reuse are incomplete and biased (Blackwell & Willcox 2009). There are such a large 
number of problems associated with the institutional framework (item 1) and economics (items 2 and 
3) of wastewater reuse and recycling that these projects are more likely to fail (Blackwell & Iacovino 
2009). 
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A second example of coalescing concealment with institutional and governance arrangements is a 
focus on end user perceptions (Table 4.1, item 6) rather than the framework and processes (items 1 
and 5) through which these perceptions perpetuate, which can also lead to premature failure (Mooney 
& Stenekes 2008). Several potable reuse projects have failed because of public opinion, impacted by 
communication, transparency and perceived fairness; in particular the loss of trust (Hurlimann and 
McKay 2004). It is often argued that a ‘social contract’ has been created to not proceed with drinking 
recycled water (McKay 2007). Toowoomba experienced a rushed public information campaign, 
politics and manipulation of information (Hurlimann & Dolnicar 2010). This may be better reframed 
as a barrier created by the behavior of public institutions (items 1 and 5) resulting in mistrust (item 6).  
Table 4.1. Systemic barriers to wastewater reuse 
Barrier type Aspect Detail where applicable 
1.  Institutional 
and governance 
arrangements 
Jurisdictional differences in 
managing urban water  
Entrenched paradigms; large centralised 
schemes result (Stenekes et al. 2006)  
Institutions not well placed to 
consider broader benefits  
(e.g. greening landscapes, surface water 
recreation (Stenekes et al. 2006)) 
Greater technical efficiency in 
larger regional utilities (Byrnes et 
al. 2010) 
Greater economic efficiency with smaller 
utilities and fewer industrial customers.  
Less infrastructure ‘gold plating’ where 
strategic decisions rely less on 
engineering paradigm 
Industry structure suboptimal No effective market for urban water 
(Abbott & Cohen 2010)  
Lost value from water restriction reduced 
consumption (Productivity Commission 
2011) 
Inefficient, costly large scale 
augmentation projects (Productivity 
Commission 2011) 
Large government infrastructure grants’ 
perverse incentives (Productivity 
Commission 2011) 
Cumbersome approval processes Subdivisions with recycled water 
schemes (Radcliffe 2004) 
Increased complexity of 
producing recycled water 
(Radcliffe 2004) 
 
Development fixed headwork 
charges discourage reuse 
(MacDonald & Dyack 2004)  
 
Non-government investor poor 
infrastructure access (MacDonald 
& Dyack 2004)  
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Barrier type Aspect Detail where applicable 
Poor water pricing differentiation 
based on use (MacDonald & 
Dyack 2004);  
 
2.  Difficulties in 
determining the 
true cost of 
disposal options 
Inadequate recognition of 
externalities in water pricing 
(Radcliffe 2004) 
Includes inadequate recognition of 
disposal externalities, which have been 
quantified (Blackwell & Willcox 2009) 
Investment decisions based on 
market appraisals  
Lack proper consideration of social and 
environmental impacts (Listowski et al. 
2009)  
Financial evaluations too 
simplistic  
Ignore externalities, focus on capital and 
operational expenditure (Dimitriadis 
2005)  
Wastewater management 
decisions are therefore likely to be 
suboptimal (Blackwell & 
Iacovino 2009) 
No externality pricing and quotas provide 
second best solutions (Frontier 
Economics 2011) 
Decision maker inadequate 
understanding of risks  
Impede reuse and create unnecessary 
monitoring costs and lengthened 
approvals (MacDonald & Dyack 2004) 
Outfalls provide ability to 
continue to dispose of toxic waste 
at sea (Beder 1992) 
Avoid costly upgrade required for land 
treatment (Beder 1992) 
3.  Issues of 
competition and 
demand 
Demand:  
No effective market for urban 
water (Productivity Commission 
2011) 
Increases may result from consumer 
acceptance, availability of alternative 
sources, increases in potable water price 
to reflect disposal externalities 
(Blackwell & Iacovino 2009)  
Supply:  
urban water monopoly provision 
(Productivity Commission 2011);  
governance versus structural 
reform focus (Productivity 
Commission 2011);  
desalination cost legacy 
(Productivity Commission 2011) 
 
Increases may result from technological 
advances and efficiency gains 
(MacDonald & Dyack 2004) 
Decreases from failure to provide subsidy 
for developments with recycled water 
schemes, failure to include externalities 
in water prices, & appropriate price 
structures for all water sources (Radcliffe 
2004). For example: 
• salinity removal costs for secondary 
effluent from industrial discharge 
(Dimitriadis 2005);  
• managing human behaviour at the 
source of wastewater creation because 
of lack of price signals and volumetric 
charges (Blackwell & Iacovino 2009) 
Recycling targets inadequate  
 
Do not include full costs of water or price 
signals reflecting competition, demand 
(Chanan et al. 2011) or supply 
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Barrier type Aspect Detail where applicable 
Ignores who is impacted and use of 
benefit-cost analysis (Crase & O'Keefe 
2012)  
Removing impediments to 
integrated water systems 
(Productivity Commission 2011) 
 
4.  Inadequate 
water quality 
management 
Not cost-effective and creates 
barriers to integrated water 
management (NWC 2011) 
Inconsistent application of AGWR across 
jurisdictions (Power 2010) 
Liability onus on water utility (Radcliffe 
2004) 
Juxtaposition of guidelines (pub. 
health, agriculture sustainability) 
& discharge licenses 
(environmental protection) 
(Higgins et al. 2004) conceal 
broader benefits  
Reclaimed water different to effluent 
discharge guidelines (Higgins et al. 2004) 
Local regulator inadequate 
understanding of acceptable risks 
(MacDonald & Dyack 2004) 
High monitoring costs 
Cumbersome approvals 
Isolated decision making 
5.  Political and 
policy influence 
on decision 
making 
Prohibition of potable reuse 
(Radcliffe 2010) 
 
Transparent consideration of 
costs, benefits not undertaken 
(Productivity Commission 2011) 
(e.g., Wonthaggi Desalination, Sydney 
Water (Khan 2011)) 
Shareholding Minister’s Conflict 
of interest (Radcliffe 2004) 
Dividend trade off against broader 
beneficiaries (Abbott et al. 2011) 
Dividend simply a tax (O’Keefe et al. 
2009)  
6.  Perceptions of 
integrated water 
supply options 
Public acceptance and perception 
of risks (Dolnicar et al.2010; 
Jefferson et al. 2000;  Radcliffe 
2004) 
While willingness to pay 
quantification emerging (Jiménez-
Cisneros & Ahuja 2014; 
Menegaki et al.; Tziakis et al. 
2009) 
Little discourse on social and political 
drivers vis-a-vis scientific or engineering 
drivers (e.g., Ludwig & Storrs 1970; 
Thompson et al. 1992))  
Assumption and rhetoric may conceal 
institutional conservatism (Stenekes et al. 
2006) 
End-user preference focus prevents 
understanding of preceding institutional 
frameworks/approaches determining 
preferences (Mooney & Stenekes 2008) 
While perceptions of reuse 
improving (Dolnicar & Schäfer 
2009), informed WTP decisions 
hindered by: 
• public input limited by inability to 
participate in an urban water market 
(Blackwell & Iacovino 2009) 
• information asymmetry on 
environmental impacts of 
government/water authorities’ 
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Barrier type Aspect Detail where applicable 
controlled disposal (Blackwell & 
Iacovino 2009) 
• underwater wastewater discharge 
away from public eye; non-existent 
timely accurate high risk day 
reporting (Blackwell & Iacovino 
2009) 
Decision maker and water 
industry perceptions 
Environmental abatement important 
(Muston & Wille 2006)  
Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth 
(Brown et al. 2009)  
Receptivity high for industrial and public 
open space 
Receptivity low/average for drinking, 
indoor/outdoor household use, and 
environmental flows 
Environmental outcomes drive onsite 
reuse and third pipe schemes 
No perceived driver for potable reuse 
Greatest impediment is financial 
cost relative to other sources 
(Martin 2006) 
 
 
A third example, inadequate understanding of risks by decision makers (Table 4.1, item 2), may be an 
impediment to wastewater reuse and may lead to unnecessary monitoring costs or lengthened 
approvals (MacDonald & Dyack, 2004). There is also a risk that when one discharge ceases, the 
environmental, social and economic burdens of one practice are shifted (item 3) to another location, 
water system, or to a future date (Mitchell, 2006). This could occur where a land or water discharge is 
justified on the grounds that this option will delay necessary upgrades to underperforming 
infrastructure. For example, Beder (1992) describes the decision to extend ocean outfalls in Sydney 
under the motivation of avoiding the costs and inhibitory land requirements of secondary treatment, as 
well as the added benefit of being able to allow industry to continue to dispose of toxic waste to 
sewers. 
The fourth example is where political and policy influence (Table 4.1, item 5) remove the need for 
transparent and objective cost-benefit assessments of alternative infrastructure to that of wastewater 
reuse (Khan 2011; Productivity Commission 2011). A related fifth example involves inadequate 
management of water quality (Table 4.1, item 4), driven by political concern (item 5) and conflicts of 
interest for shareholding ministers (Abbott et al. 2011; Radcliffe 2004) rather than equitable or 
efficient treatment.  
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5.5 The Case Studies 
5.5.1 Ben Lomond Water, Tasmania 
5.5.1.1 Background 
Recent concerns with the performance of Ben Lomond Water’s WWTPs (Figure 4.1) included 
elevated levels of bacteria, nutrients and organic matter discharge into rivers and coastal waters, and 
low discharge compliance compared with water authorities in other Australian jurisdictions (Office of 
the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2012). To assist assessment of how to prioritise investments on 
WWTPs, Ben Lomond Water was required, under its license, to submit a Wastewater Management 
Plan (WWMP) to EPA Tasmania (Water and Sewerage Industry Act 2008 (Tas)). This process 
identified discharges creating public risk, poor plant performance, contaminated biosolids, lack of 
trade waste agreements with some industries, lack of flow monitoring, bypass of peak flows direct to 
receiving waters, population growth, and peak inflows exceeding EPA limits, reuse schemes without 
formal reuse agreements in place, third party controlled irrigation, mismatch of irrigation demand 
with effluent volumes, and irrigation areas and reuse storages too small for full reuse (Ben Lomond 
Water 2011c).  
 
5.5.1.2 Tasmanian Effluent Reuse Feasibility Study Guidelines 
In 2009, EPA Tasmania began to introduce a new regulatory framework for wastewater 
treatment and disposal (Environment Protection Authority (Tasmania) 2011a). One aspect of the new 
framework involves including a condition within some WWTPs Environment Protection Notices 
(EPNs) that an effluent re-use feasibility study be completed. Environment Protection Authority 
Tasmania Effluent Reuse Feasibility Study Guidelines (2011b) lay out broad issues to include in the 
study including option costing estimates and a triple bottom line assessment and public consultation. 
The outcome of this process is either a written undertaking towards full reuse, or an Emission Limit 
Guidelines Compliance Plan and a Discharge Management Plan (Environment Protection Authority 
(Tasmania) 2011b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Ben Lomond Water (Launceston) and Hunter Water (Newcastle) Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTPs), comparable 
relative discharge and LGA populations. Sources: Water basins, www.geoscience.gov.au; Local Government Area Population 2012, 
www.abs.gov.au; Discharge, Ben Lomond Water (2011c, pp. 63-171) and Environment Protection Authority (NSW) (2012).
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5.5.1.3 Environmental and planning approvals process 
Figure 4.2 summarises the process of obtaining an approval for the Beaconsfield wastewater reuse 
scheme (Figure 4.1 indicates the location and relatively small discharge of Beaconsfield WWTP). WWTP 
regulation and assessment is split between several State government departments and local government. 
Local Government has regulatory responsibility for wastewater reuse schemes as well as planning 
approvals under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (Tas). EPA Tasmania has responsibility 
for establishing limits for discharge to water in the Environment Protection Notice (EPN) under the 
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas) (EMPC Act). However environmental 
impact assessment is carried out by an informal grouping of staff from various State Government 
departments called the Wastewater Reuse Coordinating Group (WRCG) (Environment Division 
(DPIWE), 2002). The WRCG has no legislative basis, but has extensive responsibilities: evaluating the 
Development Proposal and Environment Management Plan (DP & EMP); forming management 
conditions; endorsing the EPN; and, future review of the scheme ‘from time to time’ (Ben Lomond Water 
2011b).  
 
Figure 4.2: Process of Wastewater Reuse Feasibility Study, Development Proposal and 
Environment Management Plan (DP&EMP), and amendment/approval of Environment Protection 
Notice (EPN) for Tasmanian WWTPs over 100kl/day hydraulic loading, which have no wastewater 
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reuse (WWR). Includes assessment of environmental sustainability by Wastewater Reuse 
Coordinating Group (WRCG) applying Environmental Guidelines for the use of Recycled Water in 
Tasmania, State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997 (SPWQM) and Emission Limit 
Guidelines. Sources: Ben Lomond Water 2011c; Environment Protection Authority (Tasmania) 
2009; Power 2010. 
 
5.5.1.4 Wastewater reuse feasibility assessment at Beaconsfield WWTP 
In summary, the process involved an options analysis assessing costs, risks, advantages and 
disadvantages of various options (GHD 2011). This was followed by exploration of the technical aspects 
such as soil environmental suitablity in the process of preparing the DP & EMP. In 1995, the treatment 
plant had previously been assessed as being unsuitable for reuse. Factors mentioned within the DP & 
EMP that changed the feasibility of reuse include WWTP performance, available land adjacent to the site. 
Motivations for reuse included reduced discharge, visual and environmental benefits of planting trees, 
removal of discharge, and potential benefits of preservation of remnant local flora and provision of habitat 
to some species of fauna (Ben Lomond Water 2011b). Acquiring land also reduced risks and 
administrative complexity of dealing with third parties. The option of full-reuse on land owned by the 
authority was the lowest capital expenditure option ($2,359,000), followed by discharge to water with no 
reuse ($4,240,000), and finally partial reuse and discharge to water ($5,330,000) (GHD 2011, p. 45). The 
increased cost for both options involving discharge to water reflects the costs of upgrading the treatment 
process and constructing infrastructure including an effluent outfall. Upon completion of this process, the 
option of a tree lot irrigation scheme and associated storage dam in Beaconsfield was selected at a cost of 
approximately AU$2.5 million (Ben Lomond Water 2012).  
 
5.6 Hunter Water Corporation, NSW 
5.6.1 Background 
Hunter Water is responsible under the Hunter Water Act 1991 (NSW) for catchment management, 
urban water supply and sanitation in the Hunter Region of NSW (Figure 4.1). Hunter Water developed the 
Hunter River Catchment Effluent Management Master Plan (the Master Plan) (Figure 4.3), which formed 
a step in the compilation of the Lower Hunter Water Plan that covers drought security in the area and is 
led by the NSW Metropolitan Water Directorate (2014) (Hunter Water 2011). The Master Plan includes 
an analysis of wastewater management scenarios for reuse for a 30 year period and relates to five 
WWTPs within the region. Only one WWTP was exceeding Load Based Licence (LBL) limits at the time 
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of the study; however, two were expected to exceed their LBL limits in the future (Sinclair Knight Merz 
2012). 
The Lower Hunter Water Plan was led by the Metropolitan Water Directorate, a division of the NSW 
Department of Finance and Services. Supply of recycled water falls under Hunter Water’s operating 
licence which is monitored by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). Whereas 
environmental licensing for WWTPs falls under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 
(NSW) (POEO Act) and the Environment Protection Authority (EPA). 
 
Figure 4.3:  Flow chart, Hunter River Catchment Effluent Management Master Plan (HRCEM 
Master Plan) progression into the Lower Hunter Water Plan. Hunter-Central Rivers Catchment 
Management Authority (Hunter CMA) and other stakeholders provide input. Hunter Water 
WWTPs are regulated by the EPA (NSW) by licences issued under the Protection of the 
Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) (POEO Act) and the Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). Source: Hunter Water 2011; Power 2010; SKM 2012. 
 
5.6.2 Load based licences (LBL) 
In NSW, when a polluter seeks to upgrade a WWTP and reduce the load of pollutants, the polluter 
may enter a load reduction agreement for up to four years; this may be accompanied by a claimable EPA 
financial assurance in the event that the agreed load is not met (Protection of the Environment Operations 
(General) Regulation 2009 (NSW), s. 30 & Div. 4). These agreements reduce the fees payable under a 
LBL and therefore tend to provide incentives to upgrade WWTPs. (Figure 4.3). For example, the 
Newcastle Sewerage System (Burwood Beach WWTP and ocean discharge) paid an administrative fee of 
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$46,460, a total pollutant fee of $339,238.90, and a load based fee of $295,138.90 for the 2009-2010 
financial year (Environment Protection Authority (NSW) 2012).  
 
5.6.3 Wastewater reuse feasibility assessment for the Master Plan 
The wastewater management options analysis was carried out by Sinclair Knight Merz (SKM). 
Each option delivered different social, environmental and economic costs and benefits. The options 
canvassed included: (1) continuing to treat and release, (2) transferring from non-compliant WWTPs to 
other plants, (3) transferring wastewater to ocean outfall, (3) non-potable reuse to a point that complies 
with licence conditions, (4) non-potable reuse for all new developments, (5) local agricultural reuse, (6) a 
private irrigation scheme, and (7) three options involving potable reuse (SKM 2012). There are existing 
recycled water schemes in this region. 
These options were compared using multi-criteria analysis (SKM 2012). This style of analysis allowed 
the investigator to develop each option to a point where enough was known to generate a score for each 
option based on criteria developed under the categories of social, environmental and technical factors. 
Criteria were broadly grouped into social, environmental and technical, with sub-criteria of ‘community 
acceptance’, ‘expected water quality impacts’ and ‘chemical use’ (SKM 2012, p. 51). A workshop of 
stakeholders assessed the options and a financial analysis was undertaken for each option. The final report 
found the options producing the lowest cost per kilolitre of water were also the two highest ranked 
scenarios when all the factors were considered. The rankings were: (1) treat and release, $1.56/kl, (2) 
reuse in a private irrigated wine district, $3.10/kl, (3) direct potable recycling, $4.19/kl, and (4) indirect 
potable recycling, $4.36/kl (SKM 2012, p. 3). While treat and release and agricultural reuse were 
estimated to save 4,052ML of potable water a year, the two lower cost potable options were estimated to 
save 20,855ML of potable water a year (SKM 2012, p. 3).  
 
5.7 Discussion – Impacts on Assessment Process 
5.7.1 Governance structures  
The NSW assessment process consolidated different effluent management options into scenarios or 
combinations of options to be presented to a State Government department to assist in forming long-term 
management objectives for the entire catchment. By contrast, the Tasmanian effluent reuse feasibility 
assessment was required under the WWTPs environmental permit and the WWTP upgrade framework, 
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which was determined by EPA Tasmania in consultation with the water corporation. Differences are 
evident between the disciplinary expertise of the staff of the departments who ultimately guide strategic 
decision making in NSW and those of the Tasmanian WRCG who assess the sustainability of wastewater 
reuse at different facilities. A catchment scale plan could be carried out in Tasmania; however, the 
Tasmanian Water and Sewage Corporation is not responsible for catchments, drainage and stormwater; 
except to the extent of their responsibility to manage urban water and sewage. 
Having a centralised government department coordinate assessment of wastewater reuse feasibility 
assessments of single WWTPs into regional strategies may have advantages. For example, they could 
identify opportunities across a broader area and ensure that the views of different stakeholders are 
considered (e.g., options are fully considered and initial selection is not overly influenced by one set of 
drivers, such as political influence). Another potential benefit is the identification of the potential for 
bubble licences that allow organisations that hold multiple licences to group discharges in an area for the 
purpose of determining total loads. Local assessments may have advantages over larger regional 
assessments for their ability to identify local knowledge in a cost effective manner and to avoid putting 
offside communities located closest to the new assets.  
While in both the Tasmanian and NSW cases the process leaned towards low cost, low technology 
options, such assessments can overlook the external benefits of alternative options. For example, in some 
circumstances higher cost, more complex options may result in reduced external costs, such as 
improvements in receiving water quality, improved recreational opportunities and treatment upgrade or 
infrastructure transfer avoidance. A fundamental criticism of least cost approaches is that they do not 
necessarily provide the optimal or greatest net benefit test from cost-benefit analysis (Tietenberg 1992). 
Given that multi-criteria analysis was used to assess and rank the options in the NSW case, rather than a 
thorough assessment of all benefits through a social cost-benefit analysis, it is expected that reuse options 
that provide greater volumes of potable water at a higher cost would be ranked lower.  
With respect to governance structures, the Tasmanian water and sewerage reforms relied on the formation 
of new institutions and governance arrangements for wastewater management. This has the potential to 
shift the political focus of decisions away from State and Local Governments onto the new water 
industry. Perraton et al. (2013) argue that the current requirements for the pursuit of profits, at the expense 
of public health outcomes in Tasmania, are not necessarily in the best interest of the public. A point of 
interest for future research is whether the merger of Tasmanian water corporations into one state-wide 
water corporation results in moves towards regional assessment of wastewater reuse feasibility as 
described in the NSW case study.  
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5.7.2 Environmental regulation– Load based licensing (LBL) 
As evidenced by the NSW case study, LBL may allow societal costs of pollution to be internalised 
in exchange for the incentive of reduced fees for improved environmental performance. Command and 
control pollution regulation is criticised for not producing results, being cumbersome to enforce, and not 
providing incentives for pollution reduction below set limits (Bernstein 1993). LBL offers an alternative 
to command and control pollution regulation (Raha 2007) because it charges the cumulative impacts of 
the load on the receiving environment, and it provides flexibility for the licensee and regulator to agree on 
the compliance method. Thus, it is designed to provide economic incentives and utilise markets to 
promote pollution reduction (Environment Protection Authority (NSW) 1998). 
LBL can be compared to Tasmanian permits which contain maximum parameter and concentration limits. 
Traditional concentration based licences charge either a set fee, or a fee based on the scale or class of an 
activity. Providing an economic incentive to maintain water quality should impact cost-benefit analysis in 
favour of options that reduce the discharge of certain pollutants. However achieving this may not always 
result in wastewater reuse (Institute for Sustainable Futures 2013).  
In Tasmania, environmental conditions for wastewater discharge are expected to be made more stringent 
following a period of ‘prolonged underinvestment’ (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2011, 
p. iv). Therefore, all things being equal, a resulting decrease in compliance is expected (Office of the 
Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2012). However, in the Tasmanian Beaconsfield case, compliance 
actually increased for some indicators prior to the upgrade following the issuance of lower standards in 
the new permit, as shown by tracking compliance (Ben Lomond Water 2011a) against limits set in 1992 
and 2011 (Beaconsfield WWTP, Licence No.3597; Licence No.3597, 1992). 
In NSW, drastic increases in fees for pollutant loads were not likely to become an immediate concern, 
partly due to previous wastewater infrastructure investment planning. By comparison, in Tasmania, many 
WWTPs in the region were already exceeding discharge limits. It is possible that in Tasmania the total 
amount of capital expenditure required to upgrade a large portion of existing water and wastewater 
infrastructure, as well as the greater urgency of other upgrades (e.g., drinking water), may impact 
spending priorities, favouring lower cost reuse options. 
 
5.7.3 Environmental regulation– Transparency and regulatory uncertainty 
The drivers for each of the reuse case studies in this chapter were primarily environment protection 
in Tasmania and water planning in NSW. However, the same environment protection policies existed in 
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Tasmania before and after reform; yet the commitment to and ability of the regulator to enforce 
environmental policies impacting the uptake of wastewater reuse has changed.  
Tasmania’s State water quality policy (SPWQM) and environmental legislation (EMPC Act) remained 
the same before and after water industry reforms. Much of the language within the SPWQM is 
aspirational and, for WWTPs, enforceable limits and details for water quality are in WWTP licences. The 
environmental regulators appear to have used the creation of a water corporation and removal of urban 
water and sewage management from councils to trigger the re-issuing of many outdated licences. If water 
governance structures are reformed but environmental regulations are not, it is open to the same problems 
that led to licences requiring re-issuing at a future date. This finding is significant because it has 
implications beyond Tasmania where other Australian states, such as Victoria, have similar problems with 
regulatory uncertainty for environment protection in water (Roberts and Craig 2014).  
The process described in this chapter adds to findings that LBL tends only to drive reduced discharge and 
not reuse (Institute for Sustainable Futures 2013), by highlighting the potential for a shift in research 
focus on the barriers to wastewater recycling to include policy factors which make disposal more 
advantageous than reuse. This could occur where an environmental regulator has sufficient power to push 
the aspirational aspects of policies. This is illustrated by the NSW Department of Environment and 
Heritage (2014) Beachwatch program, which provides public feedback on recreational water quality, and 
is far more extensive than Tasmania’s monitoring arrangements. Significantly, this disparity is repeated in 
all Australian jurisdictions and means different populations have different access to information on 
disposal impacts which could impact willingness to pay for recycled water.   
Lack of procedural transparency or uncertainty within the assessment process, or in areas of water quality 
management, are potentially barriers to wastewater reuse. For example, if the regulator’s expectations are 
unknown at the outset, or there are procedural intricacies that may only be obvious to people within the 
process, the associated uncertainty may discourage investment. The (1) reliance on aspirational non-
binding mechanisms for environmental protection, when combined with (2) a lack of incentives for 
meeting these, (3) a lack of procedural transparency such as in the establishment of licences that protect 
water quality in receiving waters, and (4) the level of government at which wastewater recycling is 
planned, combine as barriers to wastewater reuse. Behind these combining barriers is the coalescing 
concealment of the potential benefits from wastewater reuse. 
From an economic perspective, the most important reform for transparent assessment of wastewater reuse 
proposals would be consistent and dependable cost-benefit assessment guidelines. Because these are non-
existent for Australia, the lack of guidelines has the potential to provide for considerable regulatory 
 
 
107 
 
uncertainty, especially for those in greatest need of the guidelines; that is, those who bear the costs of a 
poorly performing industry, the general population.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
When recycling projects are considered, it is important to question their benefits in the contexts of 
water quality improvement, economic burden and impacts on the community. Decisions on infrastructure 
can have ongoing implications for many decades after the initial investment. Therefore, it is crucial that 
feasibility assessments stem from and inform strategic direction both regionally and nationally.  
The two case studies presented provide examples of the different institutional frameworks under which 
investment decisions may be framed. In both cases, leadership from State government departments was a 
driver for the assessment of wastewater reuse. Centralised leadership, as documented in the NSW case 
study, may be a mechanism to ensure that wastewater reuse feasibility assessment is carried out in a 
consistent manner and as part of the creation of long-term strategies informed by all stakeholders. In 
Tasmania, the driver for the urgency of water quality improvements may be favouring the assessment of 
smaller areas. Feasibility of wastewater reuse was influenced by many factors, including the costs of 
continued environmental discharge. The variation in the case studies indicates that the success of any 
future Australian guidelines for wastewater reuse assessment may be determined by their ability to 
accommodate the different drivers for wastewater reuse without allowing studies to become merely 
administrative requirements where the preferred option is already selected.  
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6 Extreme variation in Australian recreational water quality management guidelines and 
practice: overcoming legal and policy challenges 
 
6.1 Abstract 
Recreational water quality management in Australia was reviewed revealing inconsistencies in 
communication of risk and microbiological limits both within and between jurisdictions. When combined 
with lack of clarity on communication of risks and short term water quality limits in national guidelines 
the result is that each state has developed its own approach to manage water-borne illness that may result 
from wastewater disposal. Some jurisdictions use traffic light (red, amber, green) communication systems 
to represent compliance with national guidelines but NSW and Victorian Beach watch programs also use 
these to represent daily microbiological water quality, whereas Northern Territory uses it to indicate 
weekly monitoring results. All states except South Australia have developed limits for when a single 
sample shows high numbers of Faecal Indicator Bacteria (FIB) however this is not included in national 
guidelines. South Australia and NSW and Victorian Beach watch programs have developed daily 
warnings based on predictions of FIB, however other states simply advise swimmers to avoid swimming 
for between 24 hours and 5 days following rain. Reforms, which may help overcome barriers to 
consistency among reporting methods include; 1) communication and innovations states have adopted on 
their own accord, 2) national research forums for the validation and verification of limits and methods, 3) 
better support for local governments to enable consistent statewide implementation, and 4) linking federal 
government grants to reporting results in a nationally consistent format.  
 
6.2 Introduction 
This chapter describes the malaise induced by non-binding guidelines, policies and informal 
management practices taken by Australian jurisdictions to implement National Medical Research Council 
Guidelines for Managing Risks in Recreational Water 2008 (NHMRC 2008) guidelines, the chapter 
suggests a path forward to overcome the legal and constitutional impediments to a uniform national 
approach. Australia’s Constitution does not give the Commonwealth government power to make laws 
over water or water quality and as a result, each state and territory sets its own water quality laws and 
policies. The federal government has developed a National Water Quality Management Strategy 
(NWQMS) and the NHMRC 2008 guidelines are one document of the NWQMS. The guidelines are not 
mandatory but instead aim to provide guidance for development of local guidelines and practices to 
support a ‘nationally harmonised approach’ (NHMRC 2008, p11). 
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In some regions state government departments or state funded programs perform the physical act of 
monitoring microbiological water quality. In most other areas, recreational water monitoring is carried out 
by local government officers. NHMRC 2008 guidelines follow the approach laid out in World Health 
Organisation 2003 Guidelines for Safe Recreational Water Environments (World Health Organization 
2003) and contain non-binding international standards for assessing the risk of marine pollution to the 
health of recreational water users. NHMRC (2008) guidelines apply the WHO (2003) guidelines in an 
Australian context and include non-binding national guidelines for the monitoring of bacterial water 
pollution and recreational safety. The process of using the NHMRC 2008 guidelines to assess health risks 
and their development is described elsewhere (Hickey & Cowie 2003, Abbott et al. 2011). 
NHMRC 2008 guidelines also cover risk factors other than microbiological indicators, such as 
cyanobacteria and physical and chemical hazards. Monitoring and communication of microbiological 
water quality of recreational waters has important implications for public health. NHMRC 2008 describe 
the risks of contracting recreational water illness from contact with recreational waters polluted by 
microbiological pollution from faecal sources. These illnesses include enteric illness (self-limiting 
gastroenteritis), respiratory, eye, or skin infections, and in some circumstances, liver or renal disease or 
central nervous system illness. 
New South Wales (NSW), Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania have recreational water monitoring 
programs applying to specific geographic areas and it was necessary to examine these programs in 
addition to guidelines and policies that apply in areas outside of these programs. Outside of areas 
managed by State departments or their programs, local governments are usually responsible for 
monitoring recreational water. This provides an additional layer of complexity which is not covered in 
this chapter. This chapter does not attempt to provide judgement on the appropriate level of 
microbiological indicators or other human health risks. It should also be noted that the examples provided 
in this case study are not exhaustive of the large variety of approaches taken by the many of local 
governments, water authorities and other bodies applying recreational water guidelines; but are 
descriptive of prevailing management practices in regions. 
The remainder of this chapter comprises of five sections; Section 5.3 reviews recreational water quality 
monitoring in Australia focussing on monitoring for FIB, how this is communicated and inconsistencies 
identified between jurisdictions. Section 5.4 provides a discussion of Australian practice and guidelines, a 
comparison to the US, and describes some lessons on improved health outcomes in Australian 
recreational waters. Section 5.5 goes on to discuss the strategies which could be addressed in the national 
guidelines to provide better health outcomes drawing on examples from the USA and states in Australia 
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who have initiated reforms in their guidelines. In doing so it discusses models of standardising water 
quality laws. Section 5.6 provides some concluding comments.  
 
6.3 Recreational water quality monitoring of microbiological limits in Australia 
6.3.1 Overview 
NHMRC 2008 guidelines provide a process for assessment of microbiological risks in recreational 
water based on sanitary inspection and the measurement of microbiological indicators of faecal pollution 
over time. The FIB organism enterococci was chosen and limits based on 95 percentile microbiological 
water samples, generally taken over a period of time of approximately five years, were included in the 
NHMRC 2008 guidelines. This selection was based on WHO guidelines and studies which attempt to 
match the ‘response’ of gastrointestinal illness with the ‘dose’ as measured by the numbers of FIB in 
waters at the time of recreation. It is known that this dose response can change based on environmental 
factors as well as people’s own immune response to pathogens, for example, NHMRC 2008 guidelines do 
not apply to children. Other aspects which NHMRC 2008 does not cover are secondary contact 
recreation, such as kayaking or jetsking. They also do not provide a trigger value at which action should 
be taken when one sample is found to contain abnormally high numbers of FIB. This is because the 
approach taken is one of categorising risks based on the conditions as observed over time, rather than at a 
particular point in time. 
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 describe the application of NHMRC 2008 guidelines and recreational water 
guidelines in each Australian jurisdiction, policies and, in some cases, practices of larger water 
monitoring programs. It can be observed that in some circumstances NHMRC 2008 guidelines are closely 
followed and in other cases they are not. For comparison the US Environment Protection Agency (US 
EPA) 2012 Recreational Water Criteria are discussed in section 5.3.8 below. 
Table 5.1: Australian microbiological recreational water quality standards, guidelines and guidance 
notes (ACT Government Health 2010, EPA Victoria 2003, Department of Health & The University 
of Western Australia 2007, NHMRC 2008, NSW Office of Environment and Heritage 2013, 
Department of Environment and Conservation (NSW) 2006, Queensland Government Department 
of Environment and Heritage Protection 2009, the Northern Territory Department of Health 2011, 
South Australian Government 2003, US EPA 2012,). All values organisms per 100ml unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
 
 
 
 
Jurisdiction Guideline Daily forecast (usually summer months) Weekly bacterial monitoring Long term bacterial water quality 
Australia 
NHMRC 
(2008) (Non-
binding 
national 
guideline) 
- - 
≤40a A - 
41- 200 B - 
200-500 C - 
>500 D - 
NSW 
(Sydney and 
Beach-
watch)b 
Daily/Weekl
y not based 
on any 
binding 
guideline. 
Long term 
based on 
NHMRC 
(2008). 
Pollution 
unlikely Green  ≤40 Good **** ≤40 
Very good 
(Green) 
 
Pollution 
possible Amber  41- 200 Fair *** 41- 200 Fair (Amber)  
Pollution 
likely, 
avoid 
swimmi
ng 
Red  200-500 Poor ** 200-500 Poor (Red) 
 
Updated 
informat
ion 
available 
Up-
date  >500 Bad * >500 Very poor (Red)  
New South 
Wales 
(Other) 
Water 
Quality 
Objectives 
for each 
Catchment 
and Marine 
Water 
Quality 
Objectives 
for NSW 
Ocean 
Watersc 
- 
Primary contact recreation: Max enterococci 100 
per 100ml 
150 faecal 
coliforms and 
35 
enterococci 
Primary contact recreation 
median 
<600 faecal 
coliforms 
Primary contact 4/5 samples 
per month 
Secondary contact recreation: Max enterococci 
450-700 per 100ml 
<1000 faecal 
coliforms and 
230 
enterococci 
Secondary contact 
recreation median 
<4000  faecal 
coliforms 
Secondary contact 4/5 
samples per month 
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Jurisdictio
n Guideline 
Daily forecast (usually 
summer months) Weekly bacterial monitoring Long term bacterial water quality 
Victoria 
(Melbourne 
Metro - 
BeachRepor
t (Port 
Phillip Bay) 
and Yarra-
Watch)d 
Daily/Weekly 
(swimming 
season) not 
based on any 
binding 
guideline. 
Long term 
based on  
State 
Environment 
Protection 
Policy 
(Waters of 
Victoria) 
(2003) 
Suitable 
for 
swimmi
ng 
Good 
 
Ocean 
>200 
enterococc
i (dry 
weather)e 
One sample internal trigger - 
State 
Environment 
protection 
policy 
(Waters of 
Victoria) 
(2003) 
75th percentile 150 
E.Coli /100ml 
 
- 
Good 
but 
caution 
if 
rainfall 
Fair 
 
>400 Two consecutive sample trigger  
Avoid 
contact 
with the 
water 
Poor 
 >1000, 
after dry 
weather 
One sample impact 
indicator trigger  
No data N/A 
 
Victoria 
(Other) 
State 
Environment 
Protection 
Policy 
(Waters of 
Victoria) 
(2003) 
- - 
≤ 150 E. Coli 
OR 35 
enterococci 
Primary Contact Median of 
5 samples ≤ 30 days 
150 
enterococci 
/100ml 
Primary Contact75th 
percentile for 11 samples ≤ 
60 days 
≤ 1000 E. 
Coli OR 230 
enterococci 
Secondary contact Median 
of 5 samples ≤ 30 days 
ACT 
ACT 
Guidelines 
for 
Recreational 
Water Quality 
(2010) 
- 
≥200 First sample trigger Retest 
- 
≥200 Two consecutive sample trigger 
Advis
e 
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Jurisdictio
n Guideline 
Daily forecast (usually 
summer months) Weekly bacterial monitoring Long term bacterial water quality 
Tasmania 
(Hobart - 
Derwent 
Estuary 
Beach and 
Bay Watch) 
- - As per Tasmanian Recreational Water Quality Guidelines 
≤40 Good  
41- 200 or 
200-500 Fair  
>500 Poor  
Tasmania 
(Other) 
Tasmanian 
Recreational 
Water Quality 
Guidelines 
(2007) 
- 
1 test >140 Test again <48 hours - 
≤40 
41- 200 or 
Good  
2nd test >140 Issue advisory - 
200-500 
 
Fair  
1 test >280 Issue advisory - >500 Poor  
South 
Australia 
Environment 
Protection 
(Water 
Quality) 
Policy (2003) 
- - 
150 E. Coli 
and 33 
enterococci 
Primary contact - 
1000 E. Coli Secondary contact - 
Northern 
Territory 
Guidance 
Notes for 
Recreational 
Water Quality 
in the 
Northern 
Territory 
(2011) 
- 
<50 enterococcif Open  
Guidelines provide interim limits. NHMRC 
2008 when sufficient data available 
51-200 
enterococci Follow up/Open 
 
Two samples <48 
hours >200 
enterococci 
Advise public  
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Notes: “-“represents not included in guideline or practice. a. NHMRC 2008 Table 5.7 provides microbiological classifications, sanitary and microbial rankings 
are combined to generate a rating of “Good – Green (Surveillance)”, “Fair – Amber (Alert)” and “Poor – Red (Action)”; b. Two part assessment involving 
sanitary inspection and microbial water quality assessment category. (NSW Government Department of Environment Climate Change and Water 2010); c. 
(Department of Environment and Conservation (NSW) 2005); d. (EPA Victoria 2012); e. (EPA Victoria 2011); f. Based on two samples per month.  
 
Jurisdictio
n Guideline 
Daily forecast (usually 
summer months) Weekly bacterial monitoring Long term bacterial water quality 
Queensland 
- (South 
East 
Queensland 
Healthy 
Waterplay) 
Healthy 
Waterways 
Microbial 
Trigger Value 
Justification 
Paper (2014) 
- 
≥200 (Primary 
contact) 
≥1000 
(Secondary 
contact) 
“Warning trigger” 
Resample <24 hrs 
Review observations 
Sanitary inspection 
- 
Either: 
Three 
consecutive days 
≥200 (Primary 
contact) 
Or 
Two consecutive 
days 
≥500 (Primary 
contact) 
“Action trigger” 
Immediate temporary closure 
Resample <24 hrs 
Review observations 
Sanitary inspection etc 
Queensland 
(Other) 
Various water 
quality 
objectives 
- ≤40 enterococci per 100ml - - - 
Western 
Australia 
Microbial 
Quality of 
Recreational 
Water 
Guidance 
Notes (2007) 
 
- 
>200 
Resample < 24hrs 
Review observations 
Sanitary Inspection 
- 
≤40 
Very good, good 
(Green)  
41- 200 Fair (Amber)  
>400 
Advise, resample < 
24hrs, review 
observations, 
sanitary inspection 
- 200-500, >500 Poor (Red) 
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6.3.2 States and programs relying of methods not contained in NHMRC 2008 or their own guidelines 
As described in Table 5.1 different limits for the FIB enterococci in primary contact recreation 
water are 33, 35, 40, 50, 140, 200, 280, 400, 500 and 1000 enterococci organisms per 100ml. NHMRC 
2008 guidelines use enterococci as a FIB in marine and freshwater. Guidelines in Victoria and South 
Australia still use both E. Coli and enterococci as FIB and use different statistical methods and FIB for 
marine waters (E. Coli) to those used in NHMRC 2008 guidelines (State Government of Victoria 2014c).  
Monitoring programs in Victoria, NSW and Queensland rely on weekly enterococci trigger value 
methods which are not included in NHMRC 2008 guidelines or their own state guidelines. Queensland 
Water Quality Guidelines (2009) refer to NHMRC 2008 as the default guideline if no guideline value is 
available. Water quality objectives refer to the value of a 95 percentile of less than or equal to 40 
enterococci organisms per 100ml and therefore this value was included in Table 5.1. A more recent paper 
from Queensland body “Healthy Waterways” recommends trigger values for enterococci for both primary 
and secondary contact recreation.  
Beachwatch NSW communicates weekly monitoring results based on Table 5.7 of the NHMRC 2008 
guidelines. However there are also Water Quality Objectives for each Catchment and Marine Water 
Quality Objectives for NSW Ocean Waters which provide ‘example’ numerical criteria for waterways 
across the state. These include reference to numerical levels from ANZECC 2000 Guidelines as well as 
values, which Beachwatch NSW no longer recommend.  
In Queensland, policies and guidelines are almost silent on recreational water quality. It therefore falls on 
specific councils to decide whether to follow the national guidelines or local and state guidelines on a 
case by case basis. In this case the Healthy Waterways program provides additional guidance for South 
East Queensland and this was included in the review undertaken in this thesis. 
 
6.3.3 Limits (trigger values) for short term or weekly monitoring 
To decide when to close a beach for recreation, most states rely on one and two sample trigger 
values. These are limits that, if a single sample is over the trigger limit a management action will be 
triggered. The management actions are either taking a second sample (with a public warning for another 
high sample) or issuing public warning. Interestingly, NHMRC 2008 does not provide single sample 
trigger values.  
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Differences exist between states with respect to the limits and management actions. Guidelines in 
Tasmania (excluding Derwent Beachwatch) and the ACT rely solely on the one and two sample 
enterococci per 100ml triggers, with ACT using only a single numerical limit (200) and Tasmania using 
its own unique limits (140 and 280) (Tasmanian Government Department of Health and Human Services 
2007). Beach Report Victoria also apply their own numerical limits at (200, 400, 1000) (EPA Victoria 
2011). 
Western Australia has developed an ‘Enterotester’ tool which allows microbial testing data to be entered 
to generate site specific trigger values and values for which two samples in a row must be higher than the 
trigger management action (Abbott et al. 2011). It enables calculation of 95 percentile value, accounts for 
different sized sample sets (large and smaller), and calculates one sample and two sample site specific 
trigger values. Generic microbiological trigger values (at 200 and 400) are also provided within Microbial 
Quality of Recreational Water Guidance Notes (2007) where insufficient data is available (Department of 
Health & The University of Western Australia 2007).  
Healthy Waterways Queensland recently created microbial trigger guidance (not an enforceable set of 
criteria) to be used in addition to NHMRC 2008 in South East Queensland, in order to create consistent 
short term recreational water management limits for both primary and secondary recreation to be used in 
addition to NHMRC 2008 in South East Queensland. They provide their own system of warning triggers 
based on enterococci (200 primary, 1000 secondary) requiring further testing, and for primary contact 
recreation, an action trigger (500 for two days, 200 for three days) for closure and a flow chart describing 
action to be taken. If more than three consecutive daily samples fall into the “warning trigger” category 
they will be upgraded to an “action trigger”; meaning advisories are issued for primary contact recreation 
(Healthy Waterplay 2014). 
The Northern Territory Guidance Notes for Recreational Water Quality in the Northern Territory (2011) 
adopts NHMRC 2008 when sufficient data are available, and generic trigger levels for fortnightly 
monitoring are matched to a traffic light system, although these values are for weekly tests and do not 
correspond with NHMRC 2008 (Northern Territory Department of Health 2011).  
For secondary contact recreation waters which are over the relevant warning value, Healthy Waterways 
(Queensland) provide a risk matrix which local officers can apply to waters. It considers vulnerability of 
users, number of people, exposure of activities, likelihood of infection and then gives a health risk, for 
which the highest two categories will result in equal closure scenarios. A risk matrix for secondary 
contact recreation provides an opportunity for smaller jurisdictions because if there are limited users, and 
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low exposure risk, then overall risk is predicted to be low and water can remain open based on the balance 
of risk (Healthy Waterplay 2014). 
 
6.3.4 Daily predictive water quality warnings  
Table 5.1 shows that South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales all have daily alert programs 
which provide information daily during designated swimming seasons utilising environmental 
information, such as rainfall, to predict when water quality may decline. Outside these services, lay 
people are exposed to unknown and potentially very high risks to their health. 
In bathing season in Victoria around the Melbourne metro area, Beachwatch and Yarrawatch (EPA 
Victoria) provide a daily rating for 36 metropolitan beaches in Port Phillip Bay and four Yarra River 
locations twice daily from December to March. These projects rely on Twitter and local life savers (at 10 
beaches) to promote rankings (State Government of Victoria 2014a). In South Australia, WaterConnect 
(EPA South Australia, https://www.waterconnect.sa.gov.au) monitors stormwater flow in coastal waters 
in addition to microbiological monitoring programs and provides an unverified dataset of potential 
stormwater flow. The South Australia EPA publishes a “Caution” sign on a map online and via email but 
by subscription (Government of South Australia 2014).  In NSW, Beachwatch gives daily water quality 
forecasts based around modelling rainfall and the previous five years of monitoring data. The program 
produces water quality predictions based on modelling of the previous 5 years of microbiological 
monitoring results and rainfall data (rainfall threshold) and current data from 40 rain gauges. A weekly 
star rating is provided using one enterococci sample result and provides stars based on NHMRC 2008 
suggested values (Table 5.7). Long term beach grades based on NHMRC 2008 guidelines are updated 
yearly, at 127 swimming locations in Sydney by Beachwatch plus 129 council sites (NSW Government 
Department of Environment and Heritage 2014). While this sounds comprehensive, outside of these areas 
large areas including Australia’s more populated towns are left unmonitored. 
 
6.3.5 General warnings following rain 
Outside of these the daily pollution warning programs, departments rely on providing general 
warnings against swimming after rain. General warnings for not swimming after rainfall range from five 
days in Tasmania (Tasmanian Government Department of Health and Human Services 2014), one to two 
days in Victoria (State Government of Victoria 2014b). New South Wales Beachwatch recommends 
avoiding water for one day for ocean and three days for Harbour beaches (NSW Government Department 
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of Environment and Heritage 2014). In Queensland the Health Waterways program recommends one day 
for open waterways and beaches and three for rivers lakes and oceans and includes swimming, surfing 
and secondary contact through jet skiing (Healthy Waterways 2014), the Northern Territory recommends 
three days for waters classified as “good” under their guidelines (Northern Territory Department of 
Health 2011). Whereas in Western Australia the warnings are based on NHMRC 2008 guidelines for 
water quality, so that users are advised to stay away for between three days and one week following 
heavy rainfall (greater than 10mm) depending on the ranking of the waterbody (Department of Health & 
The University of Western Australia 2007). Again, gross inconsistency applies within and between 
jurisdictions. 
 
6.3.6 Communication and use of the traffic light system  
Table 5.1 shows that a variety of symbols and methods of communication. A traffic light symbol is 
included in Table 5.3 to represent states using variations on the green, amber, red method of 
communicating risk. As seen in Table 5.1 NSW Beachwatch utilises NHMRC 2008 guidelines for weekly 
water quality reporting but have applied their own weekly star rating, and for the long term, a traffic light 
communication. In Queensland local variation applies. For example in Moreton Bay, signage uses colours 
to represent NHMRC 2008 in a similar manner to Western Australia and New South Wales 
(Beachwatch), albeit with their own system of some ticks and exclamation marks. By contrast, in 
neighboring Brisbane City Council, another system is used. The ACT uses a grading system of extreme, 
high, medium and low to classify primary and secondary contact recreation areas for the risk of algae 
which are harmful to human health. Microbiological risks are classified as either “open” or “closed” 
(ACT Government Health 2010).  Queensland Water Quality Guidelines also contain a traffic light 
warning criteria for blue green algae in recreational waters (Queensland Government Department of 
Environment and Heritage Protection 2009). 
Moreton Bay Council (Queensland) uses another variation of the traffic light approach with its own 
unique symbols (not listed in Table 5.1 or 5.2) to represent compliance with NHMRC 2008 Table 5.7 
(Moreton Bay Regional Council 2014). By comparison, neighbouring Brisbane City Council posts a 
‘general information sign’ warning that the waterway is affected by ‘high levels of bacteria at certain 
times, especially after heavy rainfall’. It warns against swimming, jet skiing, kite surfing and ‘any activity 
where you may swallow water and have your face frequently wet’. Brisbane also uses a ‘temporary 
warning sign’ reporting that high levels of bacteria have been recorded and advising against contact with 
the water. The council’s website notes that; ‘The enterococci trigger levels for installing and removing the 
 
 
128 
 
warning signs are based on those in the National Guidelines for Managing Risks in Recreational Waters, 
2008’ (Brisbane City Council 2014). 
Table 5.2: States that display information on beach water quality online through periodically 
updated webpages, reports, media or signage 
State Description 
Western Australia, 
Department of 
Health 
Temporary ‘Beach grades' assigned for both metropolitan and regional sites are 
presented on the Western Australia Department of Public Health website (Government 
of Western Australia Department of Health 2014) 
Tasmania, 
Department of 
Health and Human 
Services 
Weekly monitoring data from local governments is carried out (usually weekly, (some 
fortnightly) and usually between November or December and March) is reported yearly. 
Derwent Bay Watch (Hobart and surrounds) uses a website to advertise weekly and long 
term recreational water quality results (Derwent Estuary Program 2014, Tasmanian 
Government Department of Health and Human Services 2014)  
Queensland Local governments conduct monitoring and some (eg Moreton Bay Council) publish 
results online while others (eg Gold Coast Council) publish only general information 
online 
Northern Territory, 
Department of 
Health 
Yearly data and beach closure advisories based on enterococci data collected from 12 
beaches in Darwin Harbour (1 June – 30 September) by the Department of Land 
Resource Management (Northern Territory Department of Health 2013) 
ACT, Territory and 
Municipal Services 
(TAMS) and 
National Capital 
Authority 
Weekly monitoring of some areas is carried out by Territory and Municipal Services 
(TAMS) (ACT Government Territory and Municipal Services 2014) National Capital 
Authority monitors Lake Burley Griffin including weekly reports for the swimming 
season (mid-October to mid-April) (National Capital Authority 2014) 
 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of how states (other than beachwatch style programs) deliver online 
communication of water quality. It is noteworthy that Australia’s capital cities have online water quality 
information available, whereas tourist destinations such as Byron Bay and the Gold Coast do not. Table 
5.3 provides a simplified overview of Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. This is provided in order to identify 
themes in recreational water management and to assist in tracking variation in methods used. When 
referring to ‘following NHMRC 2008’ this is interpreted as the standard of recreational water quality set 
by Western Australia and NSW Beachwatch, that is, conducting regular sanitary inspections in addition to 
microbial water quality indicators based on the recommended data set. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of recreational water quality monitoring guidelines and programs in Australia 
 
Long term grade Weekly tests Daily forecast 
NHMRC 
2008 
Other (other FIB, 
rolling percentiles 
etc)a 
“Applying” 
NHMRC 
2008 Table 
5.7b 
One/Two 
sample triggers 
and maximums 
Prediction of 
likelihood of 
pollution based 
on rainfall 
Australia NHMRC 2008    - - - - 
WA Microbial Quality of Recreational Water Guidance Notes (2007)    -   - 
NSW 
Beach Watch    -  (star rating) -   
Water Quality Objectives (each catchment and 
ocean) -  -  - 
VIC 
State Environment Protection Policy (Waters of 
Victoria) 2003 -  - - - 
Beach Watch (Port Phillip, Yarra) -   -    
SA Environment Protection (Water Quality) Policy 2003) -  - - - 
 EPA Stormwater warnings - - - -  
QLD 
Healthy Waterways Microbial Trigger Value 
Justification Paper (2014) (South East Queensland 
Program) 
- - -  - 
Water Quality Objectives (Various) -  -c - - 
ACT ACT Guidelines for Recreational Water Quality - - -   
NT Guidance Notes for Recreational Water Quality in the Northern Territory (2011) - - -    - 
Tas 
Recreational Water Quality Guidelines 2007 - - -  - 
Derwent Beach Watch (Hobart - Derwent Estuary 
Beach and Bay Watch)   - -  - 
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Notes: a. Using E. Coli, faecal coliforms, rolling percentiles or median (Victoria State Environment Protection 
Policy (Waters of Victoria) 2003, South Australia (Environment Protection (Water Quality) Policy 2003); b. This is 
not the express intention of Table 5.7 NHMRC 2008 but has been adapted in many regions; c. For the column 
“applying NHMRC Table 5.7” there is variation within some states, for example, Brisbane City Council and 
Moreton Bay Council in Queensland take different approaches, described below. For this reason Table 5.3 also lists 
Beachwatch style programs and guidelines.  
 
6.3.7 Intra-jurisdictional variation in the application of NHMRC 2008 guidelines 
The following differences in application of the NHMRC 2008 guidelines are identified through 
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3; 
• Short term limits for beach closures and advisories where one or a small number of samples are 
high 
• Procedures for communicating risk when programs have not been established for five year and as 
a result 100 data points (samples) are not available should be included in national guidelines 
• Replication within samples and monitoring procedures vary 
• Variation between states exists for communication within the use of traffic light system. If traffic 
lights are used to communicate risk there is variation in what colours and symbols are used, and 
what colours represent. For example, some states use “green” to show testing is done under full 
NHMRC 2008 (all matrixes, 100 data points), others use only the microbiological limits, and 
other versions exist for example likelihood of stormwater pollution 
• Use of enterococci as FIB is not universal. The same holds for E. Coli and faecal coliforms 
• Public access to actual data varies from full access within days, to yearly summaries to no access 
unless requested, or no data at all 
• NHMRC 2008 microbiological matrix (Table 5.7) is included in the guidelines but not other 
elements such as sanitary inspection 
• Statistical methods vary, for example, Enterotester, median, 95 percentile or 75 percentile 
• Secondary contact recreation is not managed at all in some cases 
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• Levels of guidance as to what constitutes a sanitary inspection are lacking (Abbott et al. 2011) 
Despite these inconsistencies and malaise induced by undemanding guidelines, there are cases of 
advanced recreational water quality monitoring in use by Australian States and the US (not in NHMRC 
2008 guidelines). For example; 
• Weekly ranking and long term (NHMRC) ranking utilizing some version of traffic light  
• Limits which trigger management action where one or two samples contain high numbers of FIB 
• Secondary contact recreation limits and use of a secondary contact recreation risk matrix (sanitary 
inspection) 
• Predictions based on a combination of sanitary inspection combined with current rain or 
stormwater levels (mentioned in NHMRC 2008 but not taken up everywhere) 
• Beachwatch programs which support local government implementation and standardization and 
storage of data 
• Quantitative microbial risk assessments and microbial source tracking  
• Recreational water quality monitoring advanced on NHMRC 2008 and used in international 
jurisdictions includes rapid methods of detecting microbiological pollution in water, and national 
central collection of data encouraged by grants, as discussed in section 5.3.8 of this chapter. 
Noteworthy amongst these advances is the Queensland Microbial Trigger Value Justification Paper which 
defines primary contact recreation more broadly than many regulators may understand this to be. For 
example, including activities traditionally seen as secondary contact recreation based on exposure, not 
assumption. 
 
6.3.8 Recreational water quality monitoring in USA 
In the US, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (referred to as the ‘Clean 
Water Act’) makes all discharges to water illegal and requires a permit for operating a discharge. Criteria 
and standards are set at a federal level and these are carried out by the states with provisions for federal 
financial support (Copeland 1999). The Beaches Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health Act 
(2000) (Beach Act) amended  the Clean Water Act to require the US EPA to create criteria for faecal 
indicator bacteria, states adopt these criteria, monitor beaches, and to warn the public if levels indicate the 
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area is unsafe for recreation. In 2012 this amounted to 3762 coastal and Great Lake beaches (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency 2013). In order to support this the US EPA is also given the 
power to give grants to support coastal water quality monitoring (Clean Water Act s. 406). In 2014, US 
EPA estimated it would give $9,549,000 of grants (US EPA 2014). By accepting the grant the State is 
then required to comply with reporting requirements (Clean Water Act s. 406). Section 5.4 of this chapter 
proposes novel policy options based on US and other experience which may assist Australia to overcome 
constitutional issues and become move towards consistency.  
Boehm et al (2009) summarised research on the former 1986 US EPA recreational water criteria, 
highlighting that relationships of faecal indicator bacteria to recreational water illness are not well 
established for all waters such that different criteria should be created for different types of waters and 
risks. With respect to pathogen concentrations, for which pathogens are actually causing the illness, they 
only relate to gastrointestinal illness and not the range of other illnesses or vulnerable people and 
children, and they reflect an acceptable risk which was decided without asking the public what risk was 
accepted. Further, they argue the methods applied here (and in Australia) are slow and that single samples 
do not reflect water quality which often is extremely variable. This may lead to Type 1 and Type 2 errors, 
that is, waters may be either open when it is not safe or closed for no reason (Boehm 2007, Boehm et al. 
2009). Type 1 errors leave open the possibility of human illness, Type 2 errors deprive citizens of 
recreational values for no reason. In either case this is a sub-optimal outcome for marine recreators, and 
this group is worse off from this poor management. 
Through the Beach Act US EPA also initiated research required to update recreational water criteria in 
2000. This has resulted in the development of more rapid methods of detecting microorganisms in 
recreational water and the use of these to predict swimming associated health impacts (Wade et al. 2006).  
A point of comparison between Australian national guidelines and US national criteria are the 
recommendation of procedures when a single high sample is returned. US EPA 2012 Recreational Water 
Quality Criteria presents a different approach to that used in NHMRC 2008 which in theory should be 
applied in future state guidelines. The main limits to be included in State’s guidelines are magnitude 
criteria involving geometric mean and statistical threshold values for enterococci. However, a beach 
action value is also included as an optional value that states can use to make decisions on whether to close 
a beach with a single high sample.  
US EPA 2012 Recreational Water Quality Criteria (2012) provide two choices based on illness rates; 
• 32 illnesses per 1000 primary contact recreators       
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• Enterococci GM8 30, STV9 110, E. coli 100 STV 320 (cfu10/100ml) 
Beach Action Value; Enterococci (culturable) – 60 cfu, E.Coli – 190 cfu, Enterococci QPCR11 – 640 
cce12. 
• 36 illnesses per 1000 primary contact recreators  
• Enterococci GM 35, STV 130, E. coli 126 STV 410 (cfu/100ml) 
Beach Action Value; Beach action value: Enterococci (culturable) – 70 cfu, E.Coli – 235 cfu, Enterococci 
QPCR – 1000 cce. 
The illness rate of 36 per 1000 represents a 1986 criterion and therefore the lower rate represents an 
advancement of water quality (US EPA 2012).  
With respect to implementation, the Clean Water Act criteria were not taken up by all US States, which 
led to the Beach Act. However not all states had achieved the Beach Act requirements, which led the US 
EPA to pass the Bacteria Rule ("Water Quality Standards for Coastal and Great Lakes Recreation Waters” 
2004). The rule put in place protections in the states that had not either adopted US EPA’s criteria or 
adopted modified versions or site specific guidelines, based on scientific evidence, which have been 
approved by US EPA. It is noted that approaches to recreational water warnings also vary between US 
states, and that funding and other issues may cause issues for implementation of these national guidelines. 
However, this thesis does not explore implementation of US water quality guidelines.  
 
6.4 Lessons for improved health outcomes in Australian recreational waters 
6.4.1 Overview 
Table 5.4 provides an overview of five problem areas which may cause Australian recreational 
water quality management may not be optimal. Immediately following Table 5.4, an overview is provided 
where these areas are reviewed in greater detail. The identified solutions are canvassed briefly in this 
section of the chapter, and returned to in Section 5.5, which discusses the model and barriers to reforms 
8 Geometric Mean 
9 Statistical Threshold Value 
10 Colony forming units 
11 Quantitative Polymerase Chain Reaction; a genetic method, used to determine the microbial pollution in water and 
described further below 
12 Calibrator cell equivalent 
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Table 5.4: Overview of problem areas in Australian recreational water quality monitoring and 
potential consequences for society 
Identified problem Summary of problem Identified solutions 
1. Do NHMRC 
2008 guidelines 
achieve national 
consistency? 
Lack of guidance in NHMRC 2008 guidelines in some areas has 
led states to take their own approaches to fill the gaps. 
These issues have been described previously in this chapter. In 
summary;  
• Sanitary inspections, definitions in risk classification (Abbott et 
al. 2011) 
• Absence of short term trigger values (Table 5.1) 
• Absence of secondary contact recreation 
• Standardising 
monitoring 
procedures by 
providing national 
guidance for most 
advanced states 
• Further solutions 
discussed in Table 
5.5 
2.  Do assumptions 
and uncertainty 
within guidelines 
and practice create 
problems? 
When guidelines were developed certain assumptions were made 
to fill gaps in knowledge. These may produce issues for some 
users. 
• Risk to children may be underestimated (Wade et al. 2008) 
• Possibility of waters remaining open or closed at wrong times 
due to one-two day testing period (Wade et al. 2006) 
• Result of single water samples may not give reliable enough 
estimate to close or open beach (Boehm et al. 2002, Whitman 
& Nevers 2004) due to extreme spatial and temporal variability 
of FIB in water  (Boehm et al. 2002, Whitman & Nevers 2004, 
Boehm 2007, Amorim et al. 2014) 
• Study required to determine actual disease burden rather than 
assumption (Lepesteur et al. 2006) 
Optional methods for 
advanced states 
should be included in 
reformed of NHMRC 
guidelines, in order to 
ensure consistency, 
including ; 
• Rapid genetic 
methods (Griffith 
& Weisberg 2011) 
• Modelling and risk 
assessment 
3. What role does 
public perception 
and behaviour play 
in safety? 
A range of factors such as age, background and absence of 
warning signs for poor recreational water quality can influence 
whether people will swim and therefore impacts risk (Lepesteur 
et al. 2008).  
Behaviours may increase risk where a large proportion of 
recreators in an area fall outside guidelines (eg children, elderly) 
(Lepesteur et al. 2008). 
Communication to be 
included in national 
guidelines 
Further study to 
understand risk 
(Lepesteur et al. 
2008) 
4.  Does poor 
communication 
increase duty of 
care? 
Inadequate communication of recreational water risks or 
insufficient monitoring of risks may create a risk for swimmers 
who are reliant on governments to inform them when government 
run infrastructure creates a higher than normal risk, for example, 
sewage spills 
Demonstrates that it 
is better to remove 
risks (for example, by 
reducing wastewater 
discharge through 
wastewater reuse) 
than manage them 
through monitoring 
Further study to 
determine disease 
burden in relationship 
to monitoring 
program  
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6.4.2 Effectiveness of NHMRC 2008 guidelines in achieving consistency 
Australian water quality guidelines recognise the flexibility that local variation requires, however 
Table 5.1 shows that the levels of FIB and the timing and manner of warnings one receives varies 
depending on which State or suburb you are swimming in.  
Commentary suggests that the NHMRC 2008 guidelines which combine sanitary inspection with 
microbiological classification is effective but with limitations including absence of a template for sanitary 
inspections, absence of definitions of the final risk classifications in NHMRC 2008 guidelines. This has 
led Western Australia to develop a traffic light system with generic definitions of risk as the Enterotester 
spreadsheet (Abbott et al. 2011). Perhaps predictably, since 2008 other states have also moved to 
overcome these shortcomings. Table 5.1 describes how similar methods of communication are used in 
various jurisdictions to represent a variety of things, and further, that some jurisdictions recommend 
single and two sample trigger values. This variation is potentially leading to public confusion. 
Standardizing monitoring procedures brings funding and logistical issues in some areas, and a lack of 
flexibility (for example when evidence is collected demonstrating lower risk). However, in turn 
standardised monitoring processes provide increased accuracy for assessment of health risks and for how 
health risks vary between beaches (Nevers & Whitman 2010). From a policy perspective, there is a 
danger that some states are choosing to apply a higher risk threshold than recommended by the NHMRC 
2008 guidelines, potentially providing inaccurate comparisons of recreational water safety when 
compared to more advanced states. 
 
6.4.3 Overcoming assumptions and uncertainty 
In some areas where recreational water quality testing relies solely on weekly microbiological 
testing there is a possibility of underestimation or overestimation of risk. FIB concentrations at coastal 
and inland beaches have been shown to be highly variable over time and space (Boehm et al. 2002, 
5. Do recreational 
water guidelines 
effectively inform 
investment 
decisions? 
Beachwatch programs provide greater information for decision 
makers when prioritising both investment decisions and health 
and safety decisions (NSW Government Department of 
Environment and Heritage 2014)  
Caution against using lack of information on risk to justify 
inaction where the monitoring program is below national 
standard 
Smaller jurisdictions 
and regions can 
provide greater health 
protection if develop 
predicative warnings 
for known risks 
instead of relying on 
single weekly 
samples 
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Whitman & Nevers 2004, Boehm 2007, Amorim et al. 2014). In coastal waters, ‘extreme variability’ for 
enterococci has been described (Boehm 2007), raising concerns about the ability for responsible agencies 
to make decisions on whether to open or close a beach based on methodologies (applied in many 
Australian states) relying on single samples of water taken weekly (Boehm et al. 2002, Whitman & 
Nevers 2004). 
Proper use of microbiological data combined with sanitary inspection can lead to more efficient 
management because understanding of circumstances when water will have high microbiological 
numbers allows reduced microbiological monitoring (Ashbolt & Bruno 2003). However, the accuracy of 
risk assessments for recreational waters will vary based on existing knowledge. Inaccuracies result from 
inadequate information available on pathogen survival compared to FIB survival, knowledge of dose-
response models, and variation of behaviours in different regions, for example, longer exposure in 
warmer water (Tseng & Jiang 2012).  
Recreational water impacted by human faecal matter may have higher risks than waters impacted by 
faecal material from other animals (Soller et al. 2010), lending support to management approaches 
providing site specific criteria, particularly where no or low sources of human pollution would lead to 
overestimates of risk (Soller et al. 2014). On the other hand current methods used in Australia may 
underestimate the risk to children, where one US study showed higher susceptibility for illness in children 
under 10 years old in freshwaters impacted by human pollution (Wade et al. 2008). Methods for 
microbiological testing which require 24 to 48 hours for any subsequent closure or management action 
may lead to decision errors for waters being open or closed when they do not need to be (Wade et al. 
2006).  Moreover, recreational water illness may be underreported because they are self-limiting and 
many do not require hospital treatment (Boehm et al. 2009).  
Another method of overcoming this uncertainty is to use predictive modelling of FIB in combination with 
other methodologies. Although, predicative modelling may not promote reduced decision errors at all 
beaches; a Chicago USA study found greater accuracy for some beaches when predictive modelling was 
combined with site specific single sample (Nevers & Whitman 2011).  
Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment (QMRA) can assist with scenario planning in decision making 
and accounting for local variations that impact water quality such as multiple sources of contamination, 
spatial and temporal variation in FIB, and fluctuating relationships between FIB and pathogens (Ashbolt 
et al. 2010). However the accuracy of QMRA is subject to limitations where there are gaps in current 
knowledge on recreational water risks and illness (Boehm et al. 2009). Management actions beyond 
guidelines may be justified in some circumstances, for example, one study revealed that only 31 percent 
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of participants were healthy adults to whom the guidelines applied (Lepesteur et al. 2006). Assumptions 
used in some recreational water decision making decrease the reliability of those decisions and this could 
be improved through studies which consider actual disease burdens and utilize social surveys to determine 
additional factors which increase or decrease risk (Lepesteur et al. 2006).  
Rapid measures of water quality (using a genetic method called quantitative polymerase chain reaction or 
‘QPCR’) are capable of predicting recreational water illness, meaning faster detection of elevated levels 
of microorganisms and therefore more accurate decision making on when to open or close beaches (Wade 
et al. 2006, Wade et al. 2008, Wade et al. 2010).  Advantages are seen as a slower lag time between 
testing and management action (same day warnings achieved by 11.30am) with the main challenges being 
cost and issues of implementation include the physical logistics of collecting, processing and analyzing 
samples to ensure warnings are actually posted before or at least during swimmer exposure to the water 
(Griffith & Weisberg 2011). 
 
6.4.4 Managing and understanding public perception and behaviour 
As methods develop further and managers are able to gain local information such as sources of 
faecal indicator bacteria, it seems likely that these managers would wish to apply specific criteria to some 
waters. To do this without an understanding of societal preferences for risk at the location or the 
economic implications of management action, adds another assumption to the practice of recreational 
water quality management.    
Public perception of water quality impacts the choice of whether to enter the water or not and therefore 
presents another layer of variability on recreational water safety. Personal perception, local knowledge, 
absence of warnings and signage, age and residency can all influence recreation behaviours and choices 
and therefore exposure to risk (Lepesteur et al. 2008). Behaviours and social factors driving recreational 
risk are absent from guidelines. Public perception of water quality may not reflect actual water quality. In 
one Los Angeles study, the public perceived water quality to be lower than actual water quality with other 
factors being more influential than factual information through public education campaigns (Pendleton et 
al. 2001). A study of waters possessing risk in Western Australia found there was a perception of risk but 
a lack of behavioral change indicating that the seriousness of the risks was underestimated (Lepesteur et 
al. 2008) In another study, from the UK, water quality was one of a number of factors considered and 
decisions to enter the water were found to be influenced by experience (Ravenscroft & Church 2011). 
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Because the one and two sample limits now applied by many programs are still retrospective (taking a 
minimum of 24 hours to provide results), funding for research towards rapid microbiological testing 
methods is a necessary consideration. The US guidelines provide an example as to how monitoring 
advances can be included in guidelines or criteria to support more advanced states without reducing 
flexibility for smaller jurisdictions who cannot meet advanced standards.  
   
6.4.5 Does poor communication raise the duty of care? 
A legal question for future research is whether agencies owe a duty of care to recreational water 
users. Do programs providing less information necessarily increase their required level of care (compared 
to more advanced programs) by creating a reliance on no swimming warnings as opposed to informed 
choice? And further, could someone with a recreational water illness make a claim in negligence where 
management authorities operate infrastructure which creates a risk in recreational waters (for example, 
sanitary sewer overflows) but fail to notify the public of overflows.  
Other factors relevant to the question of whether recreational water management impacts duty of care for 
swimmers include; 1) the potential for confusion due to differences between communication and when a 
warning is issued, 2) variation between when and where members of the public are able to freely access 
monitoring results, and 3) variation in what risks are warned against, with only some states developing 
daily warning systems and the potential for people to assume a lack of warning equates to safety. 
Programs such as those described in NSW, Victoria and South Australia prioritise communication of risks 
as a means of increasing safety in recreational water by giving the public access to information so that 
they can make an informed choice about when to swim. Outside the three states which issue daily 
predictions, all other areas swimmers rely on the weekly microbiological monitoring and general 
warnings about not swimming after rain.  
It is important that managers understand and establish the overall goal of monitoring programs (Nevers & 
Whitman, 2009).  In some circumstances citizens may not have enough information to make informed 
assessment based on ordinary communication strategies and therefore more extensive communication 
may be justified. For example, where untreated wastewater infrastructure is diverted to recreational water 
areas and where there are vulnerable individuals in these areas who may not be able to interpret complex 
information of make a fully informed decision, demonstrating the importance of clear and consistent 
signage.  
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6.4.6 NHMRC 2008 guidelines establish knowledge to inform investment decisions 
Programs such as NSW Beachwatch claim to allow for investment on wastewater or stormwater 
infrastructure to be prioritised (NSW Government Department of Environment and Heritage 2014). For 
example, investment in water quality improvement will be a lower priority if a waterbody has good 
microbiological quality most of the time but there are a smaller number of times of much higher risk, and 
where risk can be reduced through communication. NHMRC 2008 guidelines provide the method of 
categorizing risks so that local actions can be taken such as signage or identifying stormwater discharges. 
There are examples of this through several of the programs discussed which provide warnings for specific 
high risk events. In NSW wastewater treatment licences under environmental legislation apply to the 
whole of the system, including sanitary overflow points. An international example of taking this one step 
further is the diversion of dry weather runoff to wastewater treatment facility by Orange County 
Sanitation District.  
In situations like in Launceston, Tasmania with occasional untreated discharges of sewage, a secondary 
contact recreation area (in which no recreational water risks are monitored, absence of evidence of 
recreational health impacts and no notification is required) should not be used to justify inaction where 
there is no effort made to identify health risks. Arguably, overreliance on flexibility in guidelines creates a 
negative feedback loop supporting underinvestment whereby less monitoring effort or closure of water 
allows it to remain degraded; a situation specifically discouraged by NHMRC 2008 guidelines. Whereas 
in more advanced states, flexibility may be used to take action once evidence of lower risk is collected, it 
is concerning that in states where microbiological monitoring effort is a less than recommended in 
NHMRC 2008, an absence of scientific evidence of risk may be used to support not taking management 
action. 
In most areas authorities already have a duty to report malfunctions, discharges and spills and therefore 
this information should also be available to the public. As a minimum, planned occasional untreated 
discharges to areas popular for secondary contact recreation should be automated so that an email or other 
automatic warning system can be established. One role of Beachwatch (run by the NSW Office of 
Environment and Heritage) is to communicate this data to the public. They also assist with sample media 
releases, training, sanitary inspections and weekly and long term rankings. 
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6.5  Model of standardising water quality laws 
Setting microbiological standards for waters used for recreation should be simple; national 
guidelines are made, states either adopt these, a version of these, or take another approach where there is 
scientific evidence to support this. NHMRC 2008 guidelines are implemented differently by each State in 
several areas including recreational water quality and biosolids management. The level of health 
protection varies and it is inefficient to continually redevelop and apply different guidelines for every 
state. Constitutional issues mean no state can be forced to follow a national approach and therefore if 
consistency is a desired outcome, either agreement or financial incentives or support may be necessary.  
Table 5.5 provides six potential issues and barriers to implementing these concepts for reform and 
provides advice on how or if these may be overcome. The Southern California Coastal Water Research 
Project (SCCWRP) was created by multiple agencies. It conducts coastal environmental research and 
participates in management strategies and building consensus amongst experts (Mearns et al. 1999). The 
project is listed as a policy option example under issue 6 of Table 5.5. Following the passing of the 
Bacteria Rule 2004, (discussed above) SCCWRP developed science and validation of methods so that 
California beach managers could move towards the rapid assessment and characterization of beach water 
quality risks. The project included the creation of a Rapid Methods Task Force and conducting a pilot 
study for rapid microbiological methods (Griffith & Weisberg 2011). SCCWRP demonstrates advantages 
of a multiagency approach to filling knowledge gaps in areas like water quality management with 
interlaced dimensions of science and policy. 
Table 5.5: Predicted issues for implementing more consistent water quality guidelines in Australia 
and suggestions for implementing these  
Issue/ Barrier Reform 
1. Support from community 
Likely to support but also want stricter guidelines 
than government may want 
Potentially different for different groups in society. 
Requires social science research. 
2. State government support  
May be concerned about costs, decreased 
compliance or ability to implement 
State which elements are mandatory for parties seeking 
funding and claiming to be compliant (for example; 
consistent signage, enterococci limits, weekly sampling) 
and which are included to support more advanced states 
(eg like is done in US EPA guidelines with rapid 
microbiological testing). 
3. Legal barriers  
Constitution does not give power to create laws on 
water to federal government 
Requires state government agreement. 
The best option is Council of Australia Governments 
(COAG) agreement resulting in binding mechanisms 
however incentives may be more realistic. 
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Issue 4 and issue 2 in Table 5.5 refers to a federal grant scheme as used in the US for recreational water 
monitoring. Under this grant when receiving funding parties are required to report monitoring results to a 
federal register under a uniform reporting standard, this would require no constitutional reform and would 
provide incentives for all states to cooperate. Issue five relates to implementation of technical matters. 
Smaller jurisdictions do not have equal resources compared to beach watch programs.  Programs which 
support local government in implementation (such as Beachwatch NSW) have demonstrated benefits 
producing a larger area of uniform communication, more efficiency and better trained local government 
officers. Although this would cost some money initially, it may result in efficiencies by ensuring states 
and jurisdictions are not using resources to create multiple versions of this system with slight variations, 
and it could be argued that the current situation is inefficient in many cases where microbiological 
monitoring is ineffective. In order to overcome the problem of different levels of participation by some 
states, Issue 2 of Table 5.4 refers to the flexibility to accommodate different circumstances (in line with 
NWQMS) built into guidelines, and guidelines should list sections which are necessary for state 
compliance.  
Constitutional barriers which prevent national criteria being drafted are not fatal to progress towards 
uniformity, for example, amendments which could be made to the guidelines to support this. Additional 
actions to support this could include Council of Australia Governments (COAG) agreement between the 
States, Territories and Commonwealth Government which could allow national water quality guidelines 
to be binding within states, or at the minimum a commitment to bring their own guidelines in line with 
national standards (see discussion below on challenges of this). While it is possible to achieve agreement 
through COAG so that national guidelines apply in each State, it can be difficult.  
4. Implementation by local government or small 
areas  
Financial costs, technical issues 
Funding from Federal Government for smaller governing 
bodies, in the form of a grant scheme and money towards 
assisting in implementation and training. Funding from 
federal government would come with agreement for 
reporting to a federal database in a consistent manner. 
Federal government financial support in the form of a 
grant scheme would assist this. 
5. Different circumstances 
Need to account for variation in circumstances in 
some states 
National guidelines could provide clarity as what 
constitutes basic minimum implementation requirements. 
6. Agreement between regulators 
Gaps in knowledge 
Funding for research organisations to inform this process, 
potentially through a collaborative Southern California 
Coastal Water Research Project (SCCWRP) style 
approach, based on implementation of research in key 
knowledge gaps. 
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Other notable developments in the US which are of relevance to Australia include recent moves towards 
cooperative approaches to water quality monitoring, such as the Unified Beach Water Quality Monitoring 
and Assessment Program in South Orange County. This is a collaboration of three agencies, aims to 
ensure consistency for monitoring and monitoring objectives, and was informed by a stakeholder 
consultation (California Water Boards 2014). 
The harmonization of Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) laws under COAG in reality was a 30 
year process in which it was attempted to simplify the 400 Acts and other instruments which once existed 
across Australian jurisdictions adopting model laws and codes as well as adopting universal enforcement 
and compliance policies (Windholz 2013). The length of this process demonstrates the difficulty in 
getting cooperation from Australian states in setting uniform laws. One positive difference between 
OH&S and recreational water is that it is possible that there would be less controversy and costs involved 
in providing more information on water quality; who would argue people should be given less 
information? The cost is to government departments and entities only. Therefore it can be determined and 
a level of risk can be chosen with reference to expected increases in costs.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
NHMRC 2008 guidelines aim to achieve consistency in recreational water quality management. This 
has not occurred. Every Australian State and Territory takes a unique approach to communicating 
microbiological recreational water quality risks to the public. States have developed their own practices to 
fill gaps in NHMRC 2008 guidelines. For example, innovations include monitoring programs led by state 
government departments facilitating consistent reporting between local government areas (NSW), 
accessible spreadsheets for determining site specific values (Western Australia), short term water quality 
indicators or the use of one and two sample trigger values for these weekly tests (ACT, Western 
Australia, the Northern Territory, Tasmania, and beachwatch style programs in NSW, Victoria and South 
East Queensland), the use of a risk assessments specific to secondary contact recreation (Queensland), 
communication of weekly microbiological warnings, and consistent sanitary survey methodology. Some 
states have found it necessary to go beyond the national guidelines, whereas other states appear to 
consider the national guidelines as a list of optional actions (as opposed to a program to be followed). A 
policy approach at the very least, to ensure consistency as states adopt practices, is to include guidance for 
best practice management.  
Furthermore, communication of risk is an important part of risk management and the use of inconsistent 
levels of risk and communication (signs, or lack of communication) has the potential to mislead the public 
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when they are attempting to make informed choices. It would be desirable for a more consistent level of 
acceptable risk to be settled on. This applies both between states and additionally there appears to be little 
justification for protecting swimmers and not protecting other recreational water users. There are a range 
of ways for the Commonwealth Government to lead the way in simplifying and providing consistency 
across jurisdictions.  
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7 Wastewater treatment upgrade driven by recreational and environmental impacts of a 
wastewater outfall; A case study from Melbourne, Australia 
 
7.1 Abstract 
Water authorities are typically required to monitor the quality of receiving waters near ocean 
wastewater outfalls as part of recreational water quality guidelines and wastewater licenses. This Chapter 
presents a review of scientific literature on marine environmental impacts and a discussion of a 
controversy that developed regarding reports of illnesses experienced by swimmers in the vicinity of a 
wastewater outfall pipe by presenting media reports of recreational water illness, possible outfall upgrades 
and ongoing impacts for marine recreators. Scientific literature documents widespread marine 
environmental impacts, some of which are irreversible. In addition, media reports are discussed which 
claim that members of the public contracted waterborne illness after swimming near the South East 
Outfall, a wastewater outfall in Melbourne Australia, and the responsible authority (Melbourne Water 
(‘MW’)) responded to these. For the purposes of the thesis the significance of this case study is an argued 
divergence between compliance with state and national water quality guidelines and law, with what some 
sectors of the community may perceive as environmental performance. This conclusion raises an 
important area for future research, which is the nature of public statements made by water authorities and 
the impact these have on recreation behaviour, and public acceptance of the practice of wastewater 
disposal. For example, do broad statements on the absence of microbial health risks in recreational waters 
receiving wastewater have the potential to mislead and harm users and in some circumstances may 
establish a duty of care thereby exposing water authorities to claims of negligence? Secondly, how does 
communication of recreational risks impact swimming choices and perceptions of water supply options? 
In jurisdictions where water quality monitoring does not protect users from short term risks, areas for 
reform in recreational water quality monitoring include more responsive and modern monitoring 
processes, procedures in the event of very high monitoring results, and clearer guidance on reporting of 
results.  
 
7.2 Introduction 
Policy for management of water quality in receiving waters of ocean outfalls has made a first step 
in a shift towards more accurate methods that let swimmers know if the water is safe to swim before they 
enter the water. The United States EPA released updated recreational water quality criteria (US EPA 
2012) and the European Commission has undertaken considerable work improving the water quality of 
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their recreational ocean waters through the European Water Framework Directive (Collins et al. 2012, 
Ramajo-Hernández & del Saz-Salazar 2012). Despite these significant changes driven by research and 
policy development, parts of the world suffer from poorly performing institutional arrangements for the 
management of outfalls and receiving recreational waters. Research into the responsiveness of beach 
users to water quality reports confirms that increasing the accuracy of beach advisories is expected to lead 
to increased responsiveness (e.g. Kim & Grant 2004, Busch 2009) and deliver considerable economic 
benefit to beach goers (Pendleton 2008). In contrast, this chapter draws on a subtly different case from 
Australia as a starting point for identifying possible weaknesses in the communication of environmental 
and recreational water quality monitoring results, and highlighting opportunities for reform. 
Melbourne is Australia’s second most populated city with 40 percent of the city’s wastewater treated at 
the Eastern Treatment Plant (‘ETP’) in Melbourne’s east. The remaining 60 percent is treated at the 
Western Treatment Plant, where some is reused and the remainder discharged into Port Phillip Bay. 
Wastewater was diverted from the ETP in 1979 to the Bass Strait 56km away via the South East Outfall 
(‘SEO’) at Boags Rocks as depicted in Figure 6.1 (Iacovino 2008). The ETP releases a daily average of 
350 million litres of wastewater via this shoreline outfall which until 2013 was treated to a secondary 
standard plus disinfection.  
Figure 6.1 shows recreation sites which were impacted by wastewater. These sites are between 2km east 
and 500m to the west of the SEO. In dry weather there was not predicted to be a significant risk to 
swimmers and surfers as a result of the SEO (Water Futures 2009). However, under certain conditions 
there may have been an elevated risk of contracting illness (Hayes et al. 2009, Water Futures 2009). 
Australian recreational water quality guidelines do not necessarily predict risk outside of ‘normal’ 
conditions; exclude children and people with suppressed immunity; and do not consider the health 
impacts from long-term frequent exposure to wastewater (NHMRC 2008). Part of the discussion of this 
chapter poses questions as to whether during these times, risks to of public health were accurately 
represented due to what appears to be an overstatement of the extent of scientific understanding of health 
risks. 
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Figure 6.1: SEO, Boags Rocks, Gunnamatta Beach, Victoria, Australia. Adapted from Iacovino 
(2008) 
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In 2013 the ETP was upgraded to a high standard of wastewater treatment (Melbourne Water 2013). Two 
NGOs in particular had an active role in forming public opinion on the SEO, initially the Surfrider 
Foundation, followed by the Clean Ocean Foundation, formed from concerned local residents. In 1979 the 
commencement of wastewater discharge at Boags Rocks resulted in an immediate loss of diversity of kelp 
and algae species at the site (Manning 1979). Some impacts may be permanent (Bellgrove, Clayton & 
Quinn 1997, Bellgrove et al. 2010). MW acknowledged that the aesthetic impacts of the SEO on 
surrounding beaches were in a parlous state ‘inconsistent with community expectations and policy 
guidelines’; this included a visible discolored plume, poor water clarity, odour, ‘fatballs’ from oil and 
grease, litter including plastic and ‘small pieces of sanitary gauze’ (Melbourne Water 2009, pp. 87-88).  
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows; Section 6.3 briefly outlines the marine environmental 
impacts of the SEO. Section 6.4 outlines how the SEO has performed against the Australian recreational 
water quality guidelines and reviews the studies of human health impacts of the SEO. Section 6.5 
discusses public claims of illness made to newspapers and newspaper reporting of MW’s responses to 
these claims. Section 6.6 provides a discussion of the potential impacts of the public communication of 
water quality monitoring for public health and the ineffectiveness of the regulatory arrangements. The 
chapter ends with some concluding remarks in section 6.7. 
 
7.3 Marine environmental impacts 
Extensive monitoring of the marine environment has been conducted by and on behalf of MW 
(Molloy et al. 2007, Melbourne Water 2009). Between 2004 and 2007 this included contaminant 
accumulation studies, inter and sub tidal biological monitoring, aesthetics, water quality monitoring, 
toxicity and safe dilution assessment (Molloy et al. 2007) as outlined in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Studies into marine impact of SEO sewage discharge published in peer reviewed journals 
Author Impact of SEO on marine environment 
Brown, Davies & Synnot (1990) Long term monitoring (1980-1988) records fewer species at sites closest to 
outfall and those in predominant direction of current 
H. banksii, C. officinalis, Ralfsia sp no longer at Boags Rocks  
B. proboscidea dominates area surrounding outfall  
D. potatorum (large brown bull kelp) lost from reef edge 
Doblin & Clayton (1995) Secondary treated sewage has deleterious impacts on the early life stages 
of H. banksii and D. potatorum 
Bellgrove, Clayton & Quinn (1997) Repopulation of H. banksii at Boags Rocks unlikely due to absence and 
dispersal patterns 
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Species that benefit from high nutrient loads have high recruitment and 
water column propogule density  
Hindell & Quinn (2000) Lower shell growth and higher mortality of Mussel species (B. rostratus) 
at Boags Rocks 
Lack of B. rostratus causes habitat loss for intertidal fauna 
Kevekordes & Clayton (2000) Of heavy metals and salinity effects, H. banksii embryos were most 
sensitive to osmotic stress (low salinity) and ammonium 
Kevekordes (2001) Levels of ammonium in effluent significantly affected development of H. 
banksii embryos after fertilisation 
Other compounds in SEO wastewater (eg toluene, anionic surfactants) may 
have similar effects when combined with other impacts (low salinity, 
competition) and existing stressors 
Hogan et al. (2005) Identifies ammonia as major toxicant in the ETP effluent 
Adams et al. (2008) Observed broad range of toxicity of effluent to species and concluded that 
ammonia was the major cause of toxicity 
1:140 dilution of pre-upgrade effluent required to protect 95% of species 
from chronic effects (50 per cent confidence)  
Bellgrove et al. (2010) Turf of C. officinalis runs south east of SEO replacing H. banksii which 
hinders H. banksii from repopulating after upgrade 
 
The most obvious changes from the discharge are recorded on the intertidal reef flat at Boags Rocks 
where there is now an absence of previously dominant kelp and algae species Hormosira banksii 
(Netptunes necklace), Corallina officinalis, Ulva rigida and Gelidium pusillum (Manning 1979), loss of  
Durvillaea potatorum (bull kelp) at the reef edge (Brown, Davies & Synnot 1990), and reduced shell 
growth and mortality in the mussel species Brachidontes rostratus effects intertidal fauna through habitat 
reduction (Hindell & Quinn 2000). The intertidal reef flat at Boags Rocks eventually became 
characterized by deposits of the worm Boccardia proboscidea and other species which were favored by 
artificially higher nutrients (Brown, Davies & Synnot 1990). A similar loss of species diversity continued 
in a gradient in a south east direction (Brown, Davies & Synnot 1990); turfs of C. officinalis have 
replaced H. banksii and this is expected to limit the ability of H. banksii to repopulate even if the 
discharge were to cease (Bellgrove, Clayton & Quinn 1997, Bellgrove et al. 2010). Seafloor flora was 
found to be reduced in diversity within 660m of the outfall, on the outer reef effects were detected up to 
1.4 km from the outfall (Newell et al. 1999).  
 
The level of ammonia within the pre-upgrade effluent was identified as a major cause of effluent toxicity 
for marine species (Hogan et al. 2005, Adams et al. 2008). Other factors such as salinity and nutrients 
may continue to impact some species post-upgrade (Adams et al. 2008). 
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7.4 Recreational water quality guidelines and human health impacts 
As described in Chapter 5, NHMRC 2008 guidelines establish two processes for determining 
bacteriological health risks from primary contact recreation in water. Firstly, a sanitary inspection is 
carried out which assesses the risks associated with the site and nature of any discharge. Secondly, counts 
of indicator bacteria are assessed. Numerical values are provided within the guidelines for this assessment 
but are not enforceable limits (NHMRC 2008). 
Wastewater outfalls in Victoria operate under Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) licences issued by 
Victoria’s Environment Protection Authority (EPA Victoria). The State Environment Protection Policy 
Waters of Victoria 2003 (SEPP (Waters)) establishes water quality standards upon which licences are 
based. MW monitors compliance with its EPA licence by conducting weekly tests at six shoreline 
locations surrounding the outfall and monitors a further 13 sites recording enterococci and Escherichia 
coli (E. coli) (Melbourne Water 2009).  
Table 6.3 summarises the Australian system relative to international arrangements; short term incidents, 
follow-up procedures and advances in the feasibility of rapid monitoring are areas to be considered for 
reform. It can be seen that although enterococci is used as the FIB in marine waters in other guidelines, 
the EPA WWTP relied on E.Coli. 
Table 6.2: Comparison of ETP EPA licence assessment standards with SEPP (Waters), NHMRC 
2008 and USA Recreational Water Guidelines 2012. 
 Typical risks 
over long term 
Enterococci as 
indicator in marine 
waters 
Follow up 
procedures for 
high results 
Rapid methods 
considered 
EPA Licence     
SEPP (Water)     
NHMRC 2008      
USEPA (2012)     
 
Table 6.3 compares E. coli and enterococci performance of the SEO for the surf zone, swim zone and 
discharge point against the limits specified in the EPA licence and SEPP (Water) and as assessed by 
Sinclair (2001) for the surf and swim zone. For primary contact recreation, the SEPP (Water) requires a 
30 day median of no more than 35 enterococci organisms per 100ml and 150 E. coli per 100ml. No 
maximum limits are specified in the licence or SEPP (Water), meaning individual high results do not 
incur a licence breach. Second, licence and SEPP (Water) limits are inconsistently specified or not 
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specified at all. For example, median E. coli is shown as 75th or 90th percentiles and enterococci is not 
included in the EPA licence. 
Table 6.3: Comparison of Sinclair (2001) report for samples marked “surf and swimming whole 
year”, EPA Compliance Reporting for ETP discharge monitoring point, EPA licence limits and 
SEPP (Waters) (Sinclair 2001, EPA Victoria 2003, Melbourne Water 2004, Melbourne Water 2006, 
Melbourne Water 2007, Iacovino 2008, Melbourne Water 2008)  
Indicator Unit Sinclair 
(2001) 
03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 Licence 
limit 
SEPP 
(Waters) 
E. coli 
orgs/100ml 
Median  0 18 21 16 26 23 200 a 150b 
 90th 
percentile 
15.1 138 70 93 110 118 1000 NS 
 Max 190 400 300 3100 610 2500 NS NS 
Enterococci 
orgs/100ml 
Median 0 - - 10 10 7 NS 35b 
 90th/75th 
percentile 
2 - - 89 69 39 NS 150c 
 Max 84 - - 320 490 1300 NS NS 
NS – Not specified. 
a. Annual median number of organisms per 100ml. 
b. Median number of organisms per 100ml based on 5 samples collected in 30 days. 
c. 75th percentile of 150 enterococci orgs/100ml based on 11 samples collected in 60 days. 
 
Table 6.4 provides a summary of the studies conducted which assessed the human health impacts of the 
SEO. No studies were located in peer reviewed journals. Three reports were based on results of MW’s 
own microbiological monitoring program. Fairley, Sinclair & Melbourne Water Corporation (1999) 
compared published studies to MW’s measurements of E. coli, enterococci and Total Coliforms and 
concluded it was very unlikely that swimmers at Gunnamatta suffered increased health risks as a result of 
faecal microorganisms. 
Table 6.4: Overview of independent studies into health risks from SEO 
Report Methods Basis for conclusion Conclusion 
Fairley Sinclair 
& MW (1999) 
Desktop 
assessment 
MW monitoring data No significant risk 
Sinclair (2001) Desktop 
assessment 
MW monitoring data No significant risk 
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Water Futures 
(2009) 
Quantitative risk 
assessment 
MW monitoring data, 
modelling 
No significant risk excluding specific 
conditions 
Requena (2009) Longitudinal 
cohort study 
Surveys of beach users Recreational water illness detected but no 
correlation between MW monitoring data and 
observed rate of illness. Concludes this is likely 
due to disinfection of FIB 
Hayes, Lord & 
Sherwood 
(2009) 
Review Independent science 
group review of MW 
information 
MW monitoring data, modelling and QRA did 
not account for factors that increase risk and 
increase shoreline microbiological 
concentrations  
 
Sinclair (2001) examined MW’s microbiological monitoring data (E. coli, enterococci, faecal streptococci 
and faecal coliforms) and compared this to epidemiological literature and guidelines including a draft 
version of WHO (2003). Sinclair concludes that surfers and swimmers would not be expected to be at a 
higher risk of adverse health effects as a result of the SEO compared to surrounding beaches. In a 12 
month period, 13 days were sampled out of a planned 16 days. Triplicate water samples were taken at 15 
locations including at the outfall, in the swim zone, and 800 meters offshore in the surf zone. Sampling 
was planned to be carried out once a month in the winter months (April – November) and fortnightly in 
the summer season (December – March). Data for the two indicators in the combined surf and swim zone 
are presented above in Table 6.3. 
Sinclair (2001) is referred to in several MW press statements examined in Section 4 below.  Sinclair 
(2001) lists two uncertainties to her conclusions: 1) an absence of scientific certainty as to whether surfing 
increases exposure compared to the studies relied upon in the report which focused on swimming; and 2) 
a lack of scientific certainty on the relationship between levels of indicator organisms and the probability 
of contracting illness from this particular wastewater. 
MW’s microbial monitoring program relies on detecting the abundance of E. coli and enterococci to 
indicate the presence of other pathogens. Disinfection of secondary treated wastewater (as was the case at 
the ETP) may destroy faecal indicator organisms to a greater extent than pathogenic organisms which 
results in underestimates of risk (WHO 2003, NHMRC 2008). As a result, further study is required to 
determine health risks (NHMRC 2008). In order to meet this, MW commissioned a Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (‘QRA’) under the effluent quality at the time and under expected upgrade scenarios and to 
provide an alternative assessment to account for the fact that NHMRC 2008 guidelines do not account for 
risk during short term events (Water Futures 2009). 
The QRA found that under normal weather and operating conditions the SEO should not pose a 
significant risk to human health, however during and for a few days after wet weather conditions there 
 
 
157 
 
may be a higher risk (Water Futures 2009). MW’s Independent Science Group report questioned the 
assumptions inherent in the QRA, including the the paucity of testing for worst case scenarios where an 
interaction of weather, ocean conditions, behaviors such as duration of exposure, and variations in 
operational conditions could create higher risk situations (Hayes, Lord & Sherwood 2009). 
Requena (2009) interviewed 202 beach users at Gunnamatta beach and surrounding beaches and 10 days 
later checked for the presence of marine related illness. 22 respondents reported a marine related illness. 
No correlation was observed between illness and the microbiological index indicated from MW’s 
microbiological water quality data. Requena concluded the likely cause of this was removal of indicator 
organisms and prevalence of other pathogens during disinfection of the effluent. No major health study 
was carried out to confirm the desktop assessments of disease burden amongst swimmers and surfers and 
therefore there is no way to validate whether the microbiological monitoring program and QRA (which 
relied on the microbiological monitoring program) accurately reflects the disease burden. It is therefore 
possible that the microbiological monitoring program accurately predicted good or very good water 
quality on average but there remained infrequent and short periods of risk. An example of an infrequent 
but potentially high risk day is 25 May 2007 where enterococci results of 770, 930, 1800, 6, 38 and 14 
organisms per 100ml were recorded at each sampling site respectively. During this time MW met SEPP 
(Waters) limits and licence limits, as displayed in Table 6.3. 
 
7.5 Public claims of recreational water illness 
As depicted in Figure 6.1, Gunnamatta is the recreational beach area in close proximity to the SEO 
and in the predominant direction of the current. This section is intended to provide a historical account of 
the controversy of this matter. It does not provide a social science or media analysis of what would be a 
small sample of newspaper articles. The newspaper articles discussed below come from local and 
statewide newspapers. The accuracy of any illness or environmental impact reported by newspapers 
cannot be confirmed.  
In order to ensure an unbiased portrayal of media coverage searches were conducted on 4 November 2013 
on the Australia and New Zealand Reference Centre database for the word “Gunnamatta” across all 
search fields between 1999 and 2013. This returned 653 newspaper articles in which Gunnamatta was 
mentioned. Articles were excluded that were not relevant or not referring to specific health or 
environmental claims leaving 54 remaining. This methodology, and the information in Appendix 1, is 
provided to assure the reader that an accurate account of the media coverage has been provided. 
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Of the remaining articles, 32 referred to infections claimed to be contracted from surfing or swimming at 
Gunnamatta or nearby. As shown in Table 6.5, most articles referred more generally to reports of illness, 
and some listed outfall associated diseases and included: ear infections, respiratory and dermal problems, 
viral meningitis, gastric, ear, throat, nasal, respiratory, skin and eye infections and, in three cases, viral 
meningitis (Titelius 2000, Baker 2001b, Fyfe and Morton 2005, Dowling & Weekes 2006, The Sunday 
Age 2006, Wilmoth 2006a), gastrointestinal illnesses (Opitz 2012), children contracting sore throats and 
ear infections (Fyfe 2002a), and ear infections not found at other beaches (Topsfield 2008).  
Five newspaper articles named specific individuals who reported contracting disease after swimming at 
Gunnamatta as summarized in Table 6.5. As the table indicates, a number of individuals had to be 
hospitalized and contracted life threatening diseases such as meningitis. Individuals were predominantly 
surfers but also included a lifesaver and a swimmer. Their ages ranged from 17 to 58. A few examples 
highlight the seriousness of their illnesses: a 22 year old male surfer contracted septicemia requiring an 
emergency room visit, a week hospitalization with contaminated water mentioned as a possible cause in 
his outpatient discharge summary (Clifton-Evans 2012); a 47 year old male surfer was admitted to 
hospital for five weeks with viral meningitis and brachial neuritis taking six months off work; and a 24 
year old male spent five days in intensive care after contracting viral pneumonia (Dowling & Weekes 
2006). 
Table 6.5: Australian newspaper articles between 2000 and 2013 containing reports of human 
infection claimed to be associated with contacting water close to the SEO. 
Sex/Age (y/o) User type Reported disease Newspaper article 
Male/22 Surfer Septicemia requiring hospitalization Clifton-Evans (2012) 
Male/17 Surfer Impetigo infection (skin) Fyfe (2010) 
Male/19 Lifesaver Ear infections Wilmoth (2006a) 
Male/(unknown age) Surfer Viral meningitis and brachial neuritis Wilmoth (2006a) 
Male/55 Surfer Infected cut Wilmoth (2006a) 
Male/48 Surfer Viral meningitis and kidney infection Dowling & Weekes 
(2006) 
Male/47 Surfer Viral meningitis and brachial neuritis Dowling & Weekes 
(2006) 
Female/30 Swimmer Severe tonsillitis, vomiting, headache, 
dizziness 
Dowling & Weekes 
(2006) 
Male/24 Unknown Viral pneumonia requiring intensive care Dowling & Weekes 
(2006) 
Male/(unknown age) Surfer Infected cut requiring 6 months antibiotics Wilmoth (2006c). 
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In addition to these specific claims, Kellett (2010) describes Requena’s (2009) research where 22  marine 
related illness were reported  and, finally, the Director of Surfing Victoria described parent’s complaints 
of sick children after surfing at SEO (Fyfe 2002b). Twenty four of the newspaper articles referred to 
environmental issues resulting from wastewater disposal at Gunnamatta as outlined in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6: Australian newspaper articles between 2000 and 2013 containing reports of 
environmental impacts claimed to be associated with discharge of secondary treated wastewater 
from the the SEO. 
Reported environmental impact Newspaper article 
Water issues such as wasted resources Guerrera (2004), Koutsoukis (2004), Hunt (2006),  
Mornington Peninsula Leader (2010), Koutsoukis 
(2006), Black (2002) 
Claims a diatom bloom was caused by the outfall Wilmoth (2006a), Wroe (2006) 
Visible plume, brown coloured water and/or odour 
complaints 
Fyfe (2002b), Titelius (2000), Opitz (2012), Duncan 
(2006), Hagan (2006) 
Litter including condoms, sanitary items, cotton buds, 
and balls of animal fat in the water 
Baker (2001b), Miller (2000) 
Destruction of marine flora species Titelius (2001), Hunt (2006), Hudson (2005) 
Impact or presence of ammonia Miller (2000), Titelius (2000), Baker (2001a), Wilmoth 
(2006a). 
 
In 20 of the newspaper articles MW provided a public statement or response to the claimed health issues. 
The responses, as outlined in Table 6.7, generally stated that water quality was meeting required standards 
and is safe, made reference to supporting parts of previous studies, or stated that an upgrade to the outfall 
was under review. While all these diseases could have been contracted elsewhere, given direct contact by 
users with the receiving water of the SEO, the possibility that SEO was the source cannot be ruled out. 
Appendix 1 contains a table where each of these newspaper articles is listed. 
 
Table 6.7: Overview of newspaper reporting of MW statements in response to public claims about 
alleged public health impacts of SEO  
Compliance with EPA licence or requirements 
• ‘…the water was of good quality. It fell within EPA guidelines and there was “a very low risk”.’ (Fyfe 
2002b) 
• ‘we release treated effluent into the ocean . . . under a strict EPA Victoria licence’. (Clifton-Evans 2012) 
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• ‘Melbourne Water yesterday defended its discharge practices, saying it met all EPA licence requirements.’ 
(Guerrera 2004) 
• ‘Melbourne Water spokesman Ben Pratt said that during the recent algal bloom, enterococci and E.coli levels 
were within EPA licence limits and those considered safe for recreation.’ (Wilmoth 2006a) 
Risk to surfers and swimmers and microbiological health risks 
• ‘[n]o significant microbiological health risk to swimmers or surfers" at St Andrew and Gunnamatta beaches.’ 
(Wilmoth 2006b) 
• The EPA and Melbourne Water insist that surfing and swimming near the pipe - which carries half of 
Melbourne's treated effluent - is safe. But surfers regularly complain of ear, gastric and eye infections.’ (Fyfe 
& Morton 2005) 
CSIRO 1998 study 
• ‘Melbourne Water's science and technology manager Peter Scott said a CSIRO study in 1998 showed that the 
water quality was ``good and met requirements''.’ (Titelius 2000) 
• ‘Melbourne Water managing director Brian Bayley said although CSIRO studies had deemed the water safe 
for swimming, the authority did not recommend swimming near the outfall.’ (Titelius 2001) 
NHMRC 2008 classification 
• ‘[“]This monitoring shows that water quality consistently achieves good to very good under National Health 
and Medical Research Council classifications.[“]’ (Kellett 2010) 
• ‘MELBOURNE Water has given Gunnamatta beach a clean bill of health, saying the water quality has 
consistently been rated "very good", despite the nearby sewage outfall. After a series of assessments in 
swimming zones near the outfall at Boags Rocks, Melbourne Water says there's "no significant 
microbiological health risk to swimmers or surfers" at St Andrew and Gunnamatta beaches.’ (Wilmoth 
2006b) 
• ‘… the monitoring results from the Gunnamatta outfall… consistently showed the water quality was "good" 
to "very good". (Fyfe 2010) 
2001 Monash University report 
• ‘The statement said a 2001 Monash University report had found no increased risk of illness for surfers or 
swimmers at Gunnamatta.’ (Fyfe 2010) 
High results could be aberrant 
• ‘But Melbourne Water said the results could be aberrant, as only a thin strip of water appeared to be 
contaminated, with cleaner water either side.’ (Fyfe & Morton 2005) 
• ‘…the nature of micro-organisms meant that samples varied day to day and that assessment over time more 
accurately reflected the beach condition…’ (Wilmoth 2006c) 
 
Furthermore, earlier statements acknowledge beach user concerns; ‘a CSIRO study in 1998 showed that 
the water quality was ‘good and met requirements’. But the study found that ammonia and fresh water 
had harmed native seagrass beds which had been taken over by hardier species… Mr Scott said although 
tests had shown water quality met requirements, he acknowledged that beach users had concerns.’ 
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(Titelius 2000, p. 15). And again a year later MW Managing Director Brian Bayley stated that ‘… 
although CSIRO studies had deemed the water safe for swimming, the authority did not recommend 
swimming near the outfall’ (Titelius 2001, p. 22). Following complaints from Surfing Victoria about 
children getting sick, MW’s research and technology manager stated ‘the water was of good quality. It 
fell within EPA guidelines and there was “a very low risk["]’(Fyfe 2002b, p. 9). And further that; ‘(t)he 
only way to get to the bottom of surfers' complaints would be a major health study and this would be too 
difficult and too costly’ (Fyfe 2002b, p. 9). 
In 2006 a diatom bloom impacted beaches surrounding the outfall (Wilmoth 2006a). This event is 
associated with nutrient rich waters, which may or may not contain human pathogens, and may result 
from natural processes such as upwelling currents or rivers, or from man-made factors such as the outfall 
(Sellner, Doucette & Kirkpatrick 2003). The conclusion of Clean Ocean Foundation that the event was a 
result of the outfall was not completely unrealistic, given the lack of rivers or other nutrient sources in the 
region, and summer conditions (onshore winds and low rainfall) which can cause the ‘worst case 
scenario’ which was later described by MW’s independent science committee (Hayes, Lord & Sherwood 
2009). MW stated that ‘enterococci and E. coli levels were within EPA licence limits and those 
considered safe for recreation’ and the EPA stated ‘EPA data showed enterococci levels during the bloom 
were within safe levels’, that it operated within its licence limits, and that no raw sewage was discharged 
(Wilmoth 2006a, p. 3). No statements from health authorities were identified in this chapter, however, 
previous chapters have already identified some of the inherent problems within the current regulatory 
arrangements.  
There were also tensions surrounding the public availability of information. With respect to a dispute over 
releasing data from the microbiological monitoring program;  
…the nature of micro-organisms meant that samples varied day to day and that assessment over time more 
accurately reflected the beach condition, and they stated that was why; "we have adopted this approach, of 
not yet releasing the data” (Wilmoth 2006d, p. 8).  
Moreover, previously with respect to not notifying surfers of a specific day of high microbiological 
values, MW was reported as saying results ‘could be aberrant, as only a thin strip of water appeared to be 
contaminated, with cleaner water either side’; the General Manager of Melbourne Water stated that only 2 
percent of 3600 samples over five years had been over the limit, and that ‘surfing and swimming near the 
pipe.. is safe’ (Fyfe & Morton 2005, p. 11). These statements downplaying the health risks associated 
with swimming or surfing near the outfall pipe were further exacerbated by the EPA stating that warning 
people about it was an issue for the Health Department (Fyfe & Morton 2005, p. 11). 
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7.6 Discussion 
7.6.1 General statements may overstate scientific certainty on the possibility of risk 
MW’s statement that the SEO posed no risk to swimmers is contradicted by three conditions 
identified by Hayes et al. (2009) where there may be a much greater risk than described in the health 
studies. Indeed, MW’s monitoring program captured several of these days as identified in through the 
very high maximum levels for E. coli and enterococci displayed in Table 6.3. MW’s statements on the 
possibility of risk when entering the water are central to the representation of safety at SEO. The NHMRC 
guidelines in this regard are unequivocal; 
Where specific or extreme events that may threaten public health occur, the relevant public health authority 
should be informed and recommendations should be made to the water user population about the risks of 
dangerous water conditions or poor water quality (NHMRC 2008, p32). 
Research is required to understand the significance to which people reading local newspapers place on 
statements that the discharge is compliant with the EPA licence and guidelines represented recreational 
safety. As previously stated, microbiological monitoring for E. coli and enterococci has limitations where 
secondary treated effluent is disinfected because disinfection may cause destruction of indicator 
organisms at a higher rate than other pathogens (WHO 2003, NHMRC 2008). No studies were undertaken 
to confirm the ability of these indicator organisms to predict public health risks following the disinfection. 
In addition, the EPA licence did not specify maximum values for E. coli and no limits were specified for 
enterococci; the preferred indicator organism in marine waters (WHO 2003). Choice of bacterial 
indicators can strongly influence the results of ocean recreational water quality testing (Noble et al. 2003).  
Further, Hayes, Lord & Sherwood (2009) recommended that MW’s microbiological monitoring program 
required expansion to account for conditions where shoreline concentrations were increased. MW 
previously stated that a delay in receiving results made a warning system difficult (Fyfe & Morton 2005); 
although when events can be predicted, such as after rain, NHMRC (2008) state the need for warnings. In 
this case, it is argued that regulators should set limits at which action will be taken, such as the Beach 
Action Values used by US EPA (US EPA 2012). The SEPP (Waters) and licence contain no follow up 
procedures or notification procedures for when an abnormally high value has been recorded. These 
monitoring programs reflect long term water quality trends rather than risks from specific incidents or 
higher risk events (WHO 2003, NHMRC 2008). This distinction is important when public statements 
about human health are made. Compliance with the licence did not equate to an absence of risk but the 
two concepts were discussed in conjunction giving this impression. 
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Secondly, in practice localized user behavioral and environmental aspects may be increasing risk in line 
with higher risk conditions. For example, surfers at Pumping Stations (a wave break, as noted in Figure 
6.1, named for being next to the SEO (Surf Life Saving Australia 2013)) are likely exposed to higher 
concentrations of wastewater than that represented by samples taken from MW’s surf zone. Hayes, Lord 
& Sherwood (2009) found modelling relied on by MW ignored circumstances where wastewater moved 
closer to shore and produced higher risk situations; for example during calm conditions, where there are 
onshore winds, and a south-west swell. Onshore wind and calm conditions could be expected during 
summer holidays when visitor numbers at Gunnamatta are greatest. Under these conditions higher risk 
groups such as young children are more likely to swim at this beach using the safe bathing area provided 
by Surf Life Saving Australia (2013). 
The past competence and performance of EPA Victoria’s compliance and enforcement has been heavily 
criticized for being inadequate on a number of grounds prompting a number of reforms (Ombudsman 
Victoria 2009, Victorian Auditor-General 2010, Krpan 2011). Australian environmental laws often 
licence and minimise harm as opposed to preventing it. MW’s triple bottom line analysis of the upgrade 
options scored the former treatment capacity of the ETP as the worst of all scenarios considered; stating 
that it is no longer considered best practice to discharge secondary treated wastewater through a near 
shore outfall (Melbourne Water 2009). Despite these findings, the practice remained legal under the 
discharge licence. Interestingly in 2002 the CEO of Melbourne Water published an article which 
conceded; ‘[S]horeline discharge of secondary-treated effluent no longer represents best practice, 
especially near popular beaches’, but also noted, ’(t)he plant’s compliance with its discharge licence has 
always been impressive with close to 100% compliance being regularly achieved’ (Bayley 2002, p. 61). 
With respect to environmental impacts there are several conditions found in some US National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination Permits which, if included in Australian discharge permits, may serve to 
demonstrate ecological harm. If harm to ecological communities was strongly discouraged by Australian 
environmental regulations, compliance with environmental permits may be a better representation of 
absence of environmental or human impacts. This in turn may have implications when decisions to either 
upgrade treatment plants or recycle wastewater are made, which is of relevance to this case study. For 
example, one San Diego permit sates that ‘[m]arine communities, including vertebrate, invertebrate, and 
plant species, shall not be degraded’, and goes on to provide a range of other protections for marine 
environmental values including bacterial characteristics (California Regional Water Quality Control 
Board & US EPA 2009, cl. 4(a)). The permit also requires the exclusion of the ‘Initial Dilution Zone’ of 
any wastewater outfall be away from marine communities which are sensitive to wastewater discharges, 
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such as kelp beds (California Regional Water Quality Control Board & US EPA 2009, cl. 1(b)). As noted 
above, the loss of all bull kelp communities in the area was an almost immediate impact of the SEO.  
Another important lesson from this case study is the disparity between recreational risk monitoring in 
different areas of Australia. The locations in this case study (see Figure 6.1) are less than 15km from 
Melbourne’s Port Phillip Bay beaches. Port Phillip Bay beaches are monitored through the EPA Victoria 
Beach watch program during summer months (As described in Chapter 5). Whereas Gunnamatta beach is 
monitored by the Melbourne Water. This means that Port Phillip Bay beaches are subject to microbial 
trigger values under which action is triggered as soon as a single water quality sample is returned with 
numbers of FIB over 400 enterococci per 100ml (EPA Victoria 2011). Albeit these are informal values 
not listed in guidelines or legislation, at Gunnamatta beach under State guidelines no action was taken.  
Finally, this case study raises the question as to whether the significance of the available scientific reports 
and evidence was overstated with regard to the certainty to which it indicated recreational swimmer 
safety. Studies were based on analysis of MW’s microbiological monitoring program and they are 
therefore accurate to the extent that the testing program itself accurately represented water quality during 
the period of the study. Leaving aside obvious data deficiencies, such as missing months for the monthly 
water quality testing, ongoing claims as to public health should have been made subject to the limitations 
of a long term microbiological monitoring program operating in a popular recreational area where 
disinfected secondary treated wastewater is disposed. This question is important for this thesis because 
the community is after all reliant on water authorities and regulators to provide them with information on 
the external impacts of wastewater disposal. Further, the SEO is most likely far more studied with greater 
monitoring effort than many smaller outfalls in existence. Without clear guidance on communication 
(such as reporting on NHMRC 2008 compliance) there is a risk that an absence of monitoring effort could 
be misconceived as an absence of risk. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
There are a number of problem areas in the regulation and performance of ocean outfalls. The 
upgrade of the wastewater discharged through the SEO demonstrates the process by which Australian 
water managers respond to the concerns of a section of the community. It was selected as a large and well 
documented example. However, there are many more small WWTPs discharging to recreation areas and 
far less monitoring is required for these facilities. The licence and guidelines allowed any level of risk so 
long as this risk was not seen on a majority of the testing days, hence providing protection but exposing a 
small number of users to a much higher risk. Public acceptance of this practice may change if lay-people 
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understood what water quality monitoring guidelines do not cover and, that in most cases, they are 
unlikely to be notified of an above average risk to their health. Reformed guidelines should provide clear 
and responsive assessment and communication of high risk days, consider local recreational behavior in 
areas impacted by wastewater, and reconsider the accepted level of risk in the context of evolving 
technology and community awareness of water quality issues. Of relevance to this thesis, compliance with 
environmental guidelines in this case study did not align with societal expectations for wastewater 
treatment. The implications of this for the study for the economics of wastewater reuse are discussed in 
Chapter 8. Fundamentally, continuing to supply faeces and toxins onto a popular beach location will 
make people sick, represents a waste of community and coastal assets, and will at some point be remedied 
through the full extent of the law.13  
13 From announcement in 2006 decision making process and upgrade for the ETP took 5 years. 
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8 How water quality guidelines allow combined sewage overflows to dispose of untreated 
effluent: A local comparative case from the antipodes 
 
8.1 Abstract 
The ongoing debate regarding water quality in the Tamar River Estuary, which runs through the heart 
of the city of Launceston Tasmania, is an exemplar of the issues which can arise from a non-binding, non-
enforceable Australian national water quality management strategy. This manuscript provides a salient 
description of water quality management including how water related laws and policy are applied and 
critically reviews recent reforms to the water and sewage industry which impact the local environment of 
Launceston. The city has the apparent fame of owning Australia’s only large scale Combined Sewer 
Overflows (CSO); a wastewater treatment system which collects stormwater and wastewater together and 
overflows untreated water directly to an estuary, lake, river or ocean during moderate to heavy rainfall 
events. Current water quality management has provided some engineering solutions and increased 
scientific understanding of the problems this causes. However, Australian water quality guidelines allow 
the locally degraded nature of the estuary to justify it remaining degraded, continuing to deliver perverse 
consequences for Launceston’s local environment, society and economy. The experience of community 
groups in the USA reveals lessons transferrable to Tasmania including the need for communication of the 
location of CSOs, ongoing investment in maintaining infrastructure, enforceable limits and guidelines 
which reflect modern standards and highlights the importance of community and not-for-profits in 
informing regulators, and the expected level of environmental protection. 
 
8.2 Introduction 
The two largest cities in Tasmania (Australia), Hobart and Launceston, (displayed in Figure 7.1), are 
both located on estuaries which are highly degraded by historical and current anthropogenic practices 
(Attard et al. 2011, TEER Program 2012, Derwent Estuary Program 2013, TEER Program 2013a). The 
city of Launceston sits in the North East of Tasmania where the North and South Esk Rivers all but join 
to form the upper reaches of the Tamar River Estuary. Launceston’s population of 100,000 people have 
had a considerable impact on the estuary. It is bordered by permanent signage warning against swimming, 
fishing and drinking the water. Further down the estuary signs warn against consuming shellfish due to 
heavy metal contamination (Billings 2012, Thompson 2012). All areas of Tasmanian water quality have 
been impacted by inadequate spending on water and sewage infrastructure (Office of the Tasmanian 
Economic Regulator 2011b). However, more recently reforms have taken place to create a water and 
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sewage industry operating in accordance with National Water Initiative principles and under a modern 
regulatory structure (Perraton et al. 2013).  
 
Figure 7.1: Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) discharges, weekly swimming season enterococci 
testing, monthly ambient water quality monitoring and recreational uses for Tamar estuary, 
Tasmania. 
 
The 2011 Tamar Estuary and Esk Rivers monitoring report describes exceedances guideline values for 
faecal bacteria as a historical problem (Attard et al. 2011). In 1994, full reuse investments were made with 
provision for winter discharges if required to the wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) which were then 
operated by West Tamar Council. In 2012, the last WWTP discharging to the estuary on the west bank 
(Beaconsfield WWTP) was upgraded to full reuse (Ben Lomond Water 2012). None of Launceston’s 
seven WWTPs consistently meet environmental licence conditions and Launceston’s combined sewage 
and stormwater system, the subject of this chapter, places huge pressures on Ti-Tree bend WWTP 
(TasWater 2014b). 
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The Tasmanian Economic Regulator labelled long term underinvestment as a cause for Tasmania’s water 
and sewage industry woes (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2011b). Today this continues to 
include Launceston’s underperforming WWTPs that regularly discharge untreated wastewater and 
stormwater through combined wastewater and stormwater overflow points. These discharges impact areas 
used for primary and secondary contact recreation including junior and adult rowing, sailing, and 
kayaking and fishing and bathing downriver (e.g. at Swan Bay, Windermere and Hillwood). Signage is 
erected throughout Launceston at public access points warning against fishing, swimming or drinking this 
water. It is noted that the water in this location is saline and therefore drinking is unlikely. 
Water quality issues have been reported locally and this has led many people to restrict their recreation 
behaviour. For example, the local yacht club after school program has been impacted (Maloney 2014). 
Warnings about high levels of cadmium, zinc and copper in shellfish have led to restrictions on 
consumption (Billings 2012), a sediment dredger (used to deal with sedimentation blocking the river, 
another water quality issue) became clogged with ‘tampon strings’ (Martin 2013), and one expert was 
reported to have said this event indicated the area was unsuitable for any recreation (Andrews 2013). The 
entity reporting on the health of this river reported the overall state of the upper reaches to be poor, with 
water quality improving as water moved away from the settlement of Launceston down the roughly 70km 
estuary (Aquenal Pty Ltd & Department of Environment and Parks Heritage and the Arts 2008). Although 
water quality improved slightly in later reports, this was due to seasonal fluctuations not to improvements 
in management (Aquenal Pty Ltd& DEPHA 2008, Attard et al. 2012). 
Oysters harvested wild in the Tamar were found to contain levels of metals such as Cadmium, Copper and 
Zinc that exceeded maximum levels specified in the Food Standards Australian and New Zealand code 
(Thompson 2012). Above Launceston, at another popular recreation area, Lake Trevallyn, recreation has 
been impacted by cyanobacteria blooms (Al Qasmi 2013). Dominance of cyanobacteria at certain times of 
the year in other similar lakes and rivers, may be due to the presence of the varying tolerances to low 
concentrations of photosynthesis-inhibiting herbicides applied to forestry and agriculture upstream, 
including the herbicide atrazine (Al Qasmi 2013). This water is also used as a source of drinking water 
and for recreational fishing, swimming, boating and other aquatic recreation. 
The upper reaches of the Tamar estuary have the highest microbiological pollution of the system, with 
bacterial levels routinely being above guideline values in the upper estuary (Attard et al. 2012). In this 
area, permanent signage is erected warning against swimming, fishing or drinking water. This is due to 
contamination by secondary treated wastewater and untreated wastewater (Attard et al. 2012). However, 
four rowing clubs exist in the upper estuary, a sea scouts, a yacht club and two public boat ramps, which 
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are shown in Figure 7.1. Although testing is inconsistent and not publicised, in 2012 TEER reported a 
maximum of 4611 enterococci per 100ml (Attard et al. 2012).  
Furthermore, the Tasmanian Recreational Water Quality Guidelines (2007) do not contain limits for 
secondary contact recreation and limited monitoring is carried out for these activities. The risk to people 
practicing secondary contact recreation is unknown because very little monitoring is carried out (Attard et 
al. 2012) even where, as in the local case of Launceston, untreated wastewater is discharged from CSOs 
within 100 meters of established rowing, sailing, public boat ramps and a business that hires kayaks to the 
public. Investment, updated environmental licences, several new plans and other improvements have 
occurred because of the absence of secondary contact limits and indigent monitoring across Tasmania. In 
the case of water quality, the most significant of these plans are the Compliance Implementation Plans 
(Tasmanian Government Department of Primary Industries Parks Water and Environment (DPIPWE) 
2009), which formed an inferior bridge between where regulators would like to see improvement and the 
paralysis caused by financial restrictions and existing political tensions (Perraton et al. 2013). 
 
8.3 Roles, responsibility and commitment to policies 
8.3.1 The Interviews 
In order to understand and document the roles, responsibility and commitment to policies of various 
institutions within recreational water quality management in Tasmania and the USA, the first mentioned 
author undertook a series of interviews with representative officers. Interviews were conducted across the 
period from January 2014, to April 2014 with officers of Tasmania’s state health regulator, local 
government environmental health departments, the state economic regulator, the Tasmanian water 
corporation, TasWater, and an NGO in the USA. Questions asked were general in nature relating to 
procedural matters specific to each area of responsibility for each interviewee, for example, the timing 
and location of recreational water quality testing or the procedures for reporting health risks. Appendix 2 
provides a more detailed explanation of the methods used to conduct the interviews. 
 
8.3.2 Tasmanian recreational water quality monitoring practices, roles and responsibilities 
Recreational water quality testing in Tasmania focusses on popular swimming areas during summer 
months (Tasmanian Government Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) 2012). The 
guidelines recognise that it is impractical to regularly monitor all waters used for recreation, however they 
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state the need for controlling authorities to monitor popular areas and where there are identified sources of 
pollution which risk human health (DHHS 2007). Testing is not carried out specific to point source 
discharges (DHHS 2014).  
Tasmania’s Recreational Water Quality Guidelines (DHHS 2007) pre-date the National Health Medical 
Research Council 2008 (NHMRC 2008) guidelines. In summary, they require weekly water quality 
monitoring during the swimming season. When a result is returned for a single sample greater than 140 
enterococci organisms per 100ml, another sample must be conducted within 48 hours and conduct a 
sanitary inspection to determine possible causes of elevated results. When two consecutive results are 
returned with over 280 enterococci organisms per 100ml, the public should be notified and signage 
should be erected (DHHS 2007). Section 184 of the Public Health Act 1997 (Tas) requires compliance 
with the guidelines and there is a penalty for non-compliance. As noted above, the guidelines apply to 
primary contact recreation only and not secondary contact. 
Testing for water quality is performed by local governments for recreational water quality, and general 
catchment water quality monitoring is carried out by the Tamar Estuary and Esks Rivers Program (TEER) 
(TEER Program 2013a). In the swimming locations (Figure 7.1) tests are conducted weekly by local 
government Environmental Health Officers (‘EHO’) with three local governments having responsibility 
for conducting water quality testing in this area (DHHS 2012, Launceston City Council 2013, West 
Tamar Council 2013). The West Tamar Council Environmental Health Officer (‘EHO’) undertakes 
weekly sampling at 8 locations associated with primary contact recreation (West Tamar Council 2013). 
George Town Council collects samples at four locations (DHHS 2012), and Launceston City Council 
collects samples at four locations (Launceston City Council 2013, West Tamar Council 2013). No 
recreational water testing is performed in the upper Tamar estuary area displayed in Figure 7.1. 
Tasmanian local governments would ordinarily have responsibility for both stormwater management and 
recreational water quality, however Launceston’s stormwater is collected through the combined system 
operated by TasWater. Launceston City Council is a shareholder of TasWater. While TasWater operates 
the CSO and its infrastructure, TasWater does not monitor the receiving waters for human health and 
safety.  
In the case of sewage spills TasWater has notification responsibilities under Section 32 of the 
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas) for environmental harm. Further, 
Section 128 of the Public Health Act 1997 (Tas) requires TasWater to tell the Director of Public Health if 
it becomes aware of waters within its management a risk to public health. This means that if a sewage 
spill occurs, TasWater notify the local government EHO who are required under the Public Health Act 
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1997 (Tas) to take action which in practice may include public notification, sanitary surveys and 
informing the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Most importantly, interviews showed 
that in the case of discharge from a CSO, sanitary surveys and notifying the Department would not occur.  
When a sewage pumping station spill occurs, Tasmanian guidelines for sewer overflows from pumping 
stations would ordinarily require notification of authorities who would in turn put in place public 
notifications if necessary. As mentioned this does not occur with Launceston, the Sewage Pumping 
Station Environmental Guidelines guidelines do however address Launceston specifically in stating; 
With combined systems, every effort should be made to identify environmentally sensitive areas, and 
public access areas, and develop and implement the necessary management plans to minimise impacts 
and/or to notify key users of the public of events which might impact on their use or safety.  
System upgrades should occur with due regard to investment expense and the continuous improvement of 
water quality outputs, taking into account the advantages of treating both sewage and contaminated 
stormwater (Tasmanian Government Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment, 1999, p. 
23). 
The NWQMS addresses sewer overflows in the Guidelines for Sewerage System Overflows (2004) which 
states; 
As soon as practicable after the overflow has been detected and the level of risk presented by the overflow 
has been estimates, the sewerage system operator notifies relevant stakeholders. These may include:  
• environmental and human health agencies;  
• local councils;  
• waterway mangers; 
• downstream users potentially affected by the overflow; and 
• the media for public notification of large events (Natural Resource Management Ministerial 
Council 2004, p. 32). 
In order to access the information on water quality in the Tamar and surrounding regions, a person would 
need to contact one of five authorities, depending on where the site was. This makes the task of protecting 
oneself insidiously difficult. Central sites are permanently closed for swimming, but full body immersion 
may occur during these times at organised rowing and children’s sailing events and during other less 
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formal aquatic pursuits such as kayaking. The Department of Health produce an annual summary of 
recreational water quality for the State of Tasmania (e.g. DHHS (2012)). 
 
8.3.3 Water quality – Tamar Estuary and Esk Rivers (TEER)  
TEER is a regional partnership which focuses on water quality issues on the Tamar Estuary, and the 
South Esk and North Esk Rivers. It is made up of a committee of the members, a scientific group and 
issue specific groups. Launceston City Council, West Tamar Council, George Town Council, Northern 
Midlands Council, Meander Valley Council, TasWater and Hyrdro Tasmania are the TEER partners. 
TEER’s area of operation is very large because it incorporates large catchments in the Northern half of 
Tasmania as well as the estuary. However, recreational water quality monitoring is not a key priority of 
this program. The focus of TEER is primarily ambient water quality monitoring and providing science to 
guide decision making, not monitoring for recreational quality on a day to day basis (TEER Program 
2013).  
Prior to TEER’s formation there was a gap in responsibility for water quality and catchment management 
on the Tamar Estuary and North and South Esk Rivers. The Parliament of Tasmania Legislative Council 
Select Committee into the Management of the Tamar Estuary and Esk Rivers recommended that a 
statutory authority with State Government funding was required to properly manage the area (Parliament 
of Tasmania 2008). This recommendation clearly did not match the will of the relevant local governments 
and agencies who showed a lack of willingness to take responsibility, reflecting a typical problem with  
open access resources described by lawyers and economists as a tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), 
or by game theorists as prisoner’s dilemma (Kuhn & Tucker 1950).  
Despite lack of statutory authority and arguably lack of enforcement penalties, there are some advantages 
to having a voluntary regional partnership model run by an independent not-for-profit organization. The 
TEER has had some success because it allows communication between all the members in a forum under 
which they make decisions and share knowledge (TEER Program 2014). Further, without TEER there 
would currently be no organization responsible for the work it carries out.  
The Water Quality Objectives (WQOs) are values which can be set under the SPWQM which indicate 
what must be achieved for Protected Environmental Values to be upheld. In 2008 the Tasmanian 
Government initiated a review of the SPWQM because of problems including lack of WQOs and 
Protected Environmental Values in many catchments and in coastal waters across Tasmania, as well as 
the SPWQM being out of date with national water quality guidelines (Tasmanian Government 
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Department of Environment Parks Heritage and the Arts 2008). WQOs are not set for the Tamar estuary 
and therefore default back to national objectives for ambient water quality, the Australia and New 
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council 2001 guidelines and water quality objectives 
(Gunawardana & Locatelli 2008). To address this TEER is developing a Water Quality Improvement Plan 
(WQIP) to enable sound scientific understanding of a model of water quality, further enabling partner 
organisations to assess options for planning and investment given the environmental and economic 
benefits that they provide (TEER Program 2013b). Relevant to the CSO, the WQIP will be impacted by 
TasWater’s development of a “Launceston Sewerage Improvement Program” (TasWater 2014c). Both 
programs involve public consultation. 
 
8.3.4 The Office of Tasmanian Economic Regulator 
Under the Water and Sewage Industry Act 2008 (Tas) Section 12, the Office of the Economic 
Regulator has the power to regulate prices and funding allocations for projects as well as responsibility 
for monitoring the performance of TasWater, including environmental performance. Investment in 
improvements to infrastructure which improve water quality rely on Price and Service Plans (PSPs) 
which in turn are set by the Office of the Economic Regulator. These plans require balancing of societal 
preferences such as price concerns with needs of regulators such as drinking water quality and the need to 
overcome environmental damage from wastewater treatment plants (Ben Lomond Water 2011, Southern 
Water 2011, TasWater 2014a). The Economic Regulator has a role in coordinating other regulators to 
ensure TasWater can financially meet targets set in compliance implementation plans with which focus on 
improving water infrastructure. 
Another priority of the PSP is dealing with residual issues of differences in what people in different areas 
pay for water and sewerage the economic regulator (TasWater 2014a); this impacts spending on water 
quality improvements because the economic regulator has to keep the corporation below revenue limits 
defined by national policy and Tasmanian law (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 2011a).  
If the strategy chosen to deal with Launceston’s WWTPs following TasWater’s “Launceston Sewerage 
Improvement Program” (TasWater 2014c) is reuse, another set of revenue and regulatory intricacies will 
emerge. Although the Wastewater Reuse Coordinating Group will assess this proposal (As described in 
Chapters 3 and 4), it is known from the interview that the economic regulator will retain a role of ensuring 
due diligence and expects a business case for a scheme.  
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One reason for this is because it is in the interest of monopoly businesses to invest as much as possible in, 
what is referred to in the industry as, ‘gold plating’ assets and charge users a higher return of and return 
on assets if allowed. With respect to capital expenditure, Tasmania has taken what is known as a “line in 
the sand” approach. This means that assets purchased by previous managers and transferred to TasWater 
should earn a lower rate of return than new assets which earn a commercial rate of return (Southern Water 
2011).   
Another complication is that although the dual stormwater and sewerage system collects wastewater and 
therefore TasWater charges customers for this, as a stormwater collection system, this becomes an 
“unregulated asset”. This means TasWater is required to re-coup the costs and return on this asset from 
Launceston City Council; who are part owner of TasWater (Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator 
2011a). 
 
8.3.5 Lack of transparency or regulatory uncertainty 
As depicted in Table 7.1, Roberts and Craig (2014) discuss regulatory uncertainty under four 
categories of: (1) objectives, (2) clarity of objectives and legal interpretation, (3) clarity of institutional 
responsibilities, and (4) enforcement capacity.  
Table 7.1: Issues for transparency and accountability within Tasmanian water quality management 
under State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997 (Tas) 
(1) Objectives To focus water quality management on achieving water quality objectives which will 
further the State’s resource and planning objectives. 
(2) Clarity of legal 
interpretation 
Tasmania’s SPWQM uses broad aspirational language describing conditions for 
disposal to surface waters including accepted modern technology, best practice 
environmental management, protected environmental value (where these have not 
actually been set), and technology based criteria or standards.  
(3) Clarity of 
institutional 
responsibilities 
SPWQM lists NHMRC guidelines as applicable for human health unless specified by 
the Director of Public Health and lists the Board of Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control as responsible for other guidelines. In practice statutory duties for 
water quality management in the Tamar and its catchment are dispersed between 
various government entities brought together voluntarily under TEER. Wastewater 
reuse assessment performed by informal grouping of relevant department members 
under WRCG. Both TEER and WRCG non statutory bodies.  
(4) Strength of 
enforcement powers 
Little to no capacity for enforcement or repercussions for government authorities if the 
TEER finds SPWQM objectives not met; by comparison water authority goals such as 
revenue to shareholders are made through enforceable legal instruments. Enforcement 
mechanisms are for general environmental harm (EMPC Act), conditions in wastewater 
discharge licences, and conditions in recycled water approvals and agreements. Funding 
uncertainty and cuts for water quality monitoring (TEER Program 2013) may add to 
this. 
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Factors which might impact regulatory effectiveness of water quality management in Tasmania include 
water quality guidelines which are aspirational and have no or limited enforcement mechanisms. These 
soft mechanisms ignore the need for accountability of government institutions in meeting their regulatory 
duties as well as provide a lack of clarity surrounding responsibility and targets (Roberts and Craig 2014). 
When considering aspirational government policies and targets, local governments and water authorities 
balance competing priorities for expenditure resulting in unjust outcomes for local people. This is 
reflected in the discussion above of the role of the Economic Regulator in approving price plans. 
A 2008 Tasmanian Government review of the SPWQM identified problems with implementation of the 
policy including lack of WQOs and Protected Environmental Values (PEVs) across the State’s inland and 
coastal waters as well as it not reflecting changes to national water quality strategies (Tasmanian 
Government Department of Environment Parks Heritage and the Arts 2008). The SPWQM provides a list 
of PEVs which can then be selected to apply to particular surface waters. PEVs are values to be 
maintained, for example, primary contact recreation or drinking water. As discussed above, these are not 
yet set for some Tasmanian waters.  
However unlike Victoria’s SEPP (Waters) policy which provides numerical limits for water quality 
indicators as to what some waterbody types should ideally look like, the SPWQM does not. The use of 
terms like ‘best practice environmental management’ or ‘accepted modern technology’ necessitates that 
some level of minimum standard be established either in the policy or in supporting guidelines. Some 
values are provided in further guidelines such as: 1) some uses of recycled water are covered by the 
Environmental Guidelines for the use of Recycled Water in Tasmania (Tasmanian Government 
Department of Primary Industries Water and Environment 2002), 2) Tasmanian Recreational Water 
Quality Guidelines (DHHS 2007) provide limits for primary contact recreation which are less protective 
than NHMRC 2008, and 3) emission limit guidelines for WWTPs discharging less than 500 kilolitres a 
day average dry weather flow (Tasmanian Government Department of Primary Industries Water and 
Environment 2001).  
These guidelines do not cover all SPWQM PEVs; of particular relevance to the CSO, there are no limits 
set for secondary contact recreation. Clause 8.2 SPWQM states that where there are no Tasmanian 
guidelines, national guidelines apply. However, in practice, despite established use of the Tamar estuary 
being a secondary contact area, as well its status as a PEV, there are no microbiological monitoring or 
reporting for secondary contact recreation safety in the Tamar estuary, with the exception of any samples 
taken within the ambient monitoring conducted by the TEER. 
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8.4 Regulation of CSOs in USA 
Under the US Clean Water Act (CWA), discharges to water are required to have a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. However for CSOs in the USA, the EPA 
regulates their design and monitoring with guidelines (US EPA 1999). These do not create rights 
enforceable in litigation. They are applied by states or in setting permits. These are then applied in the 
permits. This is an important distinction because it creates a point of weakness where the permit may not 
require public notification. This has led to criticisms from lobby groups who proposed laws for signage 
and notification for CSOs, as well as better urban design to minimise impacts (Plumb 2006). 
CSOs in the USA will be considered a point source discharge as part of a sewage treatment system that 
possesses a NPDES permit. Ordinarily this means that CWA technology and water quality based 
standards apply. However, the US EPA has stated that for the 9,348 CSOs operating under 828 NPDES 
permits (US EPA 2004), the CSO itself will be exempted from requirement for secondary treatment (US 
EPA 2001). The US EPA issued a Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy (US EPA 1994). 
This followed a 1989 policy which dealt with identifying CSOs and commencing permitting and moving 
to minimise impacts. Although this policy is based on bringing CSOs and their NPDES permits to meet 
CWA requirements, its language is still based around flexibility and phasing changes in allowing for 
financial capacity in various locations (US EPA 2001). Two aspects of the policy were nine minimum 
controls to be incorporated in NPDES permit which did not require substantial investment in 
infrastructure, and for Long Term Control Plans (LTCPs) to be developed. Although the policy had a 
deadline for implementing these by the time this deadline arrived only 52 percent had started 
implementing the nine minimum controls and 33 percent had implemented long term control plans 
(LTCPs) (US EPA 1998). By 2004 the number of LTCPs had increased to 59 percent (US EPA 2004). Of 
course, since this time the US EPA has issued a range of guidelines and various States have included parts 
of the controls and plans in some form of enforceable mechanism. 
The nine minimum control measures are: 1) maintaining and operating the CSO and sewer system 
properly, 2) maximising storage, 3) ensuring CSO impacts are minimised by requirements for pre-
treatment, 4) maximisng the flow that goes to the WWTP (Publically Owned Treatment Works POTW), 
5) no CSO discharge during dry weather, 6) solid and floating materials should be controlled, 7) using 
pollution prevention to reduce contaminants, 8) public notification for CSO occurrences and impacts, and 
9) monitoring CSO impacts and how well controls are working (US EPA 1995). Where CSO and SSO 
impacts occur during wet weather the US EPA has stated a preference for whole of catchment approaches 
(US EPA 2001). Therefore in addition to the 9 minimum controls, CSOs should have LTCPs developed. 
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One NGO that objected to aspects of the implementation of the US EPA policy on CSOs was the New 
Jersey Baykeeper, who supported a bill to increase communication of CSO discharges (NY/NJ Baykeeper 
2013). New Jersey Assembly Bill 2852 (NJ USA) was a bill that would have required an entity operating a 
CSO to report when a CSO discharged raw sewage to a waterway. Breach of the notification requirements 
would result in a breach of the CSO’s NPDES permit. The Legislative Fiscal Estimate states that there are 
approximately 200 CSOs owned by 40 local governments which would require notification under this 
requirement (New Jersey Office of Legislative Services 2013). 
Furthermore, CSOs discharge into surface waters, but it is not readily known or advertised how much rain 
will result in a spill because this is impacted by many factors. These factors can be seen in an EPA 
guidance which has been incorporated into the CWA concept of minimum best technology, which 
includes cleaning pipes, maximizing treatment and giving notice of discharges. As noted from the New 
Jersey Baykeeper interview, despite the CWA making it illegal to discharge to waters without a permit, 
these requirements are often not in the permits themselves. In this latter case, citizens or not-for-profit 
groups may sue under the CWA. By contrast, this right does not exist in Australia. There are some rights 
to interact with proposals under legislation. 
From the interview, it is known that New Jersey Baykeeper believes there were costs to society from 
having people not know the quality of the water, often which may not be known to the regulator. For 
example, economically disadvantaged people living and relying on the river water can be particularly 
vulnerable. Moreover, the costs of additional signage would be justified by the outcome of letting people 
know about their safety and the public would expect that such basic information on system performance 
would be known to those responsible for its management. In addition, at the very least and from an ethical 
perspective, managers have a duty of care to know the capacity of their system to the extent that they can 
predict with some certainty when they will discharge untreated sewage. However, what we see in 
Australia is an ability of managers to avoid their duty of care and in such a situation, providing the public 
with the right to sue would be preferable. In contrast, in the USA, violations under CWA can be pursued 
as a law suit under this Act which according to New Jersey Baykeeper is a well-known course of action 
for concerned community members and groups. 
In other US jurisdictions more progress on CSOs has been made. For example, in Michigan laws exist 
requiring reporting of all CSO discharges including volume, quality, corrective actions and other aspects. 
In addition, authorities are required to produce an annual report which includes progress towards stopping 
CSOs and barriers encountered (Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 2013). Further, in 
Chicago the US EPA ordered that water quality standards for Chicago’s lakes, rivers and canals be 
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updated to allow for what is called secondary contact recreation in Australia. This order necessitated 
wastewater facilities to be upgraded to disinfect wastewater before it is discharged (US EPA 2011). 
Although the Chicago decision relates to wastewater treatment as opposed to CSOs, it does represent the 
recognition of the value of waterways for secondary contact recreation.  
 
8.5 Discussion 
8.5.1 Lessons from USA CSO regulation for Australia 
Australia has one true CSO in Launceston but also many SSOs on the east coast that discharge 
during extreme weather. In many other jurisdictions, such as California in the USA, a sewer spill would 
result in closure of the affected recreational area until bacterial monitoring can show there is no risk to 
health (California Environmental Protection Agency 2015). Absurdly, it is unclear why Tasmanian 
environmental law requires the public to be warned when there is an accidental or unplanned sewage spill 
but not when untreated sewage is discharged from a CSO. Meaning that warnings are based on the 
infrastructure causing the spill even though there is equal risk to the public. 
With respect to regulatory uncertainty, when conditions are included in individual permits there is a 
reliance on updating of the permit in order that modern standards are upheld. If one were to compare 
Australian water quality guidelines to one part of US EPA guidelines you may find close similarities 
between all Australian guidelines and the US CSO guidelines; they are both not enforceable, they both 
have had challenges in implementation.  
Non-enforceable guidelines can potentially become a yardstick where states then judge their performance 
and upon which the community and TEER can apply pressure (Ward, Buller & Lowe 1996). However, 
firstly in application, Australia’s water quality management provides almost no rights for the public to 
litigate or participate except in limited circumstances during when the permit or licence is being drafted. 
Australia relies largely on enforceable permits agreed to between polluters and regulators. Secondly, 
Australian water quality guidelines are all guideline-based like the US CSO guidelines compared to other 
areas of water quality more heavily regulated by US EPA under the CWA. This means that the point of 
weakness in the Australian case is where the individual state regulator is required to apply the largely 
aspirational state guidelines under a wide variety of processes and political environments. The contrasting 
roles of research input of the TEER in Tasmania, and the advocacy role of the NJ Baykeeper in the USA, 
both demonstrate that Australian and US environmental legislation for CSOs relies upon community and 
research input in order that permits are set at levels informed by societal expectations for water quality; 
 
 
184 
 
this in turn demonstrates the pitfalls in relying on enforceable limits which are only contained in 
individual permits negotiated on a case by case basis primarily between regulators and polluters; and 
therefore outside the view of community and interest groups. 
 
8.5.2 Effectiveness of management 
There may be a range of reasons why the Tasmanian State Government did not follow the 
Tasmanian Parliamentary enquiry’s (House of Assembly Select Committee into the Tasmanian Water and 
Sewage Corporations 2012) recommendations for the TEER to be a statutory body. Two reasons may be 
that, with the power structures of existing agencies, a loose regulatory arrangement may suit some bodies, 
and other financial pressures in Tasmania may have taken precedence for spending. The TEER and the 
Tasmanian Economic Regulator both provide informal forums for various bodies to meet under one roof 
and it could be argued this may not happen if the TEER was a regulatory body. Does this cooperative role 
outweigh the potential for an ethical dilemma caused by the TEER being effectively the champion for a 
river that is polluted by the groups who fund TEER? The impact of this dilemma on the effectiveness of 
any catchment management body’s ability to conduct its business requires careful consideration. 
Moreover, while the Tasmanian DHHS has statutory responsibility for recreational water quality safety in 
practice, monitoring is carried out by local government officers with DHHS intervening during high risk 
events. Programs such as NSW Beachwatch utilize a more active model of cooperation where the State 
government department assists councils, the public benefit through consistent reporting, greater 
commitment from state government in training council officers where councils are unable to provide 
themselves, and the state benefits from having areas outside of its capacity monitored (NSW Government 
Department of Environment and Heritage 2014).  
If the focus of recreational water quality monitoring in Tasmania is not on point source discharges where 
sewage is discharged, and instead based on where people swim and therefore exposure to risk, this thesis 
argues that there should at least be a statutory responsibility to appropriately warn people of areas where 
sewage is discharged. Logically, from the perspective of protecting public health there should be no 
difference in the treatment of a one-off sewage breach and a more pronounced event that occurs more 
frequently. As highlighted above, the control of information by parties managing infrastructure and 
inability for the public to access any information on when and where a discharge occurs removes the 
ability for people to make informed decisions. There also appears to be no justification for the absence of 
protection for secondary recreation users in Tasmania. 
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8.5.3 Comments on overall success of governance 
The establishment of the TEER is a positive step because previously very little data was collected. 
However, because secondary contact is absent from recreational water quality management in Tasmania, 
simultaneous occurrence of very poor water quality in the upper reaches of the Tamar and the high levels 
of secondary contact recreation, especially for children, provides for a highly unpalatable and unjust local 
outcome. The second area that is absent in the recreational water quality management framework is that 
of polluter responsibility for monitoring receiving waters. Tasmanian Councils have responsibility for 
monitoring wastewater but limited responsibility in other related areas. Additionally, there are knowledge 
gaps for risk assessment including recreational user behaviour, the composition and dilution of 
wastewater, and the quantity and frequency that untreated sewage is discharged from overflow points. 
This case study demonstrates circularity consistent with non-binding Australian guidelines; the Tamar 
Estuary is a degraded system due to current and historical management, as a result it lacks beneficial uses 
such as swimming, therefore these are not included in water management objectives, and therefore today 
the estuary continues to be degraded; reinforcing current malpractice to continue. Even if there was 
microbiological monitoring, to degrade water where people swim by discharging sewage and then expect 
water monitoring to manage this risk represents a backward way of managing risk. Instead, by managing 
human waste correctly and providing proper warnings for stormwater and other events, the risk of illness 
can be minimized. 
That said, some risks, such as having children’s rowing events in water contaminated by untreated 
effluent, are unmanageable under current Tasmanian recreational water quality management structure; the 
users are outside the guidelines, and management efforts do not address the risk. Instead for example, 
clubs could be approached in order to identify the days and times when most secondary contact users are 
likely to be on the water and risk assessment (using the risk assessment matrix developed by Healthy 
Waterplay, Queensland, described in Chapter 5) could be undertaken around the most vulnerable users, 
enabling water quality decisions prior to junior rowing events. 
The approach described in the USA was a guideline based approach. That is, rather than having CSO 
limits within the CWA they are within the CSO Control Policy and associated guidelines. Both the US 
CSO Control Policy and Australian water quality guidelines do not provide rights enforceable by citizens 
through litigation. Australian water quality guidelines are non-enforceable. They are implemented at the 
State level through guidelines which are often aspirational with the bulk of enforceable standards being 
contained in licences agreed to by regulators for specific facilities. There are very limited rights for the 
public to participate in these licences and few rights enforceable by citizens through litigation.  
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The state of the Tamar estuary is indicative of how Australian water management focuses on finding 
solutions within a pre-determined paradigm where disposal to water is the primary choice against which 
other options are compared, to the exclusion of alternative uses and possible benefits such as tourism 
which if allowed can contribute to the understanding of the economic and intrinsic value of water (Bruzzi 
et al. 2011) or alternative technologies which completely shift paradigms of wastewater treatment (Teh 
2013). 
The absence of water scarcity in Tasmania and the degraded nature of many waters due to current and 
historical practices may be a factor which has prevented advancement of watershed management and 
urban design. Despite the difficulties with fixing CSO problems, like high costs, the guidance and nine 
minimum control measures used by the US EPA should be considered by Tasmanian regulators. In 
particular, emphasis on pollution prevention programs, watershed management and water sensitive urban 
design, public notification given presence of secondary contact recreation near CSOs, and monitoring and 
characterizing of the impacts of CSOs should be considered by water reformers.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
The challenges faced by TasWater, and the economic and water regulators in updating Tasmania’s 
urban water infrastructure while balancing budgetary and political pressures demonstrate the pitfalls of 
not meeting the first of the USA EPA’s nine minimum controls, that is, to maintain infrastructure. Despite 
recent progress, there are obvious shortfalls in the management of the Tamar estuary and the North and 
South Esk Rivers that flow into it. Launceston’s outdated wastewater system and its CSOs are one 
example of this. Four other water quality management challenges which operate to provide negative 
pressure against calls to reduce impacts of CSOs: 1) the absence of protection of secondary contact 
recreation, 2) competing spending priorities, 3) the lack of transparency in processes, 4) and regulatory 
uncertainty within water quality guidelines. Combined, these factors and Launceston’s CSOs present 
significant barriers for TasWater and other regulators to remedy a situation which is permissible under 
non-enforceable national water quality guidelines and the ability of State and local governments to hide 
behind the excoriating veil of water corporations to avoid necessary and essential spending on 
infrastructure. Immediate priorities should be to reform water quality guidelines and environmental laws 
so that human health and environmental impacts are not allowed to be considered secondary to profit 
requirements, and to focus on reducing local urban runoff through planning.   
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9 Conclusions, implications and discussion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on previous chapters to highlight aspects of urban water governance and water 
quality management which may support wastewater reuse. A summary of the thesis is followed by a 
discussion of key policy implications, synthesizing the constituent parts of each chapter of the thesis. The 
hypothesis of this thesis was that the ‘management of the external impacts of wastewater disposal in 
Australia is currently not optimal and this creates a barrier to wastewater reuse and extends to broader 
consequences for the marine and coastal environment’. In order to address this, this thesis put forward a 
multidisciplinary analysis of case studies from Australia, supported by case studies from the USA, to 
provide international perspectives. In doing so, it has identified areas for reform in environmental 
management, as well as identifying new barriers to wastewater reuse for future investigation.  
The opening chapters of this thesis identified potential barriers to wastewater reuse in urban water 
governance structures and processes, providing a case study of recent reforms of the water and sewage 
industry, driven by poor environmental performance and underinvestment. The case studies were selected 
as examples to showcase distinct elements of water governance structures and environmental guidelines. 
The broad discussion of environmental regulation and barriers to wastewater reuse of the opening 
chapters was followed by a detailed description of recreational water management with two case studies 
of treated and untreated wastewater disposal into recreation areas demonstrating specific aspects of 
environmental regulation are deficient. This was achieved through management and communication of 
recreational water in Chapter 5, and management of recreation in wastewater discharge areas in Chapters 
6 and 7. Together the chapters allow recommendations for reform to be made. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows; Section 8.2 is a summary of the thesis, providing 
highlights and a summary of each chapter. Section 8.3 provides a discussion of the key findings of this 
thesis. It divides these into three broad themes allowing the broad nature of the topics in the thesis to be 
synthesised: 1) inadequacies in management of discharged wastewater; 2) water industry governance 
structures which may divert capital away from investment in water quality improvements; and 3) 
‘coalescing concealment’ of transparent feasibility assessment. Section 8.4 provides general comments, 
allowing for broader discussion of the barriers previously discussed. Section 8.5 presents the limitations 
of the thesis. Finally, Section 8.6 closes the thesis with some brief concluding comments. 
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9.2 Summary of thesis 
Each chapter of this thesis described different and sometimes overlapping systemic elements of 
water management and governance which may influence wastewater reuse assessment in favour of 
environmental disposal. Chapter 2 described Australian water quality policies and the regulatory 
framework for managing environmental pollution and recreational water, and briefly overviewed 
intergovernmental agreements for national water reform. This chapter described wastewater disposal laws 
and policies in each Australian state focusing on licensing, mixing zones and recreational water quality 
management. Three aspects of national environmental protection were described; the NWI, NEPMs and 
the NWQMS. These national policies came about through intergovernmental agreements between the 
states and territories and the Commonwealth Government. This is relevant to the subsequent chapters 
because it demonstrates how the Australian constitution gives states power to make laws over water 
quality control and management, and every Australian jurisdiction approaches urban wastewater 
management differently. It also demonstrates the mechanisms used to provide consistency between 
jurisdictions for water matters. Notably the NWQMS for which NHMRC 2008 recreational guidelines 
belong is not supported with legislation in the same manner as the NEPM policies described.  
The second section of Chapter 2 describes wastewater disposal regulation, guidelines and practice. 
Notably this legislation is set by each state government and criteria for water quality in receiving waters 
are incorporated into WWTP licences. Barriers to wastewater reuse are discussed in Chapter 2 under 
themes of; 1) institutional and governance arrangements; 2) difficulties in determining the true cost of 
disposal options; 3) economic issues of competition and demand for water sources; 4) water quality 
management, for which the balance on the literature focuses on recycled water as opposed to 
environmental waters; 5) political influence on decision making which has led to selection of other 
projects over recycled water; and 6) perceptions of recycled water. 
Chapter 3 provides an example of a wastewater reuse scheme, which came about following intense 
reforms of Tasmania’s water and sewerage industry and led the environmental regulator to reform a large 
number of wastewater discharge permits, requiring wastewater reuse feasibility to be studied before 
ongoing discharge was allowed. This situation allowed for discussion of the economic regulation of water 
and sewage industry, the pressures of competing priorities, both financial and political, and postulation of 
the impact on wastewater reuse. Perhaps controversially, within this chapter it was argued that given 
evidence of reasonably severe human health risks due to outdated infrastructure, the operation of a 
profitable water industry was not an appropriate paradigm.  
 
 
195 
 
Because of the diverse array of water management regimes in Australia, the thesis returns to Tasmania in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 7 where one of the environmental impacts of underperforming wastewater 
infrastructure (identified in earlier chapters) is examined in the context of procedural issues which are 
mirrored in other jurisdictions to varying degrees, and which exemplify the regulatory environment which 
can favour discharge over reuse. 
Chapter 4 (published in the Australasian Journal of Environmental Management) provides an overview of 
barriers to wastewater reuse. The analysis of the drivers and barriers to wastewater reuse identified in 
Chapter 3 was extended into Chapter 4 which provided an overview of the broad discipline of the study of 
barriers to wastewater reuse as well as case studies comparing the wastewater reuse feasibility study from 
Chapter 3 with one from NSW where Hunter Water undertook a wastewater reuse feasibility study and 
planning for the Lower Hunter Water Plan (NSW). Chapter 4 goes on to discuss how differences in 
environmental regulation may impact feasibility. A discussion was also provided examining the broader 
impacts of distinct environmental regulation and agendas in the two case studies, notably load based 
licensing in NSW, different approaches to the study of wastewater reuse feasibility, varying governance 
approaches, and the manner in which regulators coordinate feasibility assessment.  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 each identified existing studies which point to important considerations for water 
investment including the inability to factor external impacts of wastewater disposal, public perception of 
recycled water, and willingness to pay for recycled water. In order to add new knowledge to this research 
area this thesis provided a review of the environmental regulations which control the human impacts of 
wastewater disposal, recreational water quality guidelines and management. Another observation within 
these chapters was that the regions of the case studies were outside of larger cities, and in many similar 
regions water scarcity may be a less significant driver for wastewater reuse than the need to prevent 
environmental discharge to meet obligations under environmental regulations. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis focused on the environmental regulation of the impacts of wastewater 
discharge. In addition to providing valuable reform options for more efficient regulation, this allowed for 
consideration of the assumption that environmental regulation is socially optimal. The thesis takes a new 
approach to this topic examining the role that recreational water quality plays in wastewater feasibility. 
Recreational water quality guidelines and practice are different in every Australian jurisdiction and 
therefore communication of recreational water risk from microbial pollution is not uniform.  
Chapter 5 examined the state of recreational water quality monitoring for microbial risks in Australia with 
particular focus on communication and signage. Variation exists in Australian recreational water quality 
guidelines with respect to microbiological monitoring and communication of risk. Several states have 
 
 
196 
 
more advanced systems for recreational water quality monitoring and communication which predict lower 
water quality and use multiple methods of communication. The NSW Beachwatch program has the most 
involved of these programs and is an ideal a model for a national approach. Western Australia has also 
put a greater than average effort into recreational water management and other states have benefited from 
their leadership.  
Chapter 6 examined an Australian wastewater corporation (Melbourne Water) through a case study of the 
years leading up to the upgrade of a wastewater discharge. Media reports of public statements on the 
recreational water quality at an ocean wastewater outfall were discussed, along with media reports of 
illness. A review of scientific studies on the marine environment shows impacts to the marine ecological 
communities were recorded for several kilometers from the outfall itself. This case study demonstrates the 
issues with managing recreational areas where wastewater is discharged without inclusion of short term 
warnings in recreational water monitoring regimes. This case study also provided an opportunity to 
compare the history of public opposition and some of the public claims made of recreational water illness 
against actual scientific evidence, and to provide commentary on the efficiency of water quality 
guidelines in managing these factors. 
The Chapter 6 case study demonstrated that compliance with environmental guidelines is not synonymous 
with a lack of risk or damage to the environment from wastewater disposal, and perhaps predictably, may 
not always reflect the wishes of all groups in society. This leads to a suggestion for future research to 
better understand societal preferences.  
In Chapter 7 the case study of Launceston’s combined sewer overflow into the Tamar estuary provides a 
spectacular example of the liberty given to state health regulators by national recreational water quality 
guidelines. The significance of this system is that the collection of both stormwater and wastewater 
produces an influx of water during rain which overloads infrastructure, flowing untreated through inbuilt 
overflow points. CSOs in Launceston discharge wastewater directly to water flowing through the city 
which is used year round for secondary contact recreation with no warnings issued. Environmental and 
human health impacts are unknown and historically were likely clouded within a mediocre attitude and 
practice of watershed management. New catchment management practices by TEER and TasWater within 
their respective jurisdictions have improved this situation however issues remain.  
Chapter 7 also highlighted an absence of protection for secondary contact recreation users in Tasmania. 
The absence of evidence of environmental conditions noted in Chapter 7 resulted from an absence of 
monitoring effort, raising the concern that by not applying flexible water quality guidelines less 
progressive states may effectively be using absence of evidence to justify inaction. 
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Also in Chapter 7, comparison was made with the regulation of similar infrastructure in the US 
highlighting an attempt to introduce legislation to mandate communication to the public of overflows, 
deemed as necessary even with a stronger system of environmental protection under the US constitution 
(by comparison to the weaknesses of a non-mandatory NWQMS demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
9.3 Key findings 
Table 8.1 describes the key findings in the thesis under three themes; 1) inadequacies in 
management disposal, described as an artificial legal separation between water in a terrestrial 
environment and once disposed to aquatic and marine environments; 2) water industry governance 
structures which may divert capital away from investment in water quality improvements; and 3) what 
has been described in this thesis as ‘coalescing concealment’ of transparent feasibility assessment. The 
contribution of various sections of this thesis to these themes is discussed below Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1: Overview of key findings, details and reform options 
Theme Aspect Specific details where applicable Reform options 
1) Artificial 
legal 
separation 
between 
water on 
land and 
once 
disposed to 
water 
Environmental 
conditions for 
wastewater 
discharge are 
based around 
weak non-
enforceable 
guidelines  
 
Recreational water quality guidelines and 
practices in Tasmania allow risk where 
wastewater is disposed to be the responsibility of 
the uninformed citizen (Chapters 5, 6, 7) 
Environmental disposal guidelines estimate 
acceptable damage but actual impact may not be 
known (Chapters 6 & 7) 
Some evidence of incentives not to upgrade 
facilities in order to keep old licence conditions 
(Chapter 3)  
Danger that lack of effort in monitoring impacts 
justifies inaction due to lack of evidence of harm 
Better integration of soft 
environmental goals into 
legally binding 
instruments 
Options include; 
• Update national 
guidelines to reflect 
modern technology 
• Independent 
cooperative research 
models  
• Funding linked to 
nationally consistent 
reporting 
• Reform state pollution 
control legislation 
NJ Baykeeper proposal 
to require notification 
(Chapter 7) 
Communication covered 
in national guidelines 
Hierarchy of 
management in national 
guidelines so that 
traditional 
Recreational water 
quality guidelines 
 
Inter-jurisdictional variation;  
• National guidelines applied differently by 
every state 
• Variation in risk accepted 
• No secondary contact guidelines in some 
states 
• Variation in methods and pollution indicators 
used  
• Variation in when and how warning issued 
(Chapter 5) 
Pollution licences 
do not always 
LBL licences compared to traditional licences 
(Chapter 4)  
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provide incentives 
to reduce 
discharge 
  
By comparison other obligations are required by 
law (for example the payment of profits from 
water corporations) (Chapter 3) 
 
microbiological 
monitoring a last resort 
where reuse or safe 
disposal not an option 
Use of market based 
instruments such as 
tradeable wastewater 
disposal entitlements Lack of notification of 
human health risks 
caused by 
wastewater 
management 
Community may not understand impacts of 
wastewater disposal  
Inconsistent communication of recreational 
water quality between regions (Chapter 5) 
No public notification required for Tamar CSO 
(Chapter 7) 
Even with developed monitoring program very 
hard to truly use monitoring to track health risks, 
better to manage wastewater to avoid health 
risks entirely (Chapter 6) 
In some jurisdictions inferior recreational water 
management coincides with underperforming 
infrastructure creating a situation of high risk 
and low warning/monitoring (Chapters 5 & 7) 
 
Unenforceable 
guidelines show 
dependence on 
political and 
economic 
situation not 
environmental 
damage 
Tasmania before and after reform (different 
outcomes, same guidelines) (Chapters 3 & 4) 
Environmental damage still ‘compliant’ under 
licences and guidelines for example Gunnamatta 
(Chapter 6, Chapter 7) 
Unenforceable guidelines are applied on a case 
by case basis when setting licences, creating a 
point of weakness in system (Chapter 7) 
2) 
Governance 
structures 
divert 
capital from 
water 
quality 
improvemen
t to other 
areas 
Governance 
structures which 
favour certain 
options, such as 
having to pay 
dividends when 
human health or 
environmental 
performance is not 
ideal 
Tasmania reform to water corporation model 
clearly generated investment, however raises 
question as to water quality guidelines, 
unenforceability and appropriateness of 
removing money from water and sewerage 
(Chapter 3) 
No one takes responsibility for water quality in 
waters which are managed by multiple agencies 
lacking clear statutory responsibilities (Chapter 
7)  
Further research to 
measure efficiencies are 
gained from corporate 
structure and how this 
compares to dividends 
paid to government 
shareholders 
Use of market based 
instruments such as 
tradeable wastewater 
disposal entitlements 
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3) 
Coalescing 
concealment 
of 
transparent 
feasibility 
assessment 
Less barriers to 
disposal than 
reuse 
Regulations which do not provide economic 
incentives for achievement of goals desired by 
policy or society conflict water authorities as 
partly public servant part commercial entities 
(Chapter 3) 
Loose water quality management regime for 
disposal to water, compared to other more 
enforceable requirements, such as recycling on 
land or profit requirements (Chapters 3 & 4) 
General lack of prioritisation of recreational 
water activities in some jurisdictions (by 
comparison to more advanced jurisdictions) 
 
Further research into 
economic benefits of 
recreational areas 
Recycling targets (water 
savings) or load 
reduction requirements 
reflected in binding legal 
mechanisms tied to 
reduced licence fees 
Research into how to 
factor comparative 
modernity of local 
environmental regulation 
into feasibility 
assessment 
Need for national cost 
benefit guidelines 
Use of market based 
instruments such as 
tradeable wastewater 
disposal entitlements 
Difficulties in 
determining/comp
aring true costs of 
reuse or disposal 
Difficulties using regulatory compliance to 
indicate social or environmental costs or 
benefits, compounded by variation between 
jurisdictions 
Regulatory uncertainty within feasibility 
assessment process (Chapter 4) and some 
guidelines (Chapter 7) 
Absence of effort, weak guidelines and general 
difficulties in assessing recreational water risks, 
which may allow wastewater disposal impacts to 
be underestimated 
Self-fulfilling prophecy of polluting water and 
then it not being valued due to being polluted, 
NJ (USA) and Tamar (Tas) arguably 
demonstrate this. What would be the value 
without the disposal and if clean? 
 
9.3.1 Artificial legal separation between water on land and once disposed to water  
Australian water quality guidelines accept a higher level of risk for people who swim or surf in 
areas impacted by wastewater than they do for people in areas where wastewater is applied to land. This 
is reflected in inconsistencies between recycled water and discharge water guidelines (Higgins et al. 
2004). An uneasy balance is described where Australia-wide deficiencies in recreational water quality 
management are combined with out of date treatment technologies in some jurisdictions, meaning 
situations known to produce high levels of human health risk are combined with low levels of monitoring 
(Chapter 5 and Chapter 7). There is a need for future guidelines to be better informed of the risk people 
are prepared to accept of recreational water illness (Boehm et al. 2009). A financially important 
consideration for authorities is whether people who became ill and suffered loss after relying on safety 
assurances made without scientific evidence could pursue water corporations or authorities on claims of 
negligence, beaching their duty of care or other civil wrongdoing. 
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Flexible guidelines and uncertainty may be an as yet undescribed barrier to wastewater reuse; having 
unenforceable environmental guidelines with enforceable conditions being found in individual permits 
means polluters may seek to avoid upgrade in order to perpetuate older licence conditions, may create 
disincentives to private investors due to regulatory uncertainty, and when regulators are under-resourced, 
may be less likely to secure good environmental outcomes if total loads to a system were pre-determined 
prior to negotiation of the permit (described in Chapter 4). Water industry governance reform in Tasmania 
(Chapter 3) resulted in at least one reuse scheme, however broader issues remain with respect to structure, 
and comments cited in Chapter 3 which indicated there was a disincentive to upgrade because 
environmental permit conditions would be made stricter.  
Chapter 7 is one example of problems caused by Australia’s non-binding NWQMS. Although generally 
US federal water pollution laws have more legal force than Australian guidelines, EPA controls for CSOs 
are under US EPA policy not legislated in the Clean Water Act and there have been similar troubles for 
implementation, however investment and cooperation have resulted in improvements. In order to show 
how the issue of public risk from CSOs may be addressed a small case study is provided of an attempted 
State law reform to require the public to be notified when CSOs discharge untreated wastewater. 
Legislation which requires public warnings when untreated effluent is discharged, such as combined 
sewage and stormwater overflow during wet weather, could increase public safety. With respect to reuse, 
it is possible that if the public knew the number of times untreated sewage was disposed to the local 
waterway their willingness to pay for infrastructure may be altered. In which case lack of communication 
of impacts of disposal is a barrier to wastewater reuse not currently considered in Australia. 
Variation in recreational water quality monitoring is another example of how activities in water are given 
less precedence in Australian environmental management. Chapter 5 describes how states have developed 
short term methods of warning swimmers when weekly samples are high including one and two sample 
trigger values, use of NHMRC 2008 as short term limits and the Enterotester which can produce site 
specific trigger values. Short term warnings are not present in NHMRC 2008 guidelines. Some Australian 
states have invested in modelling for predictive warnings of decreased water quality. Rapid 
microbiological monitoring technologies have been incorporated in US EPA guidelines since 2012. These 
may be appropriate for some jurisdictions in Australia, however research will need to be planned for in 
order to establish this for local settings.  
The Chapter 6 case study demonstrates the application of water quality guidelines and provides an 
historical account of reports of illness attributed to an outfall, including 32 media reports which claimed 
human infections were caused by the outfall. The case study follows the responses of the water 
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corporation to these claims. The utility frequently emphasised absence of risk and compliance with 
licence and guidelines. This demonstrates another aspect of communication to the beach closures 
discussed in Chapter 5, which is the communication of specific messages relating to wastewater 
discharge. This thesis contends that bathers could mistake compliance to indicate an absence of risk 
which independent science review and historical monitoring records shows was not the case. The case in 
Chapter 5 also highlights the need for procedures for reporting and warning of high results in water 
quality guidelines. While high single samples would be reported at Melbourne’s bay beaches under the 
Beach Watch program (described in Chapter 5) they are not required to be reported at beaches impacted 
in this case study. 
National guidelines need to incorporate the short term limits for recreational water quality already 
adopted by several states. Policy reforms are available to ensure a more consistent application of national 
recreational water quality guidelines. Firstly, binding between all Australian jurisdictions for consistent 
water quality regulation in Australia would be ideal, however national forums could be formed to allow 
agreement between various regulators, and provide clarity on which aspects of the guidelines are 
necessary in order to claim compliance and which provide more general guidance on implementation. 
Secondly, financial or other policy mechanisms to support uptake of national guidelines are 
recommended. For example, linking funding to reporting monitoring results to a national database in a 
consistent format is recommended.  
 
9.3.2 Governance structures divert capital from water quality improvement to other areas 
Governance structures which exist prior to and after a major reform of urban water governance 
have the potential to impact the timing and prioritization of investment. In particular, the reformed 
governance structure in Chapter 3 (post council management) found the regulator pushing a higher 
standard of environmental compliance for WWTPs. The need to balance spending priorities across all 
areas of Tasmanian water management to rectify historical underinvestment was a barrier to wastewater 
reuse. By contrast, the NSW case study in Chapter 4 showed a more consistent approach over time, with 
desired loads emitted described under the LBL process, and reuse being studied as part of the water 
planning process. 
Tasmanian guidelines require wastewater reuse to be considered before disposal is approved. However 
differences in pre and post reform regulatory requirements arguably raise issues of regulatory certainty; 
discussed further in Chapter 4. The case study also highlights that TasWater and the State believed 
wastewater reuse schemes where wastewater is applied to land for uses which do not generate direct profit 
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may have societal benefits and assist with regulatory compliance. This statement highlights a potential 
barrier to wastewater reuse in other jurisdictions, in that if there is an overemphasis on cost recovery from 
recycled water this may prevent wastewater reuse being used to avoid disposal; thereby providing an 
artificial structure ignoring a true assessment of which option has the best outcome, i.e., greatest net 
benefit rather than least cost.  
Chapter 3 also discusses the appropriateness of water corporations being required to pay dividends to 
government owners while underperforming infrastructure causes environmental damage. Further, if 
wastewater management is not operated in a genuine, competitive market then application of pricing, 
while disposal options are considered part of the sanitation service, may hinder development of 
wastewater reuse. The chapter provides evidence of the incentives behind industry structure, and adds to 
existing literature (discussed in the Chapter) which questions whether a water bill is the best tool in which 
to collect assets to fund non-water related functions of local government. In doing so a direct quote from a 
State government elected official highlights that by creating a water industry governments were able to 
create an artificial divide between elected officials and water issues. Replacing ineffective and non-
binding environmental guidelines with binding and effective environmental regulation may allow 
governments to keep the corporate structure, but prevent the need for profits outplaying social and 
environmental goals. 
A philosophical question (raised in Chapter 3) for Australian water management is whether a whole of 
government approach supports the paying of dividends to government owners where environmental 
human health regulations are not being met. If these profits are paid regardless of the external impacts of 
water management this may remove the economic incentive for governments to reinvest that capital to 
maintain environments and enforce environmental legislation. If governments create no economic or 
political incentive to reinvest in water then this may hinder progress towards integrated water 
management. Water authorities do not make decisions on large scale recycling projects in isolation from 
other areas of government, which may support larger government-led planning for recycled water projects 
(as seen in Chapter 4) to better account for environmental, economic and social factors across a region.  
Finally, governance structures impact responsibility and this may create artificial voids in responsibility, 
impacting spending on water quality improvements. For example, in Chapter 7 the discharge of untreated 
sewage is impacted by a hazy structure of responsibility between various agencies, as well as uncertainty 
created by non-binding and often aspirational guidelines.   
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9.3.3 Coalescing concealment of transparent feasibility assessment 
9.3.3.1 Environmental regulations may distort decision making 
The Productivity Commission (2011) warns that assuming wastewater recycling and reuse is in the 
communities’ best interest without examining its costs and benefits produces inefficiencies, arguing the 
focus should instead be on removing impediments to recycling. If environmental standards reflect socially 
optimal conditions then by meeting these standards the environmental costs of a project will be 
internalized (Economic Regulation Authority 2009). This is an assumption made in the report of Marsden 
Jacob Associates (2013). Environmental and health regulations may distort urban water objectives by 
either creating a financial advantage to disposal that may skew an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
recycling, or by distorting public perceptions as to the impacts of either reuse or disposal. 
Whether a local beach is open or closed on a regular basis may to inform an individual’s decision making 
and willingness to pay for investment in wastewater upgrades or other water quality improvements. When 
discussing willingness to pay for recycled water, Marsden Jacob Associates (2013) contend that the value 
of direct environmental benefits of recycling, such as avoided discharges, produce minimal benefit 
compared to other factors, arguing that the power of environmental regulators in Australia mean that 
environmental harm is unlikely. This assumption is wrong for two reasons: 1) ineffective regulation can 
allow for environmental harm; and, 2) public perception may be varied by the information made 
available. 
In relation to the first reason, the marine environmental impacts presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
show the level of damage which is permitted under national and state guidelines and laws. In the case of 
Gunnamatta, a statement from the CEO of the water authority (Bayley, 2002, p. 61), as well as the 
upgrade process itself, indicate an admission that societal standards did not match what remained a legal 
and authorised practice. The outfall itself was finally upgraded to a higher discharge standard in 2012. 
In relation to the second reason, the community’s ability to understand the true impact of wastewater 
disposal is limited by the strength of environmental and recreational water quality monitoring as well as 
the ability of the public to access and understand this information. Decisions to enter the water have been 
shown to be influenced by many different factors including the absence of warning and signage 
(Lepesteur et al. 2008). However there may be issues with this. Chapter 5 described inter-jurisdictional 
variation of the accepted level of risk, when beaches were closed and what warning signage represented. 
In Chapter 6 the monitoring program demonstrated long term water quality but not high risk scenarios.  
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Investment decisions on water and wastewater infrastructure need to take into account the economic 
benefits from water quality improvements where improvements will be made in recreation waters. 
However, where water quality improvements are marginal (e.g. in waters which are already of a good 
quality) the financial benefits of further water quality improvements would be expected to be marginal 
(Ravenscroft & Church 2011). Unnecessary closures when waters are compliant can result in net 
economic costs, however, in one study these were found to be less significant than equivalent economic 
costs where beaches remained open when non-compliant, indicating that societal preferences for the level 
of risk remain significant policy considerations (Rabinovici et al. 2004). Another study found making 
European standards more stringent would likely have a positive economic benefit, however assessments 
of costs and benefits of recreational water quality will be influenced by the types of benefits and costs that 
are included in the assessment (Georgiou & Bateman 2005).  
If recreational water illnesses are underreported (Boehm et al. 2009) they may therefore be equally 
underestimated in economic studies which rely on the accuracy of knowledge on recreational water illness 
and the extent to which exceedances of guidelines predict health outcomes in the real world. Some 
jurisdictions’ levels of recreation have been shown to increase as indicators of water quality improved 
(Vesterinen et al. 2010), whereas in other areas, perceived health risks were found to be below actual 
health risks (Machado & Mourato 2002). If experiencing recreational water illness impacts perception 
(Lepesteur et al. 2008) it may be argued significant proportions of the population may not have 
knowledge on which to judge the policy question of accepted risk. Arguably, there is a risk when 
environmental impacts of wastewater disposal are not monitored, there will be less evidence of harm, and 
therefore a skewed decision making environment. 
While beach users may have knowledge of the impacts of wastewater discharge, in the case of Chapter 6, 
it is conceivable that the majority of MW customers have not experienced the discharge by surfing or 
swimming at the site they are therefore reliant on statements of MW as to the environmental performance 
of the SEO. In Chapter 7 secondary contact recreational users are given no warning of the discharge of 
untreated effluent. For the countless smaller discharges across Australia where impacts are far less 
studied, the community’s perception on the value of avoided costs is likely to be even less informed. 
 
9.3.3.2 Procedural issues with feasibility assessment, regulatory uncertainty 
This thesis has raised a key barrier to wastewater reuse; in many areas environmental regulation is 
the primary driver for wastewater reuse in the absence of water scarcity, however, inadequacies in 
environmental regulation hide the human and environmental impacts of wastewater management from 
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wastewater reuse feasibility assessment. Inadequacies in environmental regulation produce regulatory 
uncertainty (Chapter 4) and issues of procedural transparency, and this may be an issue for wastewater 
reuse. Variation in environmental regulation may also impact the ability for externalities to be considered 
during the assessment of wastewater reuse feasibility. In Tasmania the same environmental regulations 
existed prior and post water industry reform but produced different outcomes in wastewater reuse 
feasibility assessment. This serves as a good demonstration of the problems which may be encountered 
under voluntary water quality guidelines, which is a theme which emerges throughout the thesis.  
Another area of environmental management which may interact with wastewater reuse, which Chapter 4 
addresses, is comparing environmental regulations using traditional licence fees to load based licensing.  
LBL charges more based on quantity of certain pollutants discharged, but allows polluters to reduce 
licence fees based on agreed or real reductions in discharge of those pollutants. The findings in Chapter 4 
support those of the Institute for Sustainable Futures (2013), who found that load based fees were not a 
driver for reuse per se but would drive reduced discharge. However later chapters of this thesis build on 
this finding to argue that a solution to this may be in strengthening soft water quality regulations (in line 
with recycling and other risk). In some jurisdictions this may make disposal a simpler option than reuse. 
Chapter 4 focusses on barriers such as transparency and regulations which conceal the benefits or 
disadvantages of wastewater reuse or disposal. While Chapter 4 concludes that there is a need for a 
national cost-benefit assessment guideline for reuse, it is noted that one challenge which will need to be 
overcome to achieve this would be the alignment of inter-jurisdictional variability in the ability and desire 
for environmental regulators to factor externalities. The issue of regulatory uncertainty is returned to in 
Chapter 7, in this case looking at water quality guidelines. 
Another option to make load based fees more effective could be to provide an economic incentive for 
recycling by factoring disposal of freshwater to marine environments into load based licensing for 
WWTPs. This would provide another mechanism to account for externalities. If this reform was 
considered, the result would be to expand the scope of the externalities considered to be covered by LBL 
schemes to drive water efficiency through pollution licences. Providing a financial signal for water 
efficiency would be better than the current situation where water authorities are expected to achieve water 
conservation in times of scarcity, while simultaneously increasing profits, when they collect revenue 
partly based on the volume used.  
If decision makers truly desire to test the value of an improved recreational or environmental asset, a 
tradeable entitlement regime could be used. Market based instruments are included in Table 8.1 as a 
policy option because even a trial of these would help to economically connect the externalities of waste 
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water disposal to the real costs of disposal, thus provide a link between land and sea law, provide an 
incentive to invest in upgrades rather than other water infrastructure, and provide heightened transparency 
for feasibility assessment because the ‘price’ (and externality costs) for disposal would be revealed.  
 
9.3.4 Overview of recommendations 
This thesis sought to identify areas not currently being considered in law reform. Measurement of 
public acceptance of recycled water and willingness to pay are important parts of current research on 
barriers to wastewater reuse. This thesis presented a range of evidence from case studies and reviews of 
legislation, policies and practice to argue that recreational water quality and other environmental 
regulation does not accurately portray environmental impacts. Inconsistent monitoring efforts or 
inconsistent communication of environmental externalities may result in a lack of data (or misleading 
data) on which both decision makers and the public can make these decisions. Key recommendations for 
reform include; 1) the development of guidelines for assessing costs and benefits of wastewater reuse, 2) 
investment in methods which strengthen non-binding and often aspirational guidelines, 3) provision of 
economic incentives for wastewater reuse where it is imposed on water corporations to meet societal 
goals which clash with requirements to operate in a commercial manner, 4) provision of funding for 
recreational water management including research for rapid methods and national collection of 
recreational water data reported in a consistent method, 5) better signage and reporting requirements for 
planned untreated wastewater discharges in Tasmania, 6) and inclusion of secondary contact recreation 
into Tasmanian guidelines.  
 
9.4 Comments for ongoing policy development 
9.4.1 Public perception of recycled water 
This thesis discusses management practices which affect environmental impacts of wastewater 
discharge and therefore may impact public perception of the value of wastewater reuse. With respect to 
public perception of recycled water, the significance of public perception of recycled water for drinking 
as a barrier for wastewater reuse for drinking water is well documented (Hurlimann & Dolnicar 2010). 
However, without intending to dispute other authors on this topic, it is undeniable that historically societal 
preferences were not fatal to other large infrastructure projects for which State governments are 
proponents. For example, large scale reverse osmosis desalination in Australian cities was justified in a 
time of drought. By comparison wastewater recycling must now be justified economically on a case by 
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case basis. Further, the decision to adopt large scale desalination in all Australian mainland cities and 
subsequent steadfast patronage of desalination by Australian State governments, water corporations and 
departments has ongoing consequences; firstly, desalination filled much of the gap between demand for 
water and supply in the capital cities, the cost of these projects increased water bills and therefore there is 
more focus on the financial aspects of recycling and other projects (Whiteoak et al. 2012).  
Lessons have been learnt from the failed wastewater drinking water reuse scheme in Toowoomba 
Queensland. By comparison, in Perth the Water Corporation took the approach of commencing the 
process of investigating groundwater replenishment using recycled water in the Groundwater 
Replenishment Trial Project, an open process involving research and public consultation commencing in 
January 2007 with trial recharge not commencing until November 2010 (Water Corporation 2012). 
Furthermore, the successfully incepted potable water reuse scheme in Singapore used a longer period of 
media attention compared to a sudden peak in interest seen in Toowoomba (Ching 2010). 
Although discourse on the public perception of recycled water has identified the ‘yuck factor’ as a key 
barrier to wastewater reuse, this thesis argues that another public perception barrier may be the perception 
of environmental and other externalities of the existing practice of wastewater disposal to water. If this 
public perception does not match reality then assessment of the societal and other benefits of wastewater 
reuse may be inaccurate. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 described some of the processes and issues encountered in 
determining whether to reuse or dispose wastewater. In particular, difficulties with using ‘willingness to 
pay’ as an indicator of reuse feasibility included large variation in extent externalities are communicated, 
lack of data of recreational water quality, and aspirational language used for environmental regulation, as 
described in Chapter 5. Further, in Chapters 3, 6 and 7 most of the risk or environmental impacts 
described were allowed under flexible environmental guidelines and management regimes. Caution is 
therefore required when economic studies make assumptions on environmental or social performance 
based on compliance with environmental legislation. 
A further comment is that when estimating public perceptions and demand, small groups such as not-for-
profits may have an unequal voice in the community due to ability to access media, however these groups 
may be unequally impacted by the externalities of wastewater disposal compared to other parts of society.  
  
9.4.2 General comments for policy development 
Existing ecological economic discourse on the externalities of wastewater disposal argues values 
may be undervalued in traditional cost benefit analysis, and these findings on deficiencies in recreational 
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water management add another layer to that hypothesis. Arguably, the reforms to improve recreational 
water monitoring and communication (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) may increase public awareness of 
negative impacts, or lack of negative impacts, which could impact willingness to pay for recycled water 
and also ensure the external costs of wastewater disposal are felt by the parties profiting from urban water 
and sewage not elsewhere.  
It is the regulator or policy maker’s role to decide the level to which water utilities should invest in 
dealing with market failures in the Australian water sector (including health and environmental 
externalities). The water utilities role is to meet these expectations at the lowest cost (Productivity 
Commission 2011). That said, most Australian jurisdictions have made little progress towards bringing 
environmental regulation forward into a modern market based approach. Alternatives to direct regulation 
include pricing through a load based licence (as in NSW) or allowing trading (Blackwell & Iacovino 
2009, Frontier Economics 2011). Providing a financial signal not to pollute would appear to align more 
closely to the Productivity Commission’s statement as to the role of the regulator and the utility. Under 
such an approach increasing or decreasing the loads of specific pollutants has direct financial 
consequences decided by environmental regulators prior to and away from the competing priorities which 
can be present when investment decisions are made.  
These financial signals contrast determining the costs or benefits of wastewater disposal by considering 
them as part of a decision on willingness to pay by customers who are not privy to the full information 
and therefore cannot make an informed choice or valuation. Where water scarcity is not a driver for 
wastewater reuse but governments seek higher targets for water recycling it may be necessary to subsidise 
this use to achieve the policy, or to make water efficiency an external impact considered within the load 
based licensing scheme as discussed above.  
The current focus on high valued recycled water schemes has allowed either inadequately treated water to 
degrade environments, and in other cases where supply far exceeds demand very high quality recycled 
water is disposed (such as the Eastern Treatment Plant in Melbourne, the South East Queensland Western 
Corridor Recycled Water Project and others as highlighted by Whiteoak et al. (2012)). In situations of low 
demand (or perhaps more accurately, low demand for expensive water) there appears to be a 
philosophical barrier to wastewater reuse; where supplying the water at a loss is a better result for the 
public than disposing it at either a poor quality which degrades the environment or a very high quality 
which arguably wastes energy and money. The current predicament of recycled wastewater reflects the 
artificial construct that is the Australian water industry; where profits or losses are determined by 
examining the financial impacts within segmented organisations which in reality seek the same purpose as 
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the whole of government, that is, to provide services to the public in the most efficient manner with no 
harm.  
To use Victoria as an example, desalination was pushed through from a government level above the 
planning of the water managers and planners. By comparison (with the exception of several large scale 
projects) recycling projects are carried out by water authorities or local governments. As a result it is not 
allowed to operate at a whole of government level; the polluter pays principle and issues with polluted 
recreation areas are not harnessed adequately so as to provide economic or social incentives to promote 
recycling. In addition, assessing recycling at the level of some smaller water management regions means 
assessment of feasibility for individual projects may ignore potential efficiencies across larger regions. 
 
9.5 Limitations and future research 
As a review of legislation and management this study has identified weaknesses in regulation and 
institutional processes and areas for reform. It provides in depth examination on one aspect of the 
potential environmental impacts of wastewater management, recreational water, as well as identifying 
areas for reform in the specific jurisdictions of the case studies.  
Despite this, the thesis does not explore economic regulation of the water and sewerage industry. For 
example, a question for study within the economic discipline would be how to factor variation in 
environmental standards into decision making on wastewater reuse schemes? The economic impacts of 
health impacts of wastewater disposal, increased recycling and other options are unknown, although there 
is a developing body of work in this area referred to throughout this thesis. This thesis raises numerous 
questions which would be suitable for future research; for example; 1) what would the economic and 
social benefits be if recreational water quality and management was to improve so that there were fewer 
errors; and 2) how does this compare to the costs of increased effort and research to provide this lower 
level of risk?  
With respect to the weaknesses in recreational water management identified in this thesis, an underlying 
question remains; if more information was available describing the impact of wastewater on 
environmental and social values would this alter community perception or alter decision making 
frameworks in favour of reuse and protection of waters? Some research in this area is discussed in this 
thesis however, the question is still undecided as to how and when information on water quality alters 
behaviour. Such a question would need to be the study of further research. The intention of the thesis was 
to find evidence in support or otherwise of the hypothesis, and in doing so the thesis has identified areas 
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for reform and future study. Further, if application of water quality guidelines in a location is below the 
national standard, this does not necessarily mean there will be negative impacts which outweigh the costs 
of additional infrastructure. 
This thesis described recreational water quality guidelines and extrapolated this to describe the extent of 
understanding the impacts of marine pollution on humans; conditions for monitoring may be included in 
individual discharge licences and these would impact this outcome. As each WWTP holds an individual 
licence this was beyond the scope of this thesis, but may be appropriate for further study. 
Although streamlining legislation may appear ideal, study is required to understand the outcomes on 
decision making of informal processes such as when decisions are made on individual wastewater 
discharge permits or reuse schemes. In particular research could examine whether the current case-by-
case approach produces the most efficient and accurate outcomes, whether the burden of assessing every 
application creates costs for society which compare to the benefits that are gained over having a single 
limit applied to all areas and contained in legislation. 
Actual knowledge on what the human health implications are for a given body of recreational water in 
Australia will often be unknown, and therefore a limitation of this thesis is the assumption that accepting 
a lower standard of risk than that recommended in NHMRC 2008 guidelines will have negative impacts. 
This is unknown, although it could be argued that the lack of study in this area further highlights 
inadequacies already discussed in this thesis. It is still necessary to state that by examining legislation, 
guidelines and practice this thesis only identifies areas that are deficient, and suggests that the effect of 
these be studied as areas of future research. On the other hand, where the reforms in this chapter apply to 
consistency of standards, this is one purpose of federal water policy, and therefore the results and 
proposed reforms remain valuable regardless of not being able to test the precise impact.  
Chapter 6 does not consider the impact of media interpretation on the statements made, nor does it claim 
to verify the truth of the reported assertions of recreational water illness. It was intended to provide this 
information as part of the collection of information to inform and tell the story of the case study, rather 
than to conduct social science methods on a very small sample size of newspaper reports. In addition 
future research could apply media analysis and other methodologies to study whether the amount of news 
coverage is of significance and through the analysis of all statements made by the water authority to allow 
analysis of how the media modifies information provided by the water authority. Actual community 
perception of risk could be the subject of further study, in accordance with suggestions of Lepesteur et al. 
(2006). A key theme of such research could be the intention and impact of water industry and regulators 
statements on environmental risk, as well as the accuracy and scientific basis for these. Reports of 
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recreational illness in newspapers are only evidence that a report was made only and not the truth of the 
assertion. There are often financial or practical difficulties for decision makers wishing to collect actual 
evidence of disease burden through an epidemiological study.  
 
9.6 Conclusion 
Even where disposal is discouraged in guidelines and recycling is encouraged in policy, differences 
in protection of water environments through environmental regulation of wastewater disposal and 
recreational water standards mean that there are simply fewer barriers to disposal than there are for reuse. 
Therefore, strengthening environmental regulation of wastewater disposal, and making polluters pay 
through some form of pollution entitlement, would be expected to create incentives to reuse wastewater.  
In order to comprehend the financial value of clean water, decision makers need to view themselves as 
investors in the future. An investor does not assess the value of an undervalued asset based on what it 
currently represents but instead uses knowledge and imagination to see its potential. As such, investors 
determine the amount of money to invest based on the economic and social return the asset would provide 
once the improvement has been made. In this way of thinking an investment of capital into a degraded 
building on the edge of a city is viewed for the building's potential to be apartments or offices or 
parkland; the investor takes the profit of the difference between their investment and the value of the 
improved asset and society benefits through an improved city. With respect to wastewater, citizens are 
denied valuable community amenity and recreational assets because financial assessments of the costs to 
society of disposing wastewater are made based on the current degraded conditions. In this way, the 
degraded nature of the environment prevents use, and therefore there are fewer incentives to repair it, 
even though we are financially and technically capable of doing so. Money which would have been 
available is then diverted off through dividends to pay for other priorities of government owners. The 
weak environmental regulations have undervalued the future potential of the environmental asset and the 
investment made in not polluting it was not matched with its potential value as a clean waterway. Rather 
than assessing willingness to pay based on current environmental performance, this requires an 
understanding the current and potential uses of an area, such as the money that improved recreation would 
bring to the area in order to compare the likely increase in value with the amount of money required for 
the infrastructure upgrade. Even were the market value of potential uses for disposal environments falls 
below the cost of an upgrade, non-market values from conservation of marine ecosystems or cultural 
heritage (e.g. surfing and surf lifesaving etc.) may tip the scales in favour of an upgrade.  
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APPENDIX 1  
1.1  Newspaper articles collected for Chapter 6 search    
Table A.1: Details of articles collected for public debate section of Chapter 6 including whether health, environment or specific incidents 
were mentioned and Melbourne Water statement as recorded by newspaper source. 
Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
AAP 
Australian 
National 
News 
Wire 
(2006a) 
Vic: Libs would 
close Gunnamatta 
Beach sewage 
outfall 
Infections 
from surfing 
mentioned 
No N/a No No 
AAP 
Australian 
National 
News 
Wire 
(2006b) 
Vic: Greens want 
more water 
savings 
No No N/a Greens policy 
mentioning 
closure of 
outfalls. 
No 
AAP 
Australian 
National 
News 
Wire 
(2006c) 
Vic: Vic govt 
announces $300 
million water 
recycle plan 
No No N/a No No 
ABC 
Premium 
News 
(2005a) 
Libs promise end 
to sewage outfall 
No No N/a Liberal 
statement 
describing 
moves to 
recycle 
wastewater. 
No 
ABC 
Premium 
Protesters rally 
against 
No No N/A No  No 
215 
 
 
 
Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
News 
(2005b) 
Gunnamatta 
Beach sewage 
outfall 
ABC 
Premium 
News 
(2006) 
Melbourne Water 
rejects water 
wasting reports 
No No N/a Water wastage No 
Baker 
(2001a) 
$170m push for 
sewerage clean-
up 
Yes No ‘Mr Bayley said the plan would also 
include a massive reduction in 
ammonia levels in effluent and a 
review of the need to extend the ocean 
outfall pipeline near Gunnamatta 
Beach. 
 
He said the upgrading would make the 
effluent being discharged from the 
plant among the highest quality in the 
world and allow the recycled water to 
be used for a greater range of 
agricultural purposes.’ 
 
‘[“]We've got to be honest about what 
we can achieve," Mr Bayley said. 
"Ocean discharge is a fact of life 
around the world, but that doesn't mean 
we don't work hard to minimise the 
effect on the environment. But I don't 
see the technology, the means or the 
market to completely recycle 
everything at this stage[“]’ 
Yes No 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
Baker 
(2001b) 
Surfie 'brothers' 
challenge 
Thwaites 
Surfrider 
president; 
‘surfers were 
constantly 
reporting ear, 
eye and 
throat 
infections 
after being in 
the water’ 
No N/a No Surfrider President; ‘He 
said condoms, tampons, 
cotton buds and balls of 
animal fat were often 
found on the beach or 
in the water.’ 
Baker 
(2002) 
Gunnamatta 
sewage pipe to 
stay 
N/a – 
discusses 
panel 
findings 
No N/a No No 
Black 
(2002) 
Recycling is 
smarter 
No No N/a Waste of water 
resource 
No 
Catherine 
(2007) 
Vic: Garden hose 
revival as tap 
turns on recycled 
water 
No No N/a Recycled 
water use 
protects 
Gunnamatta 
beach 
No 
Clifton-
Evans 
(2012) 
Surfers' bad break 
GUNNAMATTA 
CALLS TO 
CLEAN UP 
OUTFALL PIPE 
Yes  Septicaemia 
requiring 
hospitalisation 
‘[“]’No untreated sewage has spilt from 
the plant into the ocean,'' she said, ``and 
we release treated effluent into the 
ocean . . . under a strict EPA Victoria 
licence[“]’ 
No No 
Cutcliffe 
(2007) 
Just another 
Gunnamatta 
N/a – 
editorial on 
desalination 
N/a N/a N/a No 
Dowling 
& Weekes 
(2006) 
We'll close sick 
beach outfall, 
vow Liberals 
Yes ‘…Jeff Lim, 48, of 
St Andrews Beach, 
contracted viral 
meningitis and a 
‘Melbourne Water, which treats 
Melbourne's sewage, also tests for 
bacteria on the shoreline near the 
outfall at Boags Rocks, which is 
No No 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
kidney infection 
within a week of 
surfing at 
Gunnamatta. He 
was bedridden for 
eight weeks and 
took a year to 
recover.’ 
Brian Archibald, 47, 
of Mount Eliza, said 
he was in hospital 
for five weeks with 
viral meningitis and 
brachial neuritis and 
forced to take six 
months off work.  
Melissa Mackie, 30, 
of Mount Martha, 
said she contracted 
severe tonsillitis 
within 30 minutes 
of swimming at 
Gunnamatta. "I was 
bedridden for a 
week with vomiting, 
headaches and 
dizziness,” she said. 
Luke Beerling, 24, 
of Tootgarook, 
spent five days in 
intensive care, after 
being diagnosed 
with viral 
pneumonia.’ 
between St Andrews Beach and 
Gunnamatta Beach. It points to 
research that shows the outfall has no 
health risks for humans.’ 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
Duncan 
(2006) 
Vic: Libs to close 
sewage outfalls 
Yes, 
‘Gunnamatta 
has long been 
the subject of 
protests by 
environmenta
lists and 
surfers, who 
claim 
infections 
from surfing 
in the tainted 
water are 
common.’ 
Refers to a different 
newspaper article 
which references 
EPA data; 
‘enterococci at 45 
times the EPA's 
acceptable level. 
   Eighteen of 85 
tests at the site since 
2000 delivered 
bacteria readings’ 
N/a Yes Quoting David Davis – 
‘You could see the 
plume, the diatom, 
spreading for 
kilometres out to sea 
and down along the 
coast.  
   At Rye back beach, 
three or four kilometres 
from the Gunnamatta 
outfall, you could see a 
bathtub ring of brown 
along the high tide 
mark.’ 
Fyfe 
(2002a) 
Peninsula sewer 
plan under fire 
Surfing 
Victoria 
threatens to 
boycott 
beach due to 
children 
contracting 
sore throats 
and ear 
infections 
No EPA arguing for outfall extension. 
Melbourne Water arguing for improved 
effluent quality instead.  
Yes EPA Chairman says 
shoreline outfall no 
longer acceptable.  
Resident concerns 
extending outfall will 
extend where effluent 
ends up. 
Clean Ocean 
Foundation concerned 
‘the EPA's decision is 
an "out of sight, out of 
mind" solution that will 
simply relocate the 
pollution and affect 
marine life’. 
Fyfe 
(2002b) 
Surfers may catch 
more than just 
waves as sewage 
levels soar 
 Director of Surfing 
Victoria; “Parents 
have complained 
that their children 
have picked up sore 
‘Melbourne Water's research and 
technology manager, Peter Scott, said 
yesterday the water was of good 
Yes ‘With an onshore wind, 
the tournament director 
remembers seeing 
"huge plumes of 
brown" floating into the 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
throats and ear 
infections there. 
‘Surfing Victoria's 
head Max Wells 
said yesterday: 
"We've been 
running our events 
at Gunnamatta for 
years but at this 
stage we are really 
feeling there is a 
chance we are 
endangering the 
lives of our 
competitors." 
Mr Wells was 
concerned that 
Surfing Victoria 
could be legally 
responsible if a 
child became 
seriously ill.[”]’ 
quality. It fell within EPA guidelines 
and there was "a very low risk”. 
The only way to get to the bottom of 
surfers' complaints would be a major 
health study, and this would be too 
difficult and too costly, he said.’ 
 
contest area. "You 
could see the stuff and 
you could smell it. It 
was unbelievable," Mr 
Clarke said. 
Surfing Victoria, the 
state's main surfing 
body, yesterday 
threatened to boycott 
the Mornington 
Peninsula and scrap 
surfing competitions 
there because of the 
Gunnamatta sewage 
outfall, which releases 
370 million litres of 
treated effluent into the 
ocean each day.’ 
 
Fyfe 
(2004) 
Surfers ban 
Water Minister 
No No N/a Clean Ocean 
Foundation 
describing 
Water Minister 
as a polluter. 
No 
Fyfe 
(2010) 
Confusion on 
what's the matter 
at Gunnamatta 
Yes Impetigo infection. ‘… the monitoring results from the 
Gunnamatta outfall… consistently 
showed the water quality was "good" to 
"very good". The statement said a 2001 
Monash University report had found no 
increased risk of illness for surfers or 
swimmers at Gunnamatta.’ 
No No 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
Fyfe and 
Morton 
(2005) 
Pollution 
endangers surfers 
No warning about 
contamination 
Yes -  Clean 
Ocean 
Foundation 
comment on 
Melbourne 
Water test 
results 
No ‘But Melbourne Water said the results 
could be aberrant, as only a thin strip of 
water appeared to be contaminated, 
with cleaner water either side. 
 
"We've never had results as dramatic as 
this before. We went back to the 
laboratory and questioned it, but they 
could not throw any light on it," said 
Peter Scott, a Melbourne Water general 
manager. The water authority said the 
tests were part of its voluntary program 
to build up a history of water quality 
data near the outfall. The tests were not 
a warning system and the time to get 
results back - a few days - made it too 
late to warn surfers. 
 
Only 2 per cent of 3600 tests conducted 
over five years were above the safe 
limit, Mr Scott said. 
 
The EPA, which normally issues safety 
reports about beaches, said warning 
people about Gunnamatta was an issue 
for the Health Department. The 
authority would not take action against 
Melbourne Water unless results were 
consistently over the limit across a 
year.’ 
 
Yes Ammonia levels and 
impact of intertidal reef, 
whether short or long 
outfall. 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
The EPA and Melbourne Water insist 
that surfing and swimming near the 
pipe - which carries half of Melbourne's 
treated effluent - is safe. But surfers 
regularly complain of ear, gastric and 
eye infections.’ 
Geelong 
Advertiser 
(2006) 
Libs plan to shut 
beach sewer pipe 
Refers to 
claims from 
surfers of 
infections. 
No N/a No  No 
Guerrera 
(2004) 
MP urges Bracks 
to tackle 
Gunnamatta 
waste worry 
Clean Ocean 
Foundation 
President 
mentions 
surfer illness 
No ‘Melbourne Water yesterday defended 
its discharge practices, saying it met all 
EPA licence requirements.’ 
Yes Wasted resource 
(Water) 
Hagan 
(2006) 
Foul slick blamed 
on ocean outfall 
Yes No ‘A spokesman for Melbourne Water, 
Ben Pratt, said there was no indication 
the water conditions were connected 
with its sewage outfall. Preliminary 
results of testing by the Environment 
Protection Authority on Wednesday 
found the discolouration and odour was 
due to a high presence of microscopic 
algae. EPA senior science manager, 
Tony Robinson, said it was similar to 
an incident last month. 
 
"At this stage there is no evidence to 
suggest the material is harmful or poses 
a threat to marine life," Mr Robinson 
said.[“]’ 
Yes ‘Smelly brown water’ 
at Gunnamatta and 
nearby beaches. 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
Herald 
Sun 
(2006) 
Libs to clean up ‘Environmen
talists and 
surfers have 
long claimed 
that 
infections 
from the 
tainted water 
are 
common.’ 
No N/a No No 
Hudson 
(2002a) 
Residents in a 
stink 
No No N/a ‘It is 
enormously 
harmful to the 
environment’ 
No 
Hudson 
(2002b) 
Sewage stink Yes No N/a No No 
Hudson 
(2005) 
Stop dumping 
sewage on 
beaches: MP 
Yes - Greg 
Hunt MP – 
‘Mr Hunt 
said sewage 
dumping was 
damaging 
kelp, aquatic 
life and 
coastal 
quality, and 
that surfers 
had reported 
viral and 
other 
infections 
from 
Gunnamatta’ 
No  Yes Greg Hunt MP – ‘Mr 
Hunt said sewage 
dumping was damaging 
kelp, aquatic life and 
coastal quality….’ 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
Hunt 
(2006) 
A whiff of a 
scandal 
Yes No N/a Yes Opinion piece refers to 
destruction of kelp beds 
and fish breeding 
habitat and permanent 
grey slick on water. 
Water recycling and 
efficiency issues. 
Hunt 
(2007) 
Decade of water 
down the drain 
No No N/a Editorial – 
Water wastage 
discussed 
No 
Kellett 
(2010) 
Gunnamatta 
sickness link 
Yes 22 respondents to 
survey report 
marine related 
illness 
‘[“]This monitoring shows that water 
quality consistently achieves good to 
very good under National Health and 
Medical Research Council 
classifications.[“]’ 
No No 
Ker 
(2008) 
Recycled water 
safe for Yarra 
No No N/a Mentions 
water 
continuing to 
flow to 
Gunnamatta. 
No 
Ker 
(2009) 
Gunnamatta 
outfall plan 
dumped 
Yes No ‘…planned upgrades to the filtration 
process at the Eastern Treatment Plant 
meant the two-kilometre extension pipe 
was no longer required. Technological 
advances meant the water could now be 
treated to such a high standard it would 
have minimal impact on the marine 
environment close to shore.’ 
Yes No 
Koutsouki
s (2004) 
Gunnamatta 
priority in push to 
end ocean 
outfalls 
Yes No  Yes Wasted resource 
(Water). 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
Koutsouki
s (2006) 
Water recycling 
under spotlight 
No No N/a 
 
 
 
 
Greg Hunt MP 
discussing 
water 
conservation 
issues and 
sewage ‘being 
dumped’. 
 
No 
Miller 
(2000) 
Peninsula sewer 
pipe spews waste 
on to beach 
Yes No ‘Melbourne Water managing director 
Brian Bayley said it was virtually 
impossible for litter to be discharged 
from the Carrum plant. He said the 
pipeline was now under continual 
surveillance. Melbourne Water was 
considering how to make access points 
along it tamper-proof.’ 
Yes ‘…a tide of used 
sanitary items, cotton 
buds and other litter 
near the Boag's Rock 
outfall…’ 
Refers to ammonia 
levels. 
Minchin 
and 
Miletic 
(2006) 
Mixed welcome 
for sewage plans 
No No N/a No No 
Morningto
n 
Peninsula 
Leader 
(2009) 
Better water in 
pipeline 
No No ‘Melbourne Water asset planning 
general manager Paul Pretto said a year 
of high-tech trials had revealed a new 
way to treat waste water to “virtually 
eliminate impacts of treated effluent 
discharged into Bass Strait, near 
Gunnamatta”. 
Mr Pretto said the upgrade would see 
Melbourne Water's Eastern Treatment 
Plant become “one of the most 
sophisticated sewage treatment 
facilities in the world by the end of 
2012[”].’ 
Yes – refers to 
eliminating 
“impacts” 
No 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
MX 
(2006) 
Water upgrade 
more than drop in 
the ocean 
No No N/a No - Mentions 
plan to cut 
outflows. 
No 
N.A. 
(2001) 
Protesters take to 
water 
Yes No N/a Yes No 
Opitz 
(2012) 
Sewage overhaul 
long overdue 
‘….ear and 
throat 
infections 
and 
gastrointestin
al illnesses.’ 
No ‘Plant manager Charmaine Quick said 
the upgrade would not only improve 
water quality to a tertiary level but also 
reduce the amount being discharged at 
Gunnamatta and increase the potential 
for using recycled water.’ Goes on to 
discuss recycling. 
No ‘Water at the 
Gunnamatta outfall is 
tinged with brown’ 
Royall 
(2002) 
Time for a clean 
break 
Yes – year 11 
student 
opinion on 
surfing at 
Gunnamatta 
No  N/a No No 
Strong 
(2004) 
$1bn plan to send 
treated water to 
Gippsland 
No  No N/a Concerns for 
recycling 
using ETP 
effluent; 
‘Another 
concern is that 
treated sewage 
contains 
pesticides and 
pharmaceutical
s, including 
antibiotics and 
estrogen from 
the 
contraceptive 
pill.’ 
No 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
The 
Sunday 
Age 
(2006)  
Something to be 
frothed up about 
down at 
Gunnamatta 
Ear 
infections, 
respiratory 
and dermal 
problems, 
viral 
meningitis 
No ‘…an upgrade of the Eastern treatment 
plant at Carrum, which processes 42 
per cent of Melbourne's sewage, is 
under review.’ 
Yes No 
Titelius 
(2000) 
Surfers shun 
filthy beach 
“Surfers and 
swimmers 
regularly 
suffer from 
sore throats, 
stinging eyes 
and nasal 
problems.” 
No ‘EPA chairman Dr Brian Robinson said 
greater efforts were needed to 
investigate re-use of effluent.’ 
 
‘[“]It should have been actioned 10 
years ago,'' he said. ``We also want to 
see immediate action on quality of 
effluent by reducing ammonia levels. 
It's time to move the agenda along . . . 
we can't avoid this any longer.[“]’ 
 
‘Melbourne Water's science and 
technology manager Peter Scott said a 
CSIRO study in 1998 showed that the 
water quality was ``good and met 
requirements''.’ 
 
‘But the study found that ammonia and 
fresh water had harmed native seagrass 
beds which had been taken over by 
hardier species.’ 
‘Mr Scott said although tests had 
shown water quality met requirements, 
he acknowledged that beach users had 
concerns. 
Yes Surfrider foundation 
says water discoloured 
and smells of ammonia. 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
 
He said Melbourne Water was 
regularly monitoring the water and 
listening to surfers' concerns.’ 
 
Titelius 
(2001) 
Surfers cry foul 
over outfalls 
Yes – ‘This 
concentrated 
release of 
semi-treated 
effluent is 
also seriously 
affecting the 
health of the 
people who 
use the 
ocean.’ 
No ‘Melbourne Water managing director 
Brian Bayley said although CSIRO 
studies had deemed the water safe for 
swimming, the authority did not 
recommend swimming near the outfall. 
He said Melbourne Water was planning 
to modify its treatment plant at Carrum 
to reduce ammonia levels.’ 
Yes – 
‘environmental 
damage’ 
‘Kilometres of coastline 
have been completely 
denuded of much of the 
original marine 
vegetation’ – Clean 
Ocean Foundation 
spokesman 
Topsfield 
(2008a) 
Libs urge action 
on ocean spill 
Greg Hunt 
MP: ‘Surfers 
still go there 
because it is 
such a great 
break, but 
they report 
numerous 
examples of 
ear infections 
which you 
simply don't 
get from 
other 
beaches.’ 
No No ‘…the 
equivalent of 
55,000 
Olympic-sized 
swimming 
pools full of 
off-colour, 
treated sewage 
is flushed into 
Bass Strait 
every year.’ 
No 
Topsfield 
(2008b) 
Opposition shows 
its colours 
No No N/a ‘55,000 
Olympic-sized 
swimming 
No 
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Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
pools of off-
colour, treated 
sewage is 
flushed into 
Bass Strait 
every year’ 
Wilmoth 
(2006a) 
A beach where 
the waves are 
truly sick 
‘gastric, ear, 
respiratory, 
skin and eye 
infections 
and, in six 
cases, viral 
meningitis’ 
Ear infections, 
another surfer 
contracted viral 
meningitis, another 
complained of an 
infected cut 
‘Melbourne Water spokesman Ben 
Pratt said that during the recent algal 
bloom, enterococci and E.coli levels 
were within EPA licence limits and 
those considered safe for recreation. 
Acting EPA chairman Bruce Dawson 
wrote to The Mornington Peninsula 
Leader last week saying EPA data 
showed enterococci levels during the 
bloom were within safe levels. 
“EPA has reviewed Melbourne Water's 
compliance with its licence during this 
time and has found that the outfall at 
Gunnamatta has operated within its 
required licence limits,” he said.  
“There is no evidence to suggest raw 
sewage has been discharged from the 
outfall[“]’ 
Yes Clean Ocean 
Foundation claims 
diatom bloom result of 
outfall as a result of 
high levels of ammonia 
and bacteria. EPA 
Victoria denies this. 
 
Wilmoth 
(2006b) 
Gunnamatta ‘very 
good’ despite 
sewage 
Yes No Promotion of NHMRC rating. 
Statement; ‘[n]o significant 
microbiological health risk to 
swimmers or surfers" at St Andrew and 
Gunnamatta beaches.’ 
No No 
Wilmoth 
(2006c) 
State silent over 
outfall 
Yes ‘Surfer Mitch Nibbs 
sustained a cut to 
his face at 
Gunnamatta in 2004 
that needed six 
 ‘…the nature of micro-organisms 
meant that samples varied day to day 
and that assessment over time more 
accurately reflected the beach 
condition, and that was why "we have 
Yes  
229 
 
 
 
Author Title Health 
mentioned? 
Specific health 
incident? 
Melbourne Water statement re 
health 
Environment 
mentioned? 
Specific 
environmental 
impact? 
months of 
antibiotics to heal. 
“There were scabby, 
pussy sores all over 
my face and neck,” 
Mr Nibbs said.’ 
adopted this approach", of not yet 
releasing the data.’ 
Wilmoth 
(2006d) 
Thwaites refuses 
early release of 
Gunnamatta 
Beach tests. 
 
Yes No ‘The general manager of research and 
technology at Melbourne Water, Peter 
Scott, said the nature of micro-
organisms meant that samples varied 
day to day and that assessment over 
time more accurately reflected the 
beach condition, and that was why "we 
have adopted this approach", of not yet 
releasing the data.’ 
 
‘A spokesman for Mr Thwaites said 
Gunnamatta was one of the most 
monitored beaches in Australia. The 
unpublished information was part of a 
long-term study, he said, and that it had 
"absolutely nothing to do" with the 
election.[“]’ 
Yes 
 
‘Mark Akester, an 
environmental scientist 
with the non-aligned 
Clean Ocean 
Foundation, said he 
believed the turbulence 
on the shoreline 
reduced the number of 
bacteria but "beyond 
the wave action there's 
a problem - and that's 
what they're failing to 
reveal.’ 
Wroe 
(2006) 
States face shame 
over water waste 
Victoria 
'squandering' 
350bn litres 
Yes No N/a Yes – Opinion 
of Greg Hunt 
MP on water 
that is not 
recycled. 
No 
230 
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APPENDIX 2 
2.1 Further information on interview methodology 
The use of interviews was authorized under Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) 
minimal risk ethics approval (H0011863) (the Ethics Approval). The original methodology proposed the 
use of a survey instrument which could also be used as a structured interview, conducted either online or 
by telephone interview, and a generic introductory email which would be used to approach to a large 
number of water related organisations in order to secure a higher number of participants.  
During the course of the research closer cooperation with several water authorities was secured through a 
Water Research Australia 2012 PhD Scholarship. Following consultation with industry contacts issues 
were identified with this method. In practice there is only a small number of individuals who are able to 
provide constructive comments on this specific topic. This is restricted to those with actual involvement 
with the facilities or the policy or guideline. Generally one relevant person was identified in each 
organization. Relevant staff to interview were often interstate or overseas which can cause further 
difficulties in ensuring the information gained is relevant. The information likely to be obtained from a 
broad survey of general staff was therefore of less utility than specific information obtained through 
interviews with key personnel. 
As a result, in 2013 an amendment was sought to this ethics approval. This included an amendment to 
allow; 1) subjects who are interviewed over the phone or skype to provide consent without having to 
return the signed information sheet, 2)  to allow organization names to be listed in publications with 
permission of individuals, and 3) to reflect that a generic recruitment process and survey was no longer be 
necessary or relevant, as participants were recruited through other methods and interview would generally 
follow the open ended questions which were previously approved under the ethics approval. 
Interviews were conducted with NJ Baykeeper, the Office of the Tasmanian Economic Regulator, Ben 
Lomond Water, NRM North, the Tasmanian Health Service and West Tamar Council. Notes of the 
interviews were typed and stored with any recordings in the office of the Chief Investigator of the 
research. Interviews were de-identified for personal details of the individuals concerned. In addition a 
series of site visits was conducted outside of this interview process in order to gather information to guide 
the development of the thesis as a whole. This included Hunter Water (NSW), Water Corporation 
(Western Australia), Western Corridor Recycled Water Scheme (Queensland), Southern California 
Coastal Water Research Project (USA), Orange County Sanitation District, and Beaconsfield Waste 
Water Recycling Facility (Tasmania).  
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The small number (6) of formal interviews were used to request crucial information, such as the 
frequency of water quality testing, when warnings may be issued, and which documents and guidelines to 
refer to. The open ended interview was necessary because of the different professional backgrounds of 
each participant. For example, the questions that may be asked of a wastewater engineer would be entirely 
irrelevant if posed to a health regulator. The thesis does not rely on direct statements from interviews as 
evidence for conclusions and the interviews were used largely to point to existing information or to obtain 
documents which are cited in the thesis. This information is factual in nature and therefore no further 
analysis, statistical or otherwise, was deemed necessary. The approach of avoiding citing individual 
opinions was justified to protect interviewees, because where interviews were conducted with one specific 
individual within an organization their identity may be identifiable through their opinion. 
Transcripts of the interviews were typed and stored along with voice recordings in the office of the Chief 
Investigator of the research. All data was stored on password protected university computers during the 
investigation. Interviews were de-identified for personal details of the individuals concerned and are 
stored in a locked cabinet in the office of the Chief Investigator, to be destroyed 5 years after the date of 
PhD approval by destroying DVDs containing electronic data and shredding any documents. 
 
2.2 General guiding questions 
The following are examples taken from the Ethics Approval (H0011863) which demonstrate the 
nature of the questions used to lead the final interview process.  
1. Do you think that most operating licences or permits in this jurisdiction require that wastewater 
discharges meet State or National water quality policies for marine or estuarine water quality? 
2. Are there factors external to your organisation which prevent or impede compliance with licence, 
permit or guideline requirements for receiving water quality?  
3. If a facility was frequently breaching a discharge licence or permit would this encourage changes 
to be made to improve the quality of treated wastewater? 
4. If the discharge licence or permit breach increased in severity would this also increase the speed 
at which these changes came into effect? 
5. If recycled water customers frequently complained about the quality of recycled water would this 
encourage changes to be made to improve the quality of treated wastewater? 
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6. Which policies prohibit the use of recycled or purified recycled water as a substitute for drinking 
water?  
7. Do you have an example of an Australian or international facility or jurisdiction that shows 
current best practice wastewater management?  
8. Are there any other barriers to the efficient management of wastewater? 
 
2.3 Email and information sheet 
2.3.1 Email: 
Dear ________, 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Please find the attached information sheet which 
contains important information relating to the ethics approval for this research. We will consider your 
receipt of this email and participation in the interview as evidence of your consent to these conditions. 
 
Please note that you are consenting to us using your organisation’s name in future publications but not 
your name, position and personal details. If you wish to participate the interview but do not consent to us 
using your organisation’s name you may notify us of this in writing by responding to this email. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to assist in this valuable research. 
 
2.3.2 Information sheet: 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
SOCIAL SCIENCE/ HUMANITITES 
RESEARCH 
 
 
 
238 
 
What are the cross jurisdictional barriers to the efficient and effective recycling and reuse of wastewater, 
currently not being considered in Australian law reform?  
 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a study examining the appropriateness of Australian water quality 
standards. The study is being conducted by Simon Perraton of the National Centre for Marine 
Conservation and Resource Sustainability as part of a PhD under supervision of Dr Boyd Blackwell, Dr 
Troy Gaston and Professor Gary Meyers. 
 
1. ‘What is the purpose of this study?’ 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether it is possible to identify and remove any policy or 
regulatory barriers to wastewater recycling in Australia. This stage of the study aims to identify any 
policy or regulatory barriers that may exist in the area of wastewater management in Australia. 
 
2. ‘Why have I been invited to participate in this study?’ 
We are seeking participants who are involved in wastewater or environmental management roles. Eligible 
participants should be involved in the water management industry and your insight into decision making 
and management of wastewater resources in accordance with National, State and local guidelines and 
standards. 
 
3. ‘What does this study involve?’ 
Interviews are expected to take approximately 20 minutes to complete. It is important that you understand 
that your involvement is this study is voluntary. While we would be pleased to have you participate, we 
respect your right to decline. Although a complete set of answers is required to ensure the rigor of the 
analysis, if you decide to discontinue participation at any time, you may do so without providing an 
explanation. All information will be treated in a confidential manner, and your name and organisation will 
not be identified in any publication arising out of the research. All of the research will be kept in a locked 
cabinet in the office at the University of Tasmania. Data will be destroyed five years after the study is 
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completed by destroying DVDs containing electronic data and shredding hard copies of participant 
responses. 
 
4. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
If we are able to take the findings of this small study as well as the output from a broader legal review of 
wastewater management the result may be valuable information for others and it may lead to increased 
efficiency in Australian water management laws. 
 
5. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
You should be aware that we are unable to advise you whether information you disclose would be 
considered above and beyond that which you are able to disclose under the conditions of your 
employment. As participation in this study is entirely voluntary you may choose to not answer any or all 
questions, or to provide an answer at a later date. 
 
7. Will my personal details be published? 
All data emanating from this project will be coded as a means of protecting your anonymity and 
confidentiality. Your name will be removed however we will retain your organisation or department 
details. If you do not agree to us retaining your organisation details please reply to this email and inform 
us of this that you wish to participate but do not consent to this aspect. Given that the information you are 
likely to be sharing is not of a controversial or harmful nature, the risk to you is minimal. Additionally, 
you may request the opportunity to review material prior to publication and request the removal of any 
information that you feel may identify you. 
 
6. What if I have questions about this research? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to contact either Simon Perraton on 
(03) 6324-3762 or Chief Investigator Dr Troy Gaston on (02) 4349 4569. You are welcome to contact us 
at that time to discuss any issue relating to the research study. 
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7. Has the study been approved by the university? 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research Ethics Committee.  If 
you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study should contact the Executive Officer of 
the HREC (Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226-7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au.  The Executive 
Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. You will need to quote 
H11863. 
 
8. How do I inform of my willingness to participate? 
By participating in this interview you are implying consent to the conditions within this information 
sheet. Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. 
 
 
